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Abstract: The Spanish-American War marked a turning point in American history. For the first 
time in U.S. history, American soldiers were fighting overseas. After the war, the United States 
gained its first imperial territories. America’s new position in the world created a new rhetorical 
exigence that called for a redefinition of the American people and the United States itself. This 
dissertation explores this transitional moment and the foreign policy rhetoric of William 
McKinley in three separate chapters—McKinley’s rhetoric about the Spanish-American War, the 
redefinition of the American people, and redefinition of the country. Defending his decision to 
enter the war, McKinley used the ideograph of civilization, framing the war in moral terms for 
the country. By winning the war and adopting a rhetoric of civilization, McKinley socialized the 
United States into the great power club. In redefining the American people, McKinley appealed 
to the values of patriotism and unity, employing the rhetorical trope of the citizen-soldier as the 
embodiment of these two values. The citizen-soldier trope privileged white males, while women 
and minorities were downplayed in McKinley’s conception of citizenship. In redefining the 
country, McKinley employed the trope of American exceptionalism. Here, McKinley redefined 
the nation from a primarily exemplarist nation to an interventionist state. Rewriting American 
history, McKinley demonstrated how the nation had always expanded and this latest expansion 
was America’s natural progression as God’s chosen people. The dissertation concludes by 
examining McKinley’s rhetorical legacy, how he set the discursive boundaries for future 
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Chapter 1: Setting the Scene: The United States in the 1890s 
At 9:45 in the evening on February 15, 1898, a terrible explosion shook the U.S.S. Maine 
docked in Havana Harbor, Cuba. Initial reports indicated high casualties. In total, there were 266 
dead, including 2 officers.1 Survivors were unable to explain the cause of the explosion.2 In an 
effort to uncover the cause of the explosion, President William McKinley launched a special 
investigative commission. However, American newspapers wasted no time in assigning the 
blame to Spain, even though Spain’s departing Minister, Senor de Lomé, refused to believe 
Spanish forces were behind the explosion.3 Leading the charge against Spain were the New York 
Journal, owned by William Randolph Hearst, and the New York World, owned by Joseph 
Pulitzer. Hearst’s Journal ran the headline “Crisis is at Hand: Cabinet in session; Growing Belief 
in Spanish Treachery;” Pulitzer’s World ran “Destruction of the War Ship Maine was the Work 
of an Enemy,” with a subheading of “Naval Officers Think the Maine was Destroyed by a 
Spanish Mine.”4 Rhetorical scholar Elizabeth Lowry noted Hearst and Pulitzer were competing 
for the most sensational headlines of the day, with Hearst specifically believing “that a 
declaration of war would mean increased news coverage and more paper sales.”5  
The Maine crisis came on the heels of a setback in U.S.-Spanish relations. Six days 
before the sinking of the Maine, a private letter from de Lomé was published disparaging 
McKinley and Cuban autonomy. Pulitzer ran the headline “Worst Insult to the United States in 
Its History.” With the Maine explosion, McKinley could not appear weak or inactive reinforcing 
de Lomé’s criticism of him. As historian and biographer H. Wayne Morgan wrote about 
McKinley’s interpretation of the Maine and de Lomé letter: “In his heart he knew that 
intervention was but a matter of time.”6  
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In early March 1898, McKinley requested and received $50 million to be spent at his 
discretion on national defense. The bill passed without a dissenting vote. Pressure for war from 
the public and both sides of the aisle increased throughout the month. By late March, McKinley 
feared if he resisted both public and congressional pressure any longer he might destroy “his 
party and any hope of a constructive national and international program in the future.”7 After a 
month of failed diplomatic maneuvering to avoid war, by early April the president was ready to 
go to war. However, before McKinley delivered his request for a declaration of war to Congress, 
Democrat Joe Bailey rose in Congress to criticize the president. Bailey stated, “But if the 
President of the United States wants two days, or if he wants two hours, to continue negotiations 
with the butchers of Spain, we are not ready to give him one moment longer for that purpose.”8 
McKinley was irate with the hawkish Congress and their demands placed upon him. Some 
congressmen visited the president after Bailey’s speech. Rather than being greeted by 
McKinley’s typical genial personality, they were met with a rare show of wrath from the 
president. His faith in the people of America had wavered in their clamor for war. He told his 
personal secretary George Cortelyou, “The country should understand that we are striving to 
make our course consistent not alone for today, but for all time. The people must not be 
unreasonable.”9 McKinley finally sent his “War Address” to Congress on April 11. The United 
States officially declared war on Spain on April 25, 1898. With this declaration, McKinley 
would send American soldiers to fight on foreign soil for the first time in American history.  
Before American soldiers landed in Cuba, the U.S. Navy launched a surprise naval attack 
in the Philippines, destroying the Spanish fleet anchored in Manilla Bay, on the Philippine Island 
of Luzon. Admiral George Dewey’s surprise victory over the Spanish fleet in Manilla occurred 
on May 1, 1898, with Dewey’s fleet destroying seven ships and suffering only light casualties.10 
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American forces in Cuba did not have as easy a time as Dewey in the Philippines. Years of 
neglect and penny-pinching, along with keeping only a small standing army, left the United 
States undermanned and lacking basic supplies. Added to their trouble was a small general staff 
to organize, train, and equip over 200,000 volunteers. American forces were disorganized, with 
plans to invade Cuba delayed from early May until June 26, when American forces finally 
landed. After some initial difficulties, and the continued problem of disease, American forces 
were too much for the Spanish. By the end of summer, U.S. troops were victorious, defeating 
Spanish forces in the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico. By early August, Spain requested a 
peace conference to end hostilities.  
Even with the backdrop of American military blunders, few in Congress doubted 
America’s eventual victory. By midsummer, while the fighting was still taking place, many in 
Washington turned their attention to the post-war settlement and America’s future position in the 
world. Tennessee Senator E.W. Carmack, in a speech to his colleagues in June 1898, quoted a 
Washington Post editorial. Carmack read the following into Congressional record, “Ambition, 
interest, land-hunger, pride, the mere joy of fighting, whatever it may be we are animated by a 
new sensation. We are face to face with a strange destiny. The path of empire opens, and we 
must tread wherever it leads, whatever the sacrifice or peril. The taste of Empire is in the mouth 
of the people even as the taste of blood in the jungle.”11 Carmack described an historic change in 
American history. At the conclusion of the peace conference, the United States gained full 
control over Puerto Rico and the Philippines. In Cuba, the United States did not exert direct 
imperial control but was responsible for Cuba’s development. The United States had become an 
imperial power, drastically altering its traditional foreign policy stance of non-interventionism. 
Such a dramatic shift in policy presented a new rhetorical challenge. McKinley needed to 
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convince the American people to support multiple military engagements beyond the North 
American continent, while simultaneously inserting America into global economic affairs in 
China and elsewhere. In the process, he redefined citizenship and the country to better align with 
America’s new role in the world. 
Despite numerous biographies and histories of McKinley and his presidency in other 
fields, there has been a dearth of scholarship on McKinley in rhetorical studies. To be sure, 
McKinley has garnered some attention. For instance, William Harpine wrote a careful analysis of 
the 1896 election between McKinley and William Jennings Bryan, tracking the different 
approaches taken by the candidates in an election that was vigorously followed in America with 
an 80 percent voter turnout.12 Harpine also analyzed McKinley’s rhetoric in a chapter in Martin 
Medhurst’s Before the Rhetorical Presidency, examining the rhetorical evolution of McKinley 
from his “Inaugural Address” to his final speech in Buffalo.13 In addition, Robert Ivie examined 
a single McKinley speech given in support of American imperialism at the Trans-Mississippi 
Exposition in Omaha, Nebraska, on October 12, 1898.14  Despite these and a few other fine 
works, there seems to be a clear imbalance between the important discursive work McKinley did 
at the turn of the twentieth century and rhetorical criticism of that work.15 This dissertation 
project is an effort to remedy this imbalance. 
When studying presidents and presidential rhetoric, it is important to remember that 
presidents are historical actors. As political scientist Stephen Skowronek remarked, “Their words 
and deeds will transform the contexts in which they act, but they must act by their own lights 
within the context given.”16 Skowronek continued, “a president comes to power at a particular 
moment in the course of national events, and vindication turns on the prospect for securing 
meaning of that moment on the president’s own terms.”17 These critical transitional moments in 
5 
 
American history give presidents the opportunity to rearticulate and reshape America through 
their discourse, but not every president has this opportunity. I contend the uniqueness of 
McKinley’s historical context provided him with a transitional moment to reshape and redefine 
the U.S. and its foreign policy. The rhetorical exigence faced by McKinley presented three 
unique questions that are the focus of this dissertation. First, given U.S. involvement in wars on 
foreign soil was an alteration to American tradition, how did McKinley justify this change? 
Second, such a massive change in foreign policy required a reimaging of U.S. citizenship to fit 
with America’s new role in the world, how did McKinley transform and reimagine citizenship? 
Third, the change in American foreign policy also required McKinley to redefine America’s role 
in the world. How did McKinley redefine the country?  
In answering these questions, I argue McKinley served as an important transitionary 
president, bridging the nineteenth and twentieth centuries during an important transition in the 
nation’s history. His rhetoric represented the evolution of the nation from a major regional power 
to a great international power, adapting to the changing domestic and international contexts. To 
justify the Spanish-American War, McKinley employed the ideograph of civilization with the 
key modifiers of humanity, duty, and progress. In his justification, McKinley argued civilization 
imposed certain moral duties on the United States. Moreover, as a civilized state, the U.S. was 
responsible for upholding these duties in the international system. America’s involvement abroad 
demanded new responsibilities from its citizens as well. To cope with these changes, McKinley 
used the constitutive power of presidential rhetoric to redefine Americans. McKinley’s 
conception of citizenship prioritized patriotism and unity, specifically a unity overcoming 
regional divisions. Supporting his redefinition of citizenship, McKinley used the rhetorical trope 
of the citizen-soldier as an idealized version of his redefined American. With America’s 
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increased role in the world, the country itself needed to be redefined. McKinley refocused 
American exceptionalism from an exemplarist interpretation of America’s international role to 
an interventionist understanding. Together, these three ideas worked together to help McKinley 
transition the nation from concentrating primarily on domestic concerns to a more active role in 
the world. 
In order to make this overall argument, the remainder of the introduction lays the 
theoretical and methodological groundwork underpinning my study and provides a snapshot of 
America in 1896. First, I overview presidential rhetoric, grounding my study in the past 
scholarship of the field and highlighting some of the key findings that guide my analysis. 
Second, I present my underlying methodological assumptions supporting my research. 
Specifically, I employ a close textual analysis, emphasizing the importance of context in 
understanding a text. Third, I provide a snapshot of the United States in 1896, exploring the 
political, economic, and racial tensions on the domestic front, as well as setting the scene 
globally and locating America’s place in it. I conclude by previewing the arguments in 
subsequent chapters. 
Presidential Rhetoric: A Review 
 Studying presidential rhetoric has been part of communication departments since the 
early 1920s. Martin Medhurst, in his historical review of presidential rhetoric, noted its humble 
beginnings with only four journal articles appearing in the Quarterly Journal of Speech 
throughout the 1920s.18 The field expanded from only studying three presidents—Abraham 
Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin D. Roosevelt—to include James Madison, Theodore 
Roosevelt, John Q. Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and Harry Truman in the following two decades 
after 1945. During this period, scholars primarily employed a historical-rhetorical approach 
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composed of background context, an examination of ideas, speech composition, and delivery. 
When Edwin Black published Rhetorical Criticism in 1965, a change occurred in the field. 
History was out, and criticism was in. Multiple methods replaced the historical method as the 
primary way to examine presidential rhetoric.19 Yet, the field remained undefined until the mid-
1980s, when books by Kathleen Jamieson and Roderick Hart were published, along with 
Theodore Windt Jr.’s article defining the field. 
 In his 1986 article, “Presidential Rhetoric: Definition of a Field of Study,” Windt argued 
presidents have three main avenues of power available to them: constitutional, political, and 
power over public opinion (rhetorical). It is this last power that Windt focused on, examining 
how presidents used rhetoric to persuade the public, that is of interest to my study. Windt defined 
the field of presidential rhetoric, stating, it “is concerned with the study of presidential public 
persuasion as it affects the ability of a President to exercise the powers of the office.”20 
According to Windt, studies should include an analysis and understanding of the target 
constituencies a president addressed and should be placed in the overall context of the 
administration to understand how rhetoric influenced that administration. Concluding his 
argument, Windt remarked, rhetoric was only one of the powers available to the president, but 
“in a democracy it may well be the fundamental power upon which all others rest.”21 The 
remainder of Windt’s article focused on four categories of research (single speeches, movement 
studies, genre studies, and miscellaneous research) and looked toward the future of the field. 
 Since Windt’s definition of the field of presidential rhetoric, rhetorical scholars have 
continued to examine and shape the field of presidential rhetoric. The rest of this section looks at 
some of the broader concepts concerned with the role of presidential rhetoric, including the role 
of rhetoric in the presidency, presidential leadership, and the rhetorical presidency, as well as key 
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ideas related to my study. The two key concepts I explore are the president’s constitutive 
function in creating the American people and the role definition plays in the president’s ability to 
define the nation, issues, and political reality. 
 The same year Windt published his article defining the field of presidential rhetoric, 
David Zarefsky published his book length treatment of Lyndon Johnson’s rhetoric on the war on 
poverty. Opening his argument, Zarefsky acknowledged the significance of the presidency, 
observing, “Any such analysis must begin with the realization that in modern American society 
the presidency is the primary source of symbols about public issues.”22 The president’s task, 
according to Zarefsky, “is to understand the situation and tap the national character in order to 
give expression to previously latent thoughts that would serve to unify and inspire people.”23 As 
one of the most prominent speakers in American politics, presidents have acquired the rhetorical 
power to shape the public’s view of an issue or situation. President’s select symbols to define the 
situation or issue, giving them considerable power to shape public perception. These symbols 
become powerful rhetorical tools for the president to draw on in their discourse. As Denise 
Bostdorff stated, “Because of the symbolic nature of our political world, the issues that 
presidents discuss are not objective, independent entities, but linguistic constructions.”24 Thus, 
everything from cities to oil fields to weapons exist materially, but the meaning of these symbols 
rests in the language used to describe them and assigned to them by powerful political actors. 
This role is assumed by the president in the U.S. It is in this sense that Vanessa Beasley 
described one of the rhetorical roles of the president as “teaching reality.”25 It is through 
language and giving voice to issues and symbols, imbued with meaning, that presidents shape 
political reality and gain both rhetorical and political power.  
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 With an increase in both the number and type of speeches presidents deliver, there is little 
doubt rhetoric offers presidents the opportunity to appear presidential, leading the nation through 
a difficult crisis or toward a major national goal. In Leroy Dorsey’s introduction to the 
Presidency and Rhetorical Leadership, he defined rhetorical leadership, stating, “rhetorical 
leadership could be defined as the process of discovering, articulating, and sharing the available 
means of influence in order to motivate human agents in a particular situation.”26 Simply, as 
Dorsey surmised, “to lead requires an ability to be rhetorical.”27 Zarefsky, in the same volume, 
went further, outlining recurrent themes in presidential leadership. Presidential leadership, 
according to Zarefsky, meant rising above the minimal requirements of the Constitution and 
bringing about transformative change. Key to such transformation is employing and discovering 
all the available means of persuasion in a given case to effect the change. Any rhetorician should 
recognize this last point as Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric.28 Furthermore, in Zarefsky’s review 
of presidential rhetoric since the founding, he observed presidents have always needed more 
power than granted to them by the Constitution to be successful leaders. To fill this gap between 
prescribed powers and desired power, presidents have used rhetoric work toward transformative 
change. There are two key strategies presidents have employed to enhance their power: 
conventional and innovative rhetoric. 
Conventional rhetoric refers to rhetorical occasions when presidents can transform 
existing rhetorical practices or traditions, increasing their power. Inaugural addresses, State of 
the Union messages, and acceptance speeches fall into this first category. Innovative rhetoric 
occurs in instances where presidents expand their power either explicitly or through claiming 
significant new powers that are rhetorical in nature.29 Presidents do this by claiming an electoral 
mandate, “going public” by appealing to citizens for support on an issue, reconstructing history, 
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or issuing foreign policy. Both conventional and innovate rhetorical strategies have been used to 
exhibit presidential leadership, demonstrating how presidents have expanded their power through 
discourse. Because of this the presidency, for Zarefsky, has always been rhetorical, beginning 
with Washington and continuing to the present day.30 
 Before moving on to specific findings about presidential rhetoric, I would be remiss if I 
did not mention the rhetorical presidency. Around the same time Windt, Zarefsky, and others 
were defining the field, studying the presidency as an institution was gaining prominence in 
political science. In 1987, Jeffery Tulis wrote The Rhetorical Presidency, building off a 1981 co-
authored article, “The Rise of the Rhetorical Presidency.”31 In that work, Tulis explained that 
presidents use rhetoric to appeal directly to the citizens in a bid to go over the heads of Congress 
to secure mass support of legislative initiatives.32 Tulis did not render judgment on the rhetorical 
presidency as being good or bad; rather, he focused on rhetoric as a tool to analyze changes in 
the institution of the presidency. For Tulis, unlike Zarefsky, rhetoric only became worthy of 
study after the rise of the mass media. It was at this moment Tulis believed rhetoric became a 
force in shaping the presidency. According to Tulis, the first era began with the Founders and 
ended with Theodore Roosevelt. These presidents, Tulis noted, “proscribed the rhetorical 
presidency as ardently as we prescribe it.”33 Simply, rhetoric was not a primary part of the 
president’s job. The second era began with Woodrow Wilson and continued to the present day. 
While Tulis’ concern was on the institution of the presidency, his work has influenced the field 
of presidential rhetoric. 
In The Prospect of Presidential Rhetoric, Henry Abbott and his colleagues wrote that 
there is a distinction between presidential rhetoric and the rhetorical presidency. Scholars 
focused on the presidency as an institution usually reside in political science departments. They 
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focus primarily on how rhetoric has changed and influenced the presidency. Typically, rhetoric is 
a secondary concern to the institutional changes of the presidency. Alternatively, scholars of 
presidential rhetoric work in communication departments, investigating how discourse was used 
to persuade a given audience on a given occasion.34 However, there is a third option. Some 
scholars have attempted to bridge the gap, focusing on both rhetoric and how it has transformed 
the institution of the presidency. Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Jamieson’s book Deeds 
Done in Words, according to them, “is about presidential rhetoric.” However, it also looked “at 
the presidency as it has emerged through the rhetorical practices of our presidents.”35 Mary 
Stuckey also combined the two areas of study. In her examination of Theodore Roosevelt’s 
Brownsville speech, she claimed, “while presidential rhetoric had always mattered, under 
Roosevelt it began to assume an institutionalized primacy that it had lacked previously.”36  
My study is firmly based in presidential rhetoric, exploring how William McKinley’s 
discourse persuaded his audiences in a particular context, giving primacy to McKinley’s rhetoric. 
This does not mean there were no lessons to be taken away from my study about the presidency 
as an institution, but these were of secondary importance and only appear in my conclusion. This 
study draws from the rich scholarship of presidential rhetoric, utilizing some of its key findings 
as the groundwork for its findings. The remainder of this section digs deeper into some of the 
key findings presidential rhetorical scholars have uncovered. 
 Rhetorical scholars have made significant and diverse contributions to the scholarship on 
presidential rhetoric, examining presidential war rhetoric,37 foreign crisis rhetoric,38 the 
comforter-in-chief,39 and studies on specific presidents,40 among many other topics.41 However, I 
focus here on two concepts relevant to this study: the constitutive function of presidential 
rhetoric and the president’s use of definition. 
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 In her research on American national identity, Mary Stuckey observed the diversity of 
identities Americans possess. She stated of Americans’ complexity, “Americans at any given 
time have different sets of identities…variously composed of their experiences of national and 
international history, race(s), class, gender, region, sexuality, and life history.”42 American 
presidents articulate national identity striving to reduce these complex identities to a simple, 
singular American identity. Their rhetoric is intended to give life to “the idea of an American 
people to the American people.”43 Simply, American presidents construct an American identity 
discursively, creating the American people through constitutive rhetoric. Otherwise, individuals 
would merely exist in the United States, not as the American people, but as singular entities. 
Group identity as the people is a rhetorical construction. As Maurice Charland observed, “the 
people” do not “exist in nature, but only within a discursively constituted history.”44 Further still, 
Michael McGee argued, ‘the people’ “are conjured into objective reality, remain so long as the 
rhetoric which defined them has force, and in the end wilt away, becoming once again merely a 
collection of individuals.”45 Therefore, presidents need to give multiple speeches, enacting 
presidential leadership, and continually renewing and reminding Americans who they are. By 
enacting this constitutive role, presidents become the “symbolic guardians of national unity in 
the United States.”46 Citizens see the president as a representative of all Americans, whether they 
voted for him or not. The president should embody, and reflect rhetorically, the shared beliefs of 
the nation and the people he constituted. Because each president is different and faces different 
external exigencies, each president has some ability to rhetorically reshape and redefine the 
American people and the nation. As Campbell and Jamieson observed, presidents can persuade 
citizens to see themselves and the country in ways that are compatible with their views on 
government and the world.47 Presidents do this by appealing to the shared beliefs of the nation. 
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 In her work on presidential rhetoric, Vanessa Beasley stated, presidents “incorporate into 
their discourse the cultural logics and beliefs—doxa—that are assumed to be somehow shared by 
‘the people,’ a rhetorical creation though they maybe.”48 In studying presidential rhetoric, 
scholars uncover what the American people valued in an era, as well as how presidents 
discursively reshaped the American people to align with their administration’s values and goals. 
Through the stories, myths, and arguments presidents make to the American people, rhetorical 
scholars shed light on the presidency or presidencies under study. In these rhetorical narratives, 
presidents highlight the shared beliefs Americans hold in common and the governing priorities of 
the administration. By emphasizing the shared myths and narratives Americans have in common, 
presidents reestablish and reinforce the shared bonds between citizens. A set of shared beliefs, an 
American Creed, acts as the bond between citizens. Swedish Nobel-laureate Gunnar Myrdal 
wrote of the American Creed, stating, “Americans of all national origins, classes, regions, creeds, 
and colors, have something in common: a social ethos, a political creed. It is difficult to avoid the 
judgment that this ‘American Creed’ is the cement in the structure of this great and disparate 
nation.”49 Unlike other nations, America’s diversity since its inception was unique. Accordingly, 
U.S. presidents promoted a national identity that could accommodate diversity. Thus, according 
to Beasley, “U.S. presidents have also repeatedly stated in their speeches that American national 
identity is based on certain shared beliefs. And they have just as regularly promised that anyone 
who holds these beliefs is fit to be an American.”50 Presidential rhetoric gives voice to these 
shared beliefs. Without the president acting as the “symbolic guardian of national unity,” the 




 Integral to any president’s ability to create the people and garner support for his policies 
is the role definition plays in presidential rhetoric. Reality is perceived differently for each 
person, with the world and its shared meaning being constructed through rhetoric. Zarefsky 
demonstrated this point, arguing, “The referents of any given situation are not clear and univocal; 
rather, they are constituted by the participants in an interaction.”51 Americans from pundits to 
other political actors to everyday citizens shape and give meaning to their environment by 
naming situations around them. However, as demonstrated earlier, it is the president, with his 
rhetorical presence and stature in the nation, who has the most influence in shaping political 
reality. Simply, as Zarefsky stated, presidential rhetoric “defines political reality.”52 By naming a 
situation, presidents provide a “basis for understanding it and determining the appropriate 
response.”53 A president could define a situation as a war or a crisis or a non-event. Even the 
mere fact a president chose to speak about a particular situation or issue increased the salience of 
the subject. By raising the salience of an issue and defining it, presidents “can serve a long-term 
educative function, raising public consciousness about a particular issue or starting conversations 
that, over the long term, affect a variety of specific policies.”54 
Furthermore, as Zarefsky observed, to choose one definition over the others is, in 
essence, “to plead a cause, as if one were advancing a claim and offering support for it.”55 The 
definition chosen by the president has implications for “what counts as data for or against a 
proposal, highlights certain elements of the situation for use in arguments and obscures others, 
influences whether people will notice the situation and how they will handle it, describes causes 
and identifies remedies, and invites moral judgments about circumstances or individuals.”56 
Combined with the president’s ability to constitute the American people, the president can define 
the American people and the nation. Telling them who they are, giving salience to certain 
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qualities over others, and suggesting how they should act in relation to the political reality the 
president described. Therefore, the president’s power to define the situation and the people is one 
of the most powerful rhetorical tools he has at his disposal. 
Rhetorical History and Close Textual Analysis: Tools to Uncover 
To explore McKinley’s rhetoric, I plan on conducting a rhetorical history using a close 
textual analysis method. Thus, my approach is informed by scholarly discussion of both 
rhetorical history and close textual analysis. These threads share a concern with the role of 
context, both its influence on the text and its proper place in rhetorical analysis. I begin by 
discussing rhetorical history before moving to close textual analysis. 
The rhetorical historian is in a special position to give an interpretation of the past based 
on his or her understanding of the symbolic system rhetors used at the time. According to Moya 
Ann Ball, rhetorical history “is a rhetorical perspective for investigating historical happenings, 
and it is a recognition that historical happenings come about most often because of and through 
rhetorical discourse.”57 The rhetorical historian looks at “how messages are created and used by 
people to influence and relate to one another.”58 From this perspective, history is viewed as a set 
of rhetorical problems and situations calling for rhetoric. Rhetorical critics go about solving these 
problems by choosing a historical lens, studying “how, and how well, people invented and 
deployed messages in response to a situation.”59 Rather than merely reconstructing the past, the 
rhetorical critic “makes informed judgments about the communication of the past, intertwining 
rhetoric, history, and criticism in the process.”60 Rhetorical historians recognize discourse as a 
“force in its own right,” promoting or displacing relations within and among people.61 Key terms 
and definitions were often open to interpretation and re-interpretation by different groups who 
sought to create a new understanding of history or a term for their benefit. Thus, the rhetorical 
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critic requires skill in deciphering what values, attitudes, and beliefs were imbued in the 
metaphors, myths, narratives and other language choices of rhetors. The role of the critic is to 
investigate language through the prism of history, but what does rhetorical history offer my or 
any other rhetorical project? 
According to Kathleen Turner, rhetorical history offers “an understanding of rhetoric as a 
process rather than as simply a product; it creates and appreciation of both the commonalities 
among and the distinctiveness of rhetorical situations and responses.”62 “Doing rhetorical 
history” allows the critic to consider “what persuasive discourse means within its historical 
context.”63 To understand this situation and context, critics must understand the rhetorical 
climate of the era. A rhetorical history provides an understanding of “the context through 
messages that reflect and construct that context.”64 Rhetorical history is key to understanding 
why certain choices and messages were employed, why certain symbols and messages resonated, 
and what roads were not taken. Rhetorical historians use archival research to illuminate the 
rhetorical climate of the era by suggesting “how people defined the situation, what led them to 
seek to justify themselves or to persuade others, what storehouse of social knowledge they drew 
upon for their premises, what themes and styles they produced in their messages, how their 
processes of identification and confrontation succeeded or failed.”65 Rhetorical history is key to 
understanding why certain choices and messages were employed, why certain symbols and 
message resonated, and what roads were not taken. Rhetorical history provides rhetoricians a 
tool to study the text in context and, thus, discovering how they mutually influenced each other. 
Rhetorical histories offer a fuller understanding of how past generations communicated and a 
better understanding of the world we live in. 
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The social construction of the present does not exist without some understanding of the 
past or how society has reached its current point. The process of going back to the past is always 
necessary to better understand the present. As Zarefsky observed, “If the task sometimes seems 
difficult in the face of a fragmented public, weakened political parties, difficult issues, an 
accelerating news cycle, and the other characteristics of modern politics, it is worth reexamining 
earlier presidencies—not only to appreciate them more and see whence we came from, but to 
realize striking similarities and recurrent patterns of rhetorical invention.”66 Even if no new 
documentary evidence was found and technology provided scholars with no new tools to study 
the past, the “continual reshaping of our own minds by the events and social processes of our 
own times would make us ask new questions and discard earlier interpretations as inadequate if 
not false.”67 A rhetorical history of McKinley’s rhetoric offers a better understanding of how 
America became a major player on the international scene. 
To better understand my texts of interest, I perform a close textual analysis of 
McKinley’s speeches. Barry Brummett explained there is no clear distinction between reading 
and close reading, but a close reading “is a mindful, disciplined reading of an object with a view 
to deeper understanding of its meaning.”68 One of the ways a rhetorician can read a text closely 
is by cultivating a strong understanding of the text’s context and then reading the text through the 
context. Davis Houck and Mihaela Nocasian did exactly this in their examination of FDR’s first 
inaugural address. Houck and Nocasian analyzed archival documents to reconstruct the 1930s. 
By doing this, they were able to better grasp how the situation influenced Roosevelt’s 
construction of his first inaugural and the audience’s reception. In their cultivation of the context, 
they recognized a “symbiotic relationship between text and context.”69 Texts and contexts 
influence one another. 
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 What, then, should rhetoricians consider part of the context? Early rhetorical criticism 
primarily focused on the immediate context surrounding a speech and the audience’s reception, 
but later scholarship demonstrated the insufficiency of such limited context. James Jasinski 
strove to create the theoretical basis for expanded contexts. In a critique of Michael Leff and 
G.P. Mohrmann’s analysis of Lincoln’s speech at Cooper Union, Jasinski took issue with Leff 
and Mohrmann’s limited understanding of context that focused almost exclusively on the genre 
of a campaign speech and the reception by east coast Republicans. His major issue was the 
absence of any discussion of slavery in America and how this may have influenced Lincoln’s 
speech. Leff and Mohrmann’s focus on the purpose of ingratiation caused them to overlook how 
Lincoln relied on “the argumentative ‘locus of the existent’” throughout the text to justify 
Lincoln’s policy proposition within the larger context of slavery in the United States.70 Their 
focus on the text and immediate context—a campaign speech—caused them to overlook a 
crucial cultural context. In “Lincoln at Cooper Union: Neo-Classical Criticism Revisited,” Leff 
admitted his error and rectified it by rereading the text with an expanded context.71 While this 
admission and correction expanded Leff’s analysis, it did not clarify exactly what the larger 
context Jasinski sought would look like. 
Jasinski wanted context to play a larger role in rhetorical criticism and was perplexed by 
critics who bracket off time periods from larger societal and global contexts. 72 Besides 
expanding the scope of context, Jasinski also called for an ‘intertextual’ reading. For Jasinski, 
“context is more than a passive frame or repository of purpose;”73 rather, texts must be read in an 
intertextual matrix that places the text in “the linguistic context or ‘cultural grammar’” of the 
era.74 Better criticism comes from “an adequate textual ‘ground’ and a more detailed and 
nuanced sense of how that ground functions to enable and constrain textual practices.”75 Jasinski 
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called for rhetoricians to acquire a better understanding of the context of an era. Then, the 
rhetorician should take this knowledge and apply it to reading the text and understanding how 
audiences of that era would understand the discourse. For Leff, close textual analysis allowed for 
this expanded context and intertextual interplay. Leff reasoned the text functions in an 
intertextual network that did most of the meaning making. “The text is both a part and a whole,” 
according to Leff, “and to view it from one of these perspectives to the exclusion of the other is 
either to bracket the cultural resources that inform rhetorical production or to ignore the situated 
interest that motivate rhetorical action.”76 An expanded context is not a basic history of the era, 
but an understanding of how the social, political, and cultural contexts influenced a text and how 
the text modified these contexts.  
In my analysis, I examine both the domestic and international contexts to enhance my 
analysis. As my focus is on McKinley’s foreign policy rhetoric, my conception of context 
included the international scene, calling attention to larger international forces and trends 
occurring in the world that may have influenced McKinley’s discourse. In my first main chapter, 
for example, I explore the ideograph of civilization. I use the historical context of the nineteenth 
century to recreate how citizens of the era interpreted the term. I include a genealogy of the term 
throughout the nineteenth century in both the international and domestic spheres, examining the 
diachronic understanding of civilization. My diachronic analysis demonstrated how civilization 
functioned to divide the world into two camps, civilized and uncivilized people, leaving 
McKinley with a choice of which camp he would rhetorically place America. In the next two 
chapters, exploring McKinley’s redefinition of the America and its citizens, I focus on 
reconstructing the United States in the 1890s. In doing so, I establish how Americans viewed 
themselves and the nation. Then, by tacking back and forth between the context and McKinley’s 
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texts I analyze how McKinley used rhetoric to restructure and reshape the country and its people. 
The historical context throughout my analysis informs my understanding of this unique rhetorical 
moment in American history and how McKinley responded to it.  
America in 1896 
 On March 4, 1897, McKinley concluded his “Inaugural Address,” stating, “I congratulate 
the country upon the fraternal spirit of the people and the manifestations of good will everywhere 
so apparent.”77 However, even a cursory glance at the election of 1896 or American history in 
the early 1890s would seriously call into question McKinley’s assessment of America’s spirit of 
fraternity dwelling throughout the nation. To explore this, I want to provide a snapshot of the 
United States as the McKinley administration began. This snapshot will focus on the campaign 
and election of 1896, the economic and racial tensions of the era, and where the world and the 
United States’ place in it stood when McKinley became president. Some of these contextual 
factors will be expanded in the coming chapters, providing a more complete description of the 
era. 
The presidential campaign and election of 1896 was a highly contested race between 
McKinley and William Jennings Bryan. The contrast between the two campaigns was startling. 
Bryan toured the country, giving hundreds of stump speeches, while McKinley stayed in Ohio, 
speaking from his front porch. Bryan traversed the country giving both short and long speeches 
in towns and cities. He traveled over 18,000 miles, in an era of slow trains, delivering over 600 
speeches, sometimes up to 30 a day, with nearly 5 million people hearing him speak.78 
McKinley, who was not nearly as gifted an orator, gave about half the number of speeches as 
Bryan and, unlike Bryan, McKinley never left Ohio. Rhetorician William Harpine wrote of 
McKinley’s approach, “The genius of McKinley’s Front Porch campaign was that it did not look 
21 
 
like a campaign. The impression could not be avoided that Bryan was stumping desperately for 
votes while McKinley casually waited at home for the people to endorse him. Nothing, however, 
could have been further from the truth: McKinley’s energetic, well-organized campaign was not 
casual.”79 With each candidate vigorously campaigning for the presidency, the campaign was the 
first to resemble a modern presidential campaign. With civic participation near historic highs, 
Bryan lost the election but “received more votes than any winning presidential candidate before 
him.”80 As Harpine noted, “People cared about this election with a deep, almost unfathomable 
passion.”81 Such passion was a result of a deeply divided country. 
In his study of presidential elections from 1888 to 1988, political scientist Harvey 
Schantz noted the elections of 1892 and 1896 were two of the three most fractured elections by 
regional sectionalism. Such extreme divisions can be seen in McKinley’s regional deviations, 
winning in New England (+19.5) and the Middle Atlantic (+9) while losing the South (-16.3) and 
the Rocky Mountains (-34.1).82 In the electoral college, the South voted “solidly for Bryan, as 
did every state west of the Mississippi save Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, Oregon, and 
California.” McKinley captured those five states, along with “every state between the Mississippi 
and the Ohio rivers and all of the Northeast, plus Kentucky, West Virginia, Maryland, and 
Delaware.”83 These results indicated a politically divided nation along regional lines. Driving 
this division were economic and racial tensions. 
Citizens across the nation struggled with the transition from an agricultural to an 
industrial based economy and society, with some citizens losing their identity in the process. The 
problem was not merely one for farmers, who transitioned from small farms to larger industrial 
farms, but factory workers as well. Average industrial laborers found themselves paying more 
for products, while not seeing an increase in their wages. Many Americans saw a transfer of 
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wealth, with it moving from laborers to the producers.84 Therefore, it should be of little surprise 
that two of America’s worst and most violent labor strikes, the Pullman and Homestead strikes, 
occurred in the early 1890s. One factor driving this economic anxiety was the high protective 
tariff, the other was the gold standard. Historian H.W. Brands described the tariff as “a triumph 
for the capitalist class.”85 Brands also stated, “the agrarian West and South lined up against the 
tariff and the industrial Northeast lobbied in favor.”86 Southern and Western farmers believed the 
high protectionist tariff at home was being reciprocated abroad, keeping their food stuffs out of 
foreign markets, where farmers counted on these markets to make a profit. Whereas, the 
industrial north and east favored the high tariff to protect their burgeoning industries from 
European competition. Bryan and the Democrats ran against both the tariff and the gold standard. 
The Democrat’s platform in 1896 stated, “We are unalterably opposed to monometallism, which 
has locked fast the prosperity of an industrial people in the paralysis of hard times.”87 Again, like 
the tariff, support for bimetallism came from Southern and Western farmers, miners, and other 
laborers who would benefit from the introduction of silver into the coinage of the United 
States.88 Economic differences were just one issue that divided the nation, as racial tensions and 
discrimination increased drastically during the decade. 
As the old Southern institution of slavery died out with the defeat of the Confederacy, 
newer political and social institutions were fighting to take its place. Working for equality and 
civil rights were people like George Washington Cable and Lewis Blair. Cable, author of The 
Silent South, and Blair, author of The Prosperity of the South Dependent upon the Elevation of 
the Negro, were strong proponents for equal treatment between the races. However, many 
Southern whites, especially the lower-classes, favored separation, taking cues from leaders like 
Alabama governor Thomas Jones. Speaking to conservative Democrats, Jones stated, “The 
23 
 
Negro race is under us; he is in our power…We are his custodians.”89 The least Jones, and other 
Southerners could do, was extend basic civil rights and decent treatment to black Americans. 
Yet, the economic downturn in 1893 and regional tensions over economic issues exacerbated 
many white’s racist attitudes, as competition between low-wage white and black factory workers 
increased. Lower-class whites found it harder to extend such basic rights; rather, they sought 
confirmation of their racist ideology through enforced legal segregation. In 1896, the Supreme 
Court decided the case of Plessy v. Ferguson. With the Court’s decision, the phrase “separate, 
but equal” was introduced into America’s lexicon. With this decision, the era of Jim Crow 
dominated the South, creating legal segregation between the races and doing untold harm to race 
relations in the country for decades. Of course, the North was not necessarily a paradise for 
blacks, as Northern racism and segregation was subtler and less explicit.  
Additionally, between 1870 and 1910, over twenty million foreigners emigrated to the 
United States, with more than 5 million Europeans alone entering the country in the 1880s, and 
not all of them from Western or Northern Europe, but some from the poorer areas of Eastern and 
Southern Europe.90 These new immigrants came from countries generally considered inferior by 
Anglo-Saxons, both in Europe and the United States. Whereas immigrants from Germany and 
England were welcome, Latin and Slavic immigrants joined the lower classes of the United 
States. America had always been known for its’ ability to assimilate people into the national 
fabric, as Oliver Wendell Holmes declared, “We are the Romans of the modern world, -the great 
assimilating people,” but racial and economic tensions threatened to rend the national fabric 
apart.91  
Domestically, the nation was divided, but as McKinley gazed outward, he saw something 
different. The world was united under the control of a few European nations and Japan, which 
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were all understood as great powers. The term great power has a difficult and elusive genealogy; 
however, historian Hamish Scott observed, the term great power entered the political lexicon in 
the third quarter of the eighteenth century to describe the emerging five great powers of 
Europe.92 Great powers are states maintaining comparable military strength, with little 
distinction between them and no power greater than them. A key caveat is that economic 
influence by itself cannot qualify a state to be a full-fledged great power because economic 
power alone cannot repel a military invasion. Therefore, the United States, by definition, was not 
a great power until after the Spanish-American War, when it had strengthened its military and 
was recognized by the other great powers as one.93  
What made these powers great? To begin, scientific thinking and understanding was 
applied to military affairs throughout Western states. The rise of the general staff, with its new 
command structure, offered greater flexibility and a more systematic approach to warfare. 
Inventions, like French officer Claude-Étienne Minié’s rifle, increased the infantryman’s rate of 
fire, accuracy, and velocity allowing for mass conscription of armies with easy to use powerful 
weapons.94 Western military technological developments helped these powers dominate and 
control the large swaths of territory. The world of 1896, according to historian David Healey, 
“was still a world of empires, and the British Empire was still incomparably the largest and most 
imposing. All of the great powers, however, had colonial possessions and were ambitious for 
more; in all the world the United States now seemed the most important exception to the 
prevalence of national land-hunger.”95 In Asia, Britain dominated India, Burma, Siam, and parts 
of China, where major coastal ports were falling under control of Germany, Russia, and France, 
who also had colonies in Indo-China.  
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With most of the world controlled and dominated by a few powerful, technologically 
advanced nations, it was also quickly becoming more interconnected. With the rise of the 
locomotive and the dominance of the steamship, the transfer of materials and people was quicker 
than ever before. As an example, because of the railroad, transportation cost of goods was 
reduced in the United States from 1800 to 1880 by a factor between 30 and 70.96 The effects of 
coal on the transformation of the world cannot be overstated. Historian Jürgen Osterhammel 
explained, “Coal gets steam engines moving, and steam engines drive spindles and pumps on 
ships and railroads. The fossil fuel age that dawned in the first third of the nineteenth century not 
only made possible the production of goods on an unprecedented scale but also greatly boosted 
the formation of networks, speed, national integration, and imperial control.”97 It was not only 
people and goods that moved faster, but messages and information as well. The telegraph 
allowed for the free flow of information to stream across the world, allowing for a more efficient 
distribution of goods. By 1903 over 400,000 kilometres of telegraph wire connected the world 
with major hubs resting in large Western cities.98 Same day communication meant manufacturers 
and markets could respond quicker sending oversupply in one region to an undersupplied region 
maximizing profits. The groundwork of an interconnected global economy was laid with every 
foot of rail and wire, but was the United States ready to compete in it? 
The United States McKinley took over was an emerging economic powerhouse but 
militarily weak compared to its European brethren. Over the century, American wheat 
production increased by 256 percent, corn by 222 percent, refined sugar by 460 percent and coal 
by 800 percent.99 The nation had slowly been increasing its proportion of world trade, rising 
from 8.8 percent of total world trade in 1880 to 9.7 percent by 1890, and it would see a further 
increase to 10.2 percent in 1900.100 Not only was American trade increasing, it also erased any 
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trade imbalance. American imports in 1860 amounted to $354 million, while exports were $316 
million, creating a trade imbalance. This imbalance lasted until 1874 when exports surpassed 
imports for every year except 1875, 1888, and 1913, a trend lasting until 1971 when a downward 
trend occurred.101  
Yet, unlike European powers, a rapidly expanding economy was not matched with an 
equal build up in America’s military forces. When war threatened between the United States and 
Chile in 1891, a dreadful realization set in upon president Benjamin Harrison: America’s fleet 
was weaker than Chile’s.102 Enter U.S. naval officer and historian Alfred Thayer Mahan. In an 
1890 Atlantic Monthly article, Mahan stated, “Whether they will or no, Americans must now 
begin to look outward. The growing production of the country demands it.”103 Mahan saw the 
need for expanding into foreign markets as necessary for continued economic success, but 
moving into foreign markets also increased the possibility of war. The competition for foreign 
markets created more instability and possibility for conflict. A strong navy, in Mahan’s view, 
was needed to protect vital economic markets abroad.104 In his seminal work, The Influence of 
Sea Power on History, he argued that “whoever is master of the seas is master of the 
situation.”105 Mahan’s work found a ready audience in Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot 
Lodge, and though neither were in the Senate in 1890, Mahan’s argument was persuasive. 
Congress, after great debate and strong reluctance, approved the building of three new 
battleships, the Oregon, Indiana, and Massachusetts; and a fourth, the Iowa¸ two years later.106 
By 1896, the U.S. Navy was reaching the levels of other European powers, but the army was 
anemic.  The American military could barely compete with middle-sized European countries like 
Serbia or Bulgaria, let alone the powerhouses of Great Britain, Russia, or Germany in 1897.107 
But the United States did not need its army up to that point in its history.  While European 
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nations raced each other to colonize Africa and Southeast Asia, the United States “made little 
effort to conquer territory in the Western Hemisphere, much less outside it.”108 But questions 
surrounding the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands and the worsening situation in Cuba raised 
the issue of just how prepared the United States was if it needed to use its military. 
Chapter Previews 
Going out into the world, Americans brought with them their unique blend of optimism 
and moralism. In his study of the United States, Martin Lipset found Americans “are among the 
most optimistic people.”109 This optimism was not only directed towards American citizens; it 
extended outward to all humans. In Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville found in the 
United States a general feeling that all humans were “endowed with an indefinite faculty for 
improvement.”110 Each person possessed the latent potential to improve the self and the world. 
Along with their optimism, Americans brought with them a strong sense of morality, of right and 
wrong, good or evil. Unlike European traditions, where churches were closely tied to non-
democratic institutions and hierarchies in agrarian societies, the United States had a close 
intermingling between politics and religion. Being a good democratic citizen also meant being a 
good and virtuous citizen. Lipset described Americans as “utopian moralists who press hard to 
institutionalize virtue, to destroy evil people, and eliminate wicked institutions and practices.”111 
As the United States began its turn toward the world, Americans, with their optimism and 
moralism, saw a world waiting to be improved through U.S. action. The following is an outline 
of the rest of this dissertation, examining how the United States began to transition into that 
waiting world. 
Chapter 2 explores McKinley’s use of civilization as an ideograph, focusing on how 
civilization was used as a warrant for the Spanish-American War. Justifying the United States’ 
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intervention in Cuba, McKinley appealed to civilization, as both a legal concept and ideology to 
uphold. By waging a form of barbaric warfare against the Cuban people, the Spanish had broken 
the principle of civilization, permitting the United States to intervene militarily. The Spanish had 
failed to protect American citizens and property on the islands, providing further proof of 
Spain’s failure. McKinley further described the situation in Cuba as one of anarchy and chaos, 
the antithesis to civilization’s orderly, organized, and scientific idealization of civil society. Of 
particular interest, was McKinley’s conception of duty, and how when employed in his rhetoric it 
mandated the United States to act in the world, upholding the principles of civilization. 
McKinley’s other key terms, humanity and progress, were critical in garnering support for his 
policies. Humanity appealed to Americans’ moral sensibilities, making the war a moral crusade 
to relieve the oppressed peoples in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. Progress embodied 
the tenets of the civilizing mission, spreading American values around the world. It also served 
as a reminder to Americans to push U.S. society forward, avoiding the regression of once great 
societies, like China. 
Chapter 3 explores McKinley’s redefinition of American citizenship. Going out into the 
world required a new conception of citizenship. Citizens needed to be aware of and support the 
United States’ new position in the world. Focusing on two speaking tours of the Midwest in 
October 1898 and 1899, I explore how McKinley reimagined the U.S. citizen through the 
rhetorical trope of the citizen-soldier. The citizen-soldier became the idealized American. The 
citizen-soldier was a male, who sacrificed for his country in a time of crisis, but then when the 
war was over went back to his peaceful civilian life. He exhibited the traits of an ideal 
republican, being politically aware, fulfilling his duty to the country, sacrificing for the common 
good, and preserving his personal liberty and freedom. Employing the citizen-soldier trope, 
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McKinley proclaimed an era of patriotism and unity, ending the threat sectionalism posed to U.S. 
foreign policy. The nation could not fight overseas, while being divided at home. McKinley used 
the public memory of the Civil War, emphasizing the divided state of the nation, and replaced 
this memory with the new memory of unity, of a truly United States, in the Spanish-American 
War. While McKinley defined male citizenship through the citizen-soldier, McKinley did little to 
reimagine women’s role in society. Rather, employing the trope of republican motherhood, 
McKinley stated women were to remain in the private sphere of the home, raising their children 
to be good citizens. The home was to be the hearth of liberty, a concept important to McKinley’s 
rationale for redefining the nation, but never explicitly connected in his discourse. 
To successfully orient the public to support a new U.S. foreign policy, McKinley also 
needed to redefine the nation. Chapter 4 follows America’s rhetorical transformation from 
exemplarist power to an interventionist nation by 1900, with McKinley sending troops to China 
without Congressional authority. McKinley started his presidency, like all of his predecessors, 
following Washington’s “Farewell Address” adage of remaining free of entangling alliances. 
However, four short years later, McKinley was telling Americans the world was changing, and 
isolation was no longer possible. The United States had a duty to act in the world. A few key 
rhetorical texts shed light on this transformation, including passages from McKinley’s post-war 
tours of the Midwest, his “Fourth Annual Message,” and his final speech at the Pan-American 
Expo in Buffalo. Throughout his rhetoric, McKinley championed interventionism, while he 
maintained the U.S. needed to stay true to its liberal values. The United States was protected by 
God and needed to maintain liberty at home, but McKinley also aligned the United States’ 
history of expansion across the continent as a natural outgrowth of its’ destiny. Therefore, 
American expansion overseas was a continuation of past U.S. policy. McKinley defined U.S. 
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expansion in economic terms, preferring more overseas markets for U.S. goods, not more 
territory. McKinley’s foreign policy, according to historian Thomas McCormick, can be 
summarized as open doors, not closed, political and economic domination, instead of military, 
and an informal empire, rather than large scale colonialism.112  
 The conclusion serves to bring these three rhetorical moves together, demonstrating how 
McKinley’s rhetoric transitioned the nation and adapted to the changes occurring at home and 
abroad. McKinley’s use of the term civilization and humanity emphasized the morality of 
interventionism by arguing the U.S. should be a positive force for change in the world. The 
oppressed nations of the world could look to the United States not merely as a beacon of hope, 
but as a possible liberator and protector against illiberal threats. The moralism of civilization and 
humanity also factored into America’s more active role in the world and its belief in American 
exceptionalism. America would not fall prey to the dangers of imperialism, which were so 
rampant during the era, because the U.S. was uniquely different from all other nations. Such 
beliefs continued after McKinley in his successor’s rhetoric and actions in Latin America and 
Asia. This more active role would not be possible without the support of the American people. 
McKinley’s utilization of the citizen-soldier trope helped Americans think of themselves as a 
united people and protectors of the Republic. Together with America’s expanded role, the 
American Republic now stretched beyond its territorial borders. Americans now envisioned 
themselves as defenders of America’s ideals at home and overseas. All of these changes helped 
the country transition into the role of a great power. I also argue McKinley’s rhetoric set the 
discursive boundaries for his successors and his expanded rhetorical role changed his place in the 
rhetorical presidency. I conclude by emphasizing the need for rhetoricians to pay attention to 
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critical transitional moments in the country, as they offer presidents opportunities to reshape and 
redefine the country. 
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Chapter 2 The Ideograph: Moralizing the Spanish-American War 
The United States declared war against Spain on April 25, 1898. Four short months later, 
on August 12, the United States and Spain signed an armistice ending the military phase of the 
Spanish-American War. The quick victory with relatively little bloodshed prompted Secretary of 
State John Hay to comment, “It has been a splendid little war, begun with the highest motives, 
carried on with magnificent intelligence and spirit, favored by that Fortune which loves the 
brave.”1 The importance of the Spanish-American War in United States history cannot be 
overstated. In 1902, future president Woodrow Wilson recognized its importance writing in The 
Atlantic, “No war ever transformed us quite as the war with Spain transformed us.” In explaining 
America’s transformation, Wilson added, “The nation that was one hundred and twenty-five 
years in the making has now stepped forth into the open arena of the world.”2 The great powers 
of Europe recognized America’s victory, along with its strong economy, as fulfilling the 
necessary characteristics to be a great power, as outlined in the introduction. By the end of the 
fighting, the United States controlled Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and Manilla. Stipulations in the 
armistice mandated that Spain evacuate any remaining forces in Cuba immediately and cede 
Spanish territories in the West Indies and Puerto Rico to the United States. However, the fate of 
the Philippines was not mentioned and remained in question heading into peace negotiations.  
 The Filipino people were in revolt against their Spanish colonizers when the Spanish-
American War broke out. With orders from Washington, Admiral George Dewey steamed the 
Pacific squadron to Manilla, engaging and destroying the Spanish fleet anchored there. American 
forces quickly seized the capital city of Manilla on the main Filipino island of Luzon. However, 
the scant American forces did not have the strength to expand their influence beyond the city. 
Filipino rebels, for their part, did not know what to make of the Americans, who helped drive out 
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the Spanish but gave little indication of what America’s role would be after the war.3 Many 
Americans, especially those in the McKinley administration, wondered what to do with the 
islands. Should the United States annex all or none of the islands or just the island of Luzon? 
What about the Filipinos who hoped the United States would enable their independence? Were 
Americans conquerors and imperialists or liberators? These questions, and many more, weighed 
heavily on American president William McKinley. 
 Delegates from America and Spain opened peace negotiations on October 1, 1898, in 
Paris. There were two main issues to be solved at the Conference: the Philippines and Cuba. 
Spanish officials proposed to solve the Philippine problem first, before negotiating over Cuba, by 
requesting the evacuation of American forces from the islands. The American delegation sought 
to delay any negotiations over the Philippines because McKinley had not formulated America’s 
official policy yet.4 The United States’ delegation dashed Spanish hopes of dealing with the 
Philippines first and focused on the Cuban issue instead to buy McKinley time. Secretary of 
State John Hay informed McKinley that the British, who feared a German takeover of the 
islands, hoped the Americans would take the entire archipelago. Leading Republicans Henry 
Cabot Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt pushed McKinley to accept a “large policy” of American 
territorial expansion. McKinley, meanwhile, had mixed feelings about retaining some or all of 
the archipelago. At the beginning of his term McKinley described his hopes to Carl Schurz: “Ah, 
you may be sure that there will be no jingo nonsense under my administration,”5 referring to 
Lodge, Roosevelt, and Alfred Thayer Mahan’s large policy of American expansion. As a Civil 
War veteran, McKinley knew all too well the “genuine horror of bloodshed.”6 Additionally, the 
prospect of a prolonged military engagement fighting the Filipinos did not appeal to McKinley’s 
Christian roots. However, these same Christian roots could not allow McKinley to just abandon 
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the Philippines. He firmly believed the Filipinos were incapable of self-government, even as a 
U.S. protectorate. America had a moral duty to look after the Filipinos. From a political 
perspective, anything short of full annexation might invite invasion by Germany or another 
power, and returning the islands back to Spain would make America the laughing stock of the 
world. Domestically, McKinley undertook a speaking tour of the Midwest during October, 
taking the pulse of the nation as he went. McKinley returned convinced “the American people 
would not accept it if we did not obtain some advantage from our great victories in Manilla.”7 
McKinley was resolved to take decisive action, but the question remained how much of the 
Philippines would America seek? And, what would be its role on the island? 
 Being a resolute pious and religious man, McKinley got down on his knees and prayed to 
God for guidance. The story, as McKinley first told it to a group of Methodist ministers and then 
relayed to General James Rustling in an interview for The Christian Advocate in 1903, begins 
with an undecided President pacing the floor of the White House and praying to God night after 
night. “And one night late it came to me this way—I don't know how it was, but it came,” 
McKinley recounted.8 He analyzed his options as such: “(1) That we could not give them back to 
Spain-that would be cowardly and dishonorable; (2) That we could not turn them over to France 
or Germany, our commercial rivals in the Orient-that would be bad business and discreditable; 
(3) That we could not leave them to themselves-they were unfit for self-government, and they 
would soon have anarchy and misrule worse then Spain's was.”9 Having dismissed these three 
previous options as untenable and undesirable, he arrived at his decision. McKinley concluded 
“that there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and 
uplift and civilize and Christianize them and by God's grace do the very best we could by them, 
as our fellow men for whom Christ also died.”10 McKinley reminisced that he then got a sound 
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night’s sleep, awoke the next morning, and instructed his chief engineer of the War Department 
“to put the Philippines on the map of the United States.” Pointing to a large map on the wall of 
his office, he exclaimed, “There they are and there they will stay while I am President!”11 
The accuracy of this account has been questioned by historians, but critical to this study 
is McKinley’s defense of keeping the Philippines, to “uplift and civilize and Christianize” them. 
Throughout multiple speeches McKinley consistently employed the ideograph of civilization as a 
defense for American foreign policy. Civilization underpinned McKinley’s foreign policy, but it 
was also transformed through the modifiers of duty, humanity, and progress. I begin this chapter 
by focusing on civilization’s genealogy, tracing two distinct paths. First, I explore its wider 
usage and evolution in European and international legal discourses. Second, I follow its 
development in American presidential discourse from Washington to Cleveland. After which, I 
provide a brief biography of William McKinley, focusing on the role of religion and duty in his 
life. I then review the rhetorical scholarship on the ideograph, before moving on to my analysis. 
In the remainder of the chapter, I argue that civilization was employed with duty and humanity 
during the Spanish-American War to persuade Americans of the moral necessity of war. These 
word groupings necessitated Americans to act on their principle beliefs, protecting civilization 
from the uncivilized Spanish. After the war, McKinley kept the same word grouping, presenting 
the moral argument that Americans had a duty to guide the Filipinos toward civilization. In his 
post-war rhetoric, McKinley also added progress to the mix. Civilization, based in the United 
States, would spread to the Philippines and eventually the entire globe. Progress and civilization 





The History of Civilization in the Nineteenth Century 
 Civilization was not a uniquely American concept. Human societies have separated 
themselves into civilized and barbarian camps since ancient times. A brief glimpse at Julius 
Caesar’s The Conquest of Gaul or Sun Tzu’s The Art of War would reveal Caesar’s commentary 
on the savage and barbarian tribes of Gaul or Chinese attacks on barbarian encampments. 
Throughout human history, powerful empires have often viewed those outside their society as 
inferior, uncivilized peoples. However, such separating into civilized and uncivilized camps has 
important rhetorical consequences.  
In The Rhetoric of Empire, David Spurr focused on a different sort of war than Caesar or 
Sun Tzu. Spurr cited the anthropological war against culture created by rhetoric. Spurr cited 
Jacques Derrida, who defined the anthropological war as “the essential confrontation that opens 
communication between peoples and cultures, even when that communication is not practiced 
under the banner of colonial or military oppression.”12 Derrida continued his critique of 
communication, specifically writing, and how it leads to a separation and rupture between 
cultures. Writing, according to Derrida, used the “violence of the letter,” which imposed by one 
culture upon the other created a violence “of difference, of classification, and of the system of 
appellation.”13 Cultural subordination “begins in the act of naming and leaving unnamed, of 
marking on an unknown territory the lines of division and uniformity, of boundary and 
continuity.”14 By employing a language of civilization, imperial powers “spread and intensified 
the power gap between core [civilized] and periphery [uncivilized], while prompting 
‘modernizing missions’ in many of the polities it encountered.”15 This rhetoric of difference 
emphasized the “notion of savage as other, the antithesis of civilized value.”16  
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Rather than pursue a rhetoric of identification, as Kenneth Burke defined it,17 
transcending the separation between civilized and uncivilized, European great powers spoke the 
rhetoric of self-idealization. Spurr described a rhetoric of self-idealization as a rhetoric 
“deployed on behalf of a collective subjectivity which idealizes itself variously in the name of 
civilization, humanity, science, progress, etc., so that the repeated affirmation of such values 
becomes in itself a means of gaining power and mastery.”18 Through communication and 
discourse, great powers continually reinforced their superiority over uncivilized peoples, not just 
technological or militarily, but culturally and rhetorically as well. By the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth century, Europe imposed the standard of civilization not just on its neighbors 
but the world. Therefore, by the time McKinley took office and the U.S. became a great power, 
he could adopt and adapt his rhetoric to fit America’s new role as a great power or face the 
possibility of exclusion by the other powers. McKinley chose to adapt his rhetoric, creating a 
uniquely American interpretation of civilization, while still maintaining the core of civilization’s 
meaning. When McKinley invoked the ideograph of civilization, he employed a term with a 
historical ideological weight. The remainder of this section performs two critical tasks. First, it 
outlines the basic principles of the standard of civilization. Second, it explores the historical 
development of civilization, highlighting its implications in world affairs. 
Political scientist Gerrit Gong identified five main principles of Europe’s standard of 
civilization: 1) civilized states guarantee the basic rights—life, dignity, and property—as well as 
freedom of travel, commerce, and religion of foreign nationals; 2) an organized political 
bureaucracy exists, running the state, and the state is capable of organizing for self-defense; 3) 
adhering to generally accepted international law, and maintaining a domestic judicial system 
with courts, codes, and published laws guaranteeing legal justice for all—foreigners and native 
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citizens; 4) international obligations of maintaining adequate avenues for diplomatic interchange 
and communication are fulfilled; and 5) civilized states by and large conform to accepted norms 
and practices of the ‘civilized’ international society—suttee, polygamy, and slavery were all 
“unacceptable practices.19 These represented the basic principles of civilized nations in the 
nineteenth century, rising to prominence after the Napoleonic Wars. 
Prior to the Treaty of Vienna in 1815, ending the Napoleonic Wars and establishing the 
standard of civilization, relations between states were ruled by natural law since the Treaty of 
Westphalia in 1648. Natural law presupposed an “all-powerful God who rules the world with 
wisdom and equity and in whose eyes all individual human actions are either meritorious or 
deserving of punishment.”20 Natural law accepted the equality of all humans under the sight of 
God, offering nations a guiding principle in how to interact with new and alien peoples. There 
was an assumed “fundamental homogeneity” between all civilizations, establishing equality 
between peoples.21 Political scientist Jennifer Mitzen described the transition after Westphalia, 
stating, “the Christian moorings of international law increasingly came undone in favor of law 
anchored by state practices.”22 Within a state, the prince’s claims to governmental supremacy 
were now recognized as supreme over rival claims by religious leaders. Internationally, treaties 
were now guaranteed and recognized “horizontally” by other states and sovereigns, without the 
need for “vertical” or higher religious authority sanction. Through the use and inclusion of 
secular language in texts, the concept of Europe, rather than Christendom, began to emerge in the 
eighteenth century.23  
In this changing landscape, the writings of Swiss legal philosopher Emmerich de Vattel 
become relevant to this transition. In his seminal work, Law of Nations, Vattel claimed states, not 
individuals, were the rights-bearing units of the European system. States were “the sole judges of 
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right and wrong and of their rights and obligations.”24 Vattel concluded, “The Law of Nations is 
the science which teaches the rights subsisting between nations or states, and the obligations 
correspondent to those rights.”25 Based on the legal writings of Vattel, and other legal minds, the 
five great powers of Europe created a standard of civilization for the international system after 
1815. The system established by a pattern of “peace at home [Europe] and war abroad, and its 
accompanying sense of ‘civilized’ at home and ‘barbaric’ abroad.”26 Waging both military and 
cultural wars, the civilized powers of Europe enacted the rhetoric of difference on the world. 
Furthermore, to solidify their standing and further impose their perspective, Europeans 
enshrined the standard of civilization in international law. The legal standard of civilization was 
a result of twin problems facing Europe: protection of European possessions and peoples 
overseas and defining who was a civilized member of society. The more practical of the two 
problems was the need to protect European life, liberty, and property in possible hostile non-
European nations. Europeans needed to figure out what rights they deemed universal for 
protecting their citizens and property overseas. The more difficult quandary was determining 
which nations deserved legal recognition, personality, and standing in international law.  
By 1846, and appearing in all editions after, legal scholar Henry Wheaton’s Elements of 
International Law defined international law as an understanding “among civilized nations,” 
dropping the pretext of “Christian nations” from previous versions.27 While legal scholar Lassa 
Francis Lawrence Oppenheim’s discussion of civilized nations and international law stated, 
“civilsed [sic] States are, with only a few exceptions, Christian States,” he noted the greatest 
importance between civilized and uncivilized nations were “agriculture, industry, and trade.”28 
As a legal concept, civilization was evolving as a secular concept, separate from Christianity. 
The term civilization was not inherently Western, European or Christian; it was simply “an 
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expression of the assumptions, tacit and explicit, used to distinguish those that belong to a 
particular society from those that do not.”29 In fact, many non-European nations had their own 
concept or standard of civilization based on their own cultural understandings. By East Asian or 
Islamic standards, Europeans for centuries were considered ‘barbarians’ or ‘infidels’ for failing 
to meet their standard of civilization.30 However, with natural law giving way to the 
secularization of international relations and the West dominating the globe politically and 
militarily, the many definitions of civilization gave way to one—Europe’s definition. Formerly 
civilized states, such as Oriental kingdoms, Islamic emirates, or African chieftaincies, were now 
excluded from the family of nations.31 For the first time in world history, “a global hierarchy of 
physical, economic and cultural power” existed.32 The world was separated into three distinct 
categories of civilization: civilized states—Europe, white settlers, and some Latin Americans; 
‘barbarous humanity’—Ottoman and Persian empires, Central Asia, China and Japan; and 
‘savage humanity’—everyone else.33 
While civilization was a secular concept, there was a holdover from Christianity, 
civilization’s civilizing mission. Civilized people had a deep desire to improve the human 
condition. Political theorist Gerrit Gong observed, “Man, the nineteenth century declared, was 
not intended to wait for knowledge and progress to be revealed. Instead, he was to discover them 
through his own efforts for the benefit of all.”34 In this desire, the civilizing mission was created. 
The mission became a moral crusade for all civilized people. According to Gong, people took to 
it “with all the self-confidence and zeal that many thought the Christian reformers were losing in 
the face of secular science’s challenge.”35 The civilizing mission can be viewed as religion’s 
shadow hiding behind the secularization of international relations. If science was going to dictate 
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who was civilized and uncivilized, then the civilized made it their mission to proselytize to as 
many uncivilized people as they could. 
From Washington to Cleveland: Civilization and the American Indian 
 While civilization started as a European concept, it had long been used in presidential 
rhetoric. McKinley was not the first president, nor the last, to employ civilization in presidential 
rhetoric. Past presidents’ use of civilization focused on civilizing American Indians. Presidents 
saw American Indians as living outside the boundaries of American civilization. Thus, these 
native peoples needed Americans to bring them the blessings of civilization. Civilization was 
used to separate American citizens from native peoples, who happened to live within United 
States territory. This section overviews previous presidential rhetoric surrounding civilization, 
exploring civilization’s rhetorical history in the United States. 
 Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the United States needed to maintain 
amicable relations with the European powers; however, its primary focus was on expanding the 
domestic frontier and dealing with American Indians. In his “Third Annual Message,” 
Washington stated, “It is sincerely to be desired that all need of coercion in future may cease and 
that an intimate intercourse may succeed, calculated to advance the happiness of the Indians and 
to attach them firmly to the United States.”36 Washington hoped to attain these peaceful relations 
through providing impartial justice, equitable commerce, and keeping the peace between all 
peoples on the continent. By providing such benefits, Washington believed permanent tranquility 
could exist between the United States and American Indians. Such an accomplishment would, 
for Washington, reflect the “undecaying luster on our national character and administer the most 
grateful consolations that virtuous minds can know.”37 From its inception, the American 
government was to administer the benefits of civilization to peoples they believed lacked the 
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basic institutions of a civilized society. By providing these benefits, the United States’ national 
character was enhanced in the eyes of the civilized world.  
 Mary Stuckey provided insight into the importance of American Indians in the rhetoric of 
early presidents. Discussing Thomas Jefferson’s rhetoric, Stuckey observed Jefferson’s rhetoric 
served as a model for future presidents in two ways. Frist, Jefferson understood cultural 
differences in terms of economics, minimizing the importance of culture. In his message to 
Congress regarding the Lewis and Clark expedition, Jefferson explained one of his primary 
missions was multiplying the number of trading houses with American Indians, with the hope it 
will lead them to “agriculture, to manufactures, and civilization.”38 By increasing contact with 
the American Indian through trade, Jefferson believed it would better prepare them to 
“participate in the benefits of our governments.”39 For Jefferson, economic activity was both a 
sign of a civilized society and a critical method for incorporating uncivilized peoples into 
civilized society. Second, this left American Indians with two options: either they could 
assimilate into American culture or they could disappear, both rhetorically and physically, from 
the American political landscape.40 Jefferson focused on civilizing the American Indian, hoping 
to incorporate them into American society. From Jefferson to Jackson, rhetorical focus on 
American Indians centered on the idea of civilizing them.41 
 Andrew Jackson’s presidency reframed the debate about American Indians. Instead of 
assimilating them into American culture, Jackson believed removing American Indians from 
American society would best foster them to become civilized. In his “Second Annual Message,” 
Jackson compared the removal of American Indians and their troubles to that of white settlers on 
the frontier. Jackson noted 
Doubtless it will be painful to leave the graves of their fathers; but what do they 
more than our ancestors did or than our children are now doing? To better their 
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condition in an unknown land our forefathers left all that was dear in earthly 
objects. Our children by thousands yearly leave the land of their birth to seek new 
homes in distant regions…It is rather a source of joy that our country affords 
scope where our young population may range unconstrained in body or in mind, 
developing the power and faculties of man in their highest perfection.42 
 
In this address, Jackson’s comparison implied moving west, settling the land, and dealing with 
hardship was a trait of American citizens. By failing to deal with such hardship, American 
Indians “had not yet been taught to want those things that settlers already desired,” demarcating 
them as inferior.43 Jackson saw the failure of American Indians to assimilate into American 
culture, initiating Jackson’s call for complete removal and separation from American society. By 
his “Sixth Annual Message,” Jackson stated  
The experience of every year adds to the conviction that emigration, and that 
alone, can preserve from destruction the remnant of the tribes yet living amongst 
us. The facility with which the necessaries of life are procured and the treaty 
stipulations providing aid for the emigrant Indians in their agricultural pursuits 
and in the important concern of education, and their removal from those causes 
which have heretofore depressed all and destroyed many of the tribes, can not fail 
to stimulate their exertions and to reward their industry.44  
 
Jackson’s rhetoric shifted the debate about American Indians from merely focusing on civilizing 
them through assimilation into American society to completely removing them from American 
society. This rhetorical shift, as noted by Stuckey, created a racial marker of American 
citizenship. The label “American Indian” came to mean “savagery, wildness, freedom, and 
independence,” while white came to mean “entitlement—to ‘civilization’ and land.”45 The 
forcible removal of American Indians from their land by Jackson started a trend between them 
and whites that lasted the rest of the decade. Americans continued to put forth claims about 




 Presidents after Jackson focused less on physically removing American Indians from 
society, instead, returning to a theme of civilizing them. John Tyler stated, “With several of the 
tribes great progress in civilizing them has already been made. The schoolmaster and the 
missionary are found side by side, and the remnants of what were once numerous and powerful 
nations may yet be preserved as the builders up of a new name for themselves and their 
posterity.”46 Tyler paired two common themes of civilization in the mid-nineteenth century: 
education and Christianity. Before 1846, when Christianity was removed from Wheaton’s 
Elements of International Law, there was an explicit connection between Christianity and the 
standard of civilization. To be a civilized nation or peoples was to be Christian; an idea that 
faded in Europe throughout the nineteenth century but remained powerful in the United States.  
After the Civil War, Ulysses S. Grant, who saw his share of brutal warfare, decried the 
wars waged against American Indians as immoral, stating, “Wars of extermination, engaged in 
by people pursuing commerce and all industrial pursuits, are expensive even against the weakest 
people, and are demoralizing and wicked. Our superiority of strength and advantages of 
civilization should make us lenient toward the Indian.”47 Grant concluded, “the benign influences 
of education and civilization” were the best ways to improve the lives of American Indians. 
Grant believed by doing this the United States “will stand better before the civilized nations of 
the earth and in our own consciences for having made it.”48 For Grant, war against an inferior 
opponent undermined America’s moral position in the world. America should help lesser 
peoples, raising them to the standard of civilization, not conquering them through war. 
Rutherford B. Hayes took the position that Europe and many international lawyers took 
toward uncivilized tribes: certain civilized laws and regulations would be adopted from time to 
time, but tribes were not expected to meet the complete standard of civilization all the time. 
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What this meant in practice was uncivilized states or peoples adopted certain laws, or had them 
imposed by civilized nations, but civilized nations did not expect uncivilized states to have the 
full complement of legal guarantees and protections available in Great Britain or the United 
States.49 Grover Cleveland rhetorically separated American Indians into two groups: those who 
met a level of civilization and those who did not. He stated, “While some [American Indians] are 
lazy, vicious, and stupid, others are industrious, peaceful, and intelligent; while a portion of them 
are self-supporting and independent, and have so far advanced in civilization that they make their 
own laws, administered through officers of their own choice, and educate their children in 
schools of their own establishment and maintenance, others still retain, in squalor and 
dependence, almost the savagery of their natural state.”50 Cleveland’s rhetoric toward American 
Indians most resembled the international legal framework established in Europe toward the rest 
of the world. There was a clear bifurcation between United States citizens, and the civilized 
world, and American Indians. Cleveland’s rhetorical bifurcation went deeper, separating 
American Indians into those who could possibly reach a higher standard of civilization and those 
who were beyond help. 
What happened in American presidential rhetoric was the evolution of civilization from 
Washington to Cleveland, with each turn adding another layer to the term. With Washington, 
civilization focused on building good relations with American Indians, establishing the rule of 
law, and extending trade. Jefferson emphasized trade, but also invisibility, either through 
assimilation or physical disappearance. Jackson sought the complete removal of American 
Indians believing they were beyond civilization’s reach. Post-Jackson presidents reverted back to 
bringing civilization to American Indians through education, Christianity, and industry. 
Rhetorical remnants of education, the rule of law, and civilizing the uncivilized found their way 
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into McKinley’s conception of civilization. However, the largest shift was extending civilization 
beyond the American continent. Past presidents had little choice in dealing with American 
Indians. They lived on the continent and interacted with U.S. citizens. McKinley chose to go to 
war with Spain, acquiring territory with people different from Americans, thus altering certain 
aspects of civilization. Unlike Jefferson or Jackson, McKinley could not ignore or remove these 
uncivilized people he chose to make visible through his foreign policy. Before examining 
McKinley’s rhetoric, a brief biography of the president is needed because understanding his 
sense of responsibility is critical to understanding his rhetorical choice of employing the term 
duty in relation to civilization. 
William McKinley: A Soldier from Ohio 
 The personal history of William McKinley is important because it helps explain why the 
word duty was present in his rhetoric. McKinley’s Methodist upbringing and military service 
instilled a strong sense of duty and responsibility in the future president. While in Washington, 
he attended weekly services where the themes of humanitarian duty and America’s role in the 
world were preached, reflecting a larger religious discourse in the country. His background is 
also important in curtailing criticism of McKinley as a weak president.51 McKinley was an adept 
president, who was skilled in the art of persuasion and reading his audience. His rhetorical style 
was softer, and less blustery, than his successor and Vice President Theodore Roosevelt, often 
leaving him in Roosevelt’s shadow. Presidents that are considered strong have come to be 
thought of as great presidents.52 But McKinley, being neither boisterous or strong in the way 
Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt or Andrew Jackson were, is often overlooked or mischaracterized. 
McKinley’s strength resided in the stability and depth of his character. He was firmly in control 
of his presidency and had a clear vision for the United States. 
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 Born in Niles, Ohio, in 1843, William McKinley was the last American president to have 
served in the Civil War. McKinley’s mother, Nancy Allison McKinley, bore the main 
responsibility for raising her children, as her husband oversaw his foundries and other 
businesses. Mrs. McKinley imprinted on her children a strict sense of discipline and 
responsibility. She and her sister were active and devoted members of the Methodist church in 
Niles and were said to run “the church, all but the preaching.”53 Both William Sr. and Nancy 
wanted their children to have a better life, including a better education. William Jr. took to the 
classroom with much enthusiasm, including a strong liking for the school debating society. He 
believed education could help individuals discover God’s purpose for them in this world. Raised 
as a devout Methodist and reflecting his deep attachment to his mother, McKinley adhered 
closely to a life of religious piety. When the Civil War broke out, McKinley believed it was his 
duty to serve but requested his mother’s blessing first. Nancy replied, “if you think it is your duty 
to fight for your country, I think you ought to go.”54 Reflecting McKinley’s duty to both God and 
country, he was morally strict compared to most of his fellow soldiers. McKinley did not drink, 
was chaste, and did not yet swear. Writing home, McKinley said of his strict observances: “It is 
by no means essential that an individual who has enlisted to defend his country should forget his 
early teaching and bury his parents’ instruction in oblivion.”55 McKinley saw action on and off 
throughout the war, eventually being made brevet major of volunteers by Abraham Lincoln on 
March 13, 1865, for his “‘gallant and meritorious services’ at Opequhan, Fisher’s Hill, and Cedar 
Creek.”56 McKinley’s sense of responsibility and duty to God and country inspired him to return 
home and serve his country as a politician. 
After the war, McKinley began a career in law that led him to meet many influential 
people throughout Ohio, a political breeding ground for national politicians. His gentle, soft-
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spoken, and courteous disposition made him a favorite of many, including future president 
Rutherford B. Hayes. McKinley later left law for politics, running and winning a seat in the U.S. 
House of Representatives, which he held from 1876 to 1890. While serving on Capitol Hill, 
McKinley dominated debates over the tariff and taxes. He had an adept understanding of 
industrialized America and used logic and reason to persuade his audiences, a trait that remained 
consistent throughout his political career. McKinley’s power derived from “persuasion rather 
than force, and persuasion is seldom dramatic.”57 Although his preference for subtle personal 
diplomacy left him out of the limelight during his tenure in Congress, he was very influential in 
persuading his colleagues of the righteousness of his arguments behind the scenes. McKinley left 
the House of Representatives to return to Ohio, where he won the governorship in 1892. While 
serving as governor, McKinley kept order in an economically depressed state caused by the 
Panic of 1893, even while other nearby regions were wracked by riots. McKinley’s success won 
him the aide of fellow Ohioan and millionaire steel industrialist Marcus Hanna, who organized 
McKinley’s campaign and advised him during his presidential bid in 1896.58 By the time 
McKinley reached the White House, he had survived more than twenty years in the political 
jungle of Ohio politics. His tenure as governor demonstrated McKinley’s strong executive skills, 
many of which he would soon implement as president. 
McKinley’s personality did not change when he entered the White House. Rather, his 
devotion to God led him to Washington’s Metropolitan Methodist Episcopal Church. Here, F.M. 
Bristol preached about “the providence of God in the events of history and America’s unique 
role in the world’s future.”59 Bristol’s sermons reflected a larger religious context of Christian 
rhetoric surrounding the Spanish-American War, and subsequent debate over retaining Cuba, 
Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. Religious historian, Matthew McCullough, argued American 
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Christians in 1898 condemned any exploitation of the islands, but from their perspective they 
believed in aiding these territories as benevolent acts of charity. Exploitation of the islands or 
peoples by the Christian United States was impossible because they were Americans, not 
backwards Spaniards. Keeping with their moral and altruistic motives, retaining the territories 
would only help the formerly oppressed peoples find their way toward liberty. McCullough 
concluded, “In pursuing this duty imposed upon the nation by a wise providence, Americans 
could be confident that the same divine favor would secure for them a glorious, if unforeseeable, 
destiny.”60  
The Ideograph: Building Blocks of Ideology 
Before analyzing McKinley’s rhetoric, I offer an overview of the ideograph and its 
characteristics. Ideographs are the structural elements of ideology signifying and containing 
ideological commitments. They orient their audience in a particular manner guiding them to a 
particular understanding of the world. In short, they are one term summations that orient the 
audience toward a specific interpretation of an event, an issue, or situation. They act as “God” or 
“Ultimate” terms by stifling questions surrounding the meaning or action being taken in the 
name of the ideograph. Unlike other “God” or “Ultimate” terms, Michael McGee wrote, 
ideographs call attention to the social rather than the rational or ethical human condition. These 
terms “exist in real discourse, functioning clearly and evidently as agents of political 
consciousness.”61 Ideographs are usually already part of society and inherited by users when they 
are socialized into that society. McGee summarized the ideograph in four main points: 1) it is an 
ordinary term found in political discourse; 2) it is a high-order abstraction meant to provide 
collective commitment to an ill-defined goal; 3) it warrants the use of power, excuses behavior 
and belief which might otherwise be socially sanctioned; and 4) ideographs are culturally bound. 
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They are ideas that must be accepted to belong in a specific society, underscoring the culturally-
bound nature of ideographs. 
 More importantly, ideographs convey an ideology. In fact, McGee argued ideographs are 
the rhetorical building blocks of ideology. For McGee, ideology in practice “is a political 
language, preserved in rhetorical documents, with the capacity to dictate decision and control 
public belief and behavior.”62 Everyday political language builds a language of ideographs 
manifesting ideology. This everyday language, characterized by slogans and phrases, is a 
vocabulary of ideographs, and can be “easily mistaken for the technical terminology of political 
philosophy.”63 Ideographs are powerful because they have the “capacity both to control ‘power’ 
and to influence (if not determine) the shape and texture of each individual’s ‘reality.’”64 
Uncovering how ideology functions through ideographs is critical to understanding the policy-
making efforts of presidents. Historian Michael Hunt understood ideology as the starting point 
for comprehending policy, stating, “Suppose, to begin with, that ideology is central, not 
incidental, to policymaking.”65 Hunt noticed policymakers using these “code words” to create 
shared meaning between the speaker and audience. As McGee explained, “Human beings are 
‘conditioned,’ not directly to belief and behavior, but to a vocabulary of concepts [ideographs] 
that function as guides, warrants, reasons, or excuses for behavior and belief.”66 Hunt concluded, 
“Policymakers steeped in these notions used them to reduce complicated problems to 
manageable proportions, to devise a personally appealing response, and to marshal support at 
home for the choices they had made.”67 While ideographs aid the rhetor in making direct appeals 
using a language specifically crafted to carry with it specific assumptions, they carry a danger of 
simplifying complex and nuanced international situations without providing the proper context 
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for a full discussion of possible policy options. Yet, their rhetorical power and presence in 
society have made ideographs the building blocks of political discourse. 
The social nature of ideographs made them an ideal place to study ideology in action, 
both rhetorical and material action. Ideographs are the link between rhetoric and ideology.68 
Ideographs are “vehicles through which ideologies or unconsciously shared idea systems that 
organize consent to a particular social system become rhetorically effective.”69 Ideographs 
function to solidify the ideological commitments of individuals, but they also have a material 
function. They rouse audiences to act in a particular manner or at least condone certain actions 
by their government. Trevor Parry-Giles observed that ideographs “function to justify or validate 
collective policy by virtue of their operation in public texts.”70 Ideographs are used by rhetors to 
secure public acceptance for collective behavior by utilizing ideological commitments by 
framing situations in a particular light, focusing the public’s attention to certain issues. Through 
such action, ideographs help narrow and limit the public’s response, ensuring the response is 
consistent with the rhetor’s ideology. This also allows rhetors to exercise social power by 
appealing to and constructing “the people” in whose name they will resolve the public issue.71 
Thus, rhetors create or draw attention to certain exigencies, allowing them to create “the people” 
and secure their consent to ideological solutions through the use of widely accepted ideographs. 
While this seems like the manipulation of the public through rhetoric, Parry-Giles was quick to 
defend against such assumptions. Rather, he saw such ideological power emerging from “a 
community’s symbolic environment and from the ability of rhetorical leaders to utilize and 
express a cultural vocabulary in powerful and persuasive ways.”72  
While ideographs are lasting features of a society, their meaning is not static. McGee 
examined two different ways to study ideographs: diachronically and synchronically. Diachronic 
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study focuses on the expanding and contracting meaning of ideographs from the beginning of the 
society to its present.73 A diachronic understanding of an ideograph analyzes changes in its usage 
over time. Synchronic study is “a situationally-defined synchronic structure of ideograph clusters 
constantly reorganizing itself to accommodate specific circumstances while maintaining its 
fundamental consonance and unity.”74 The synchronic methodology focuses on the present 
understanding of the ideograph, including its range of meanings and cluster of words around the 
ideograph that may modify individuals’ understandings of it. McGee used the example of how 
the understanding of <equality> in relationship to liberty is modified when <equality> is 
clustered with “access” as compared to “being educated.” The cluster of words around the 
ideograph can alter its interpretation and its ideological commitments. More importantly, 
diachronic and synchronic cannot be separated. Ideographic understandings will always have a 
past that follows an ideograph to the present day, and the diachronic cannot overlook the present 
because “its entire raison d'être consists in justifying the form and direction of collective 
behavior.”75 Understanding an ideograph’s past, and its cultural context, are important aspects of 
studying them. 
The lengthy tracing of civilizations diachronic past, both in the United States and Europe, 
was intended to establish the rhetorical culture of the era. In their study on <equality>, Celeste 
Condit and John Lucaites define rhetorical culture as “the range of linguistic usages available to 
those who would address a historically particular audience as a public, that is, a group of 
potentially disparate individuals and subgroups who share a common interest in their collective 
life.”76 While every rhetorical culture presents a wide range of potential foci, metaphors, 
allusions, etc., the ideograph, Condit and Lucaites argued, was the central organizing element of 
a rhetorical culture. Michael McGee, in his original essay on ideographs, described them as 
53 
 
being “bound within the culture which they define.”77 Ideographs are culturally bound, meaning 
members of a community are “socialized, conditioned, to the vocabulary of ideographs as a 
prerequisite for ‘belonging’ to the society.”78 Therefore, members of a society are expected to 
understand both the explicit and implicit expectations from members when ideographs are 
employed in rhetorical discourses. When the United States became a great power, McKinley was 
expected to adopt the rhetoric of civilization. By adopting, and adapting, the ideograph of 
civilization, McKinley helped socialize the United States into the Family of Nations. 
Into the World: Civilization and the United States’ Destiny  
Even with its legal underpinnings and wide circulation in Europe, the term civilization 
does not immediately register as an American ideograph the way equality, liberty, or freedom 
might. However, civilization has played an important role in the nation’s rhetorical history and 
has been more present in the modern world than one might initially recognize. Carol Winkler 
introduced the ideograph <terrorism> by stating, “Terrorism functions as a signifier of American 
identity, defining what the nations stands for and against.”79 Terrorism divided the world into 
those who are civilized and those who are uncivilized. Dana Cloud’s scholarship explicitly 
focused on the term <clash of civilization>. Cloud examined the modern-day interpretation of 
the term in relation to the U.S.-Afghanistan War. There are three important takeaways relevant to 
this study from Cloud’s work. First, the term helped symbolize the othering of the enemy. It set 
up a binary between the American “self” and, in Cloud’s study, the Afghan “other.” In this 
binary, one was associated with being morally good and reasonable, while the other was evil and 
irrational. Civilization functioned as a one-word encapsulation of war rhetoric delineating one 
side as good and one side as evil, with no middle ground. Second, war required vilification of the 
enemy, but occupation necessitated a humanitarian frame. In both the Afghan War and the 
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Spanish-American War, the United States occupied foreign soil, forcing civilization to adapt 
from an exclusionary frame of “otherness,” to a more inclusive cluster of words to win over 
those living under occupation. Finally, civilization, and similar ideographs, reduce a “complex 
set of geopolitical motives, strategies, and outcomes to a cultural binary.”80 Only by closely 
examining the historical context, and unpacking the ideograph, can rhetorical scholars begin to 
understand the complex web of relationships the ideograph works to obfuscate. 
I make the following arguments throughout the rest of the chapter: 1) civilization was an 
ideograph employed by McKinley separating the world into two camps: civilized and 
uncivilized. This bifurcation was used to justify American military action against Spain; 2) 
civilization was modified by the terms humanity and duty. Duty necessitated action against Spain 
on behalf of the values encapsulated by civilization and humanity; 3) after the Spanish-American 
War, humanity and America’s duty to humanity, were brought to the forefront of McKinley’s 
argument, providing aid and helping the uncivilized; and 4) progress was crucial to a 
civilization’s health. Civilized nations move forward through technological advancements. 
Civilization as a standard and concept should progress throughout the world, bringing its 
blessing to all people. 
1897: A Year of Change 
 McKinley’s outlook on the world changed drastically from the beginning of 1897 to its 
end. As the year progressed, the situation in Cuba deteriorated quickly and the U.S.-Spanish 
relationship deteriorated faster. McKinley’s rhetoric also changed, moving from abiding by 
America’s long standing policy of non-intervention in another country’s affairs to opening the 
door for possible military intervention in Cuba. In this section, I argue that civilization served 
two key purposes. First, in McKinley’s “Inaugural Address,” civilization served as a marker of 
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distinction, separating the world into two categories: civilized and uncivilized or barbaric. 
Second, in his “First Annual Message,” civilization was used to condemn Spain for their conduct 
in Cuba. When Spain failed to meet the standard of civilization, McKinley quickly censured their 
behavior. 
McKinley’s Inaugural Address 
Civilization as a key rhetorical term appeared only twice in McKinley’s “First Inaugural 
Address,” once in reference to ratifying a treaty between the United States and Great Britain and 
the other regarding lynchings in America. Regarding the recent lynching’s of African Americans 
in the South, McKinley chastised his fellow citizens, stating, “Lynchings must not be tolerated in 
a great and civilized country like the United States; courts, not mobs, must execute the penalties 
of the law. The preservation of public order, the right of discussion, the integrity of courts, and 
the orderly administration of justice must continue forever the rock of safety upon which our 
Government securely rests.”81 A hallmark of a civilized state was its adherence to the rule of law. 
Lynching broke the norms of civilized societies. Such actions were associated with barbaric 
nations, who were unable or unwilling to protect its citizens from such unlawful acts. It was 
simply not something civilized nations permitted. McKinley recognized for Americans to be 
taken seriously as a civilized state, such incidents cannot be tolerated and must be publicly 
admonished. After these remarks, civilization was almost exclusively used when McKinley 
spoke about foreign policy. 
Foreign policy was not excluded from McKinley’s “First Inaugural Address,” as he 
maintained George Washington’s guiding principle of non-interference. McKinley affirmed this 
policy stating, “We have cherished the policy of non-interference with affairs of foreign 
governments wisely inaugurated by Washington, keeping ourselves free from entanglement, 
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either as allies or foes, content to leave undisturbed with them the settlement of their own 
domestic concerns.”82 However, immediately following these expressed sentiments, McKinley 
left himself some rhetorical room for changing America’s position. Expounding on his foreign 
policy principles, McKinley stated: 
It will be our aim to pursue a firm and dignified foreign policy, which shall be 
just, impartial, ever watchful of our national honor, and always insisting upon the 
enforcement of the lawful rights of American citizens everywhere. Our diplomacy 
should seek nothing more and accept nothing less than is due us. We want no 
wars of conquest; we must avoid the temptation of territorial aggression. War 
should never be entered upon until every agency of peace has failed; peace is 
preferable to war in almost every contingency. Arbitration is the true method of 
settlement of international as well as local or individual differences.83 
 
Protection of American citizens abroad, while a reasonable statement by an American president, 
was a hallmark of European civilized states. In Europe’s pursuit of expansionist policies, these 
great powers pushed for extraterritorial rights for their citizens abroad, in conjunction with trade 
policies opening “uncivilized” states to the unmatched industrial and military strength of 
civilized states.84 Add in the final two principles of McKinley’s foreign policy outlook—war 
being the last resort when peace has failed and arbitration being the true method of settling 
international disputes—and the pieces for an expansionist foreign policy were in place. While 
McKinley viewed war as reprehensible, he did not rule it out as a possibility, but it would only 
be as a last resort when all other diplomatic options had failed. 
Concluding his exposition on foreign policy, McKinley urged the Senate to ratify a treaty 
between the United States and Great Britain, noting they had “a duty to mankind” because its 
passage advanced the cause of civilization.85 The treaty’s passage improved relations between 
the world’s two most liberal nations, putting behind them their confrontational past, and 
represented a pact between two civilized nations, symbolizing America’s growing international 
influence as a power able to write the rules of international society. The treaty’s content is of 
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little importance, but McKinley’s choice of duty paired with civilization is an important 
precursor to his rhetoric justifying the war; it is a connection I develop below. By pairing duty 
and civilization together, McKinley simplified and framed the choice for Senators. Either they 
lived up to the standard of civilization, thus fulfilling their duty, or they will have failed, 
lowering the United States’ global position and possibly endangering relations between the two 
countries. McKinley’s relatively peaceful rhetoric represented in his “First Inaugural” was short 
lived. With the events in Cuba quickly deteriorating, McKinley’s rhetoric changed drastically by 
his “First Annual Message” in December 1897. 
The Growing Unrest in Cuba: McKinley’s Rhetorical Shift in His “First Annual Message” 
Throughout a contentious 1897, McKinley pushed Spain to end the brutal reconcentrado 
policy of Spanish general “Butcher” Weyler. As the war raged between Cuban guerrillas and 
Spanish soldiers, Weyler decided to separate the Cuban people from the guerrillas by herding 
Cuban peasants into a series of fortified camps. Access to these camps was tightly controlled to 
limit the possibility of rebels entering and inciting trouble. While the logic was sound, the 
implementation was brutal. Conditions in the camps were horrendous with continual shortages of 
food, primitive to nonexistent sanitation, and rampant disease. Combined with a scorched-earth 
military policy outside the camps, the Spanish had turned Cuba into a miserable and desolate 
island. Through diplomatic pressure, the United States was able to get Weyler recalled and the 
reconcentrado policy reversed, but the imprint of the policy remained with McKinley.86 In light 
of these events, McKinley’s rhetoric changed dramatically from his inaugural. 
McKinley employed civilization in his “First Annual Message” to draw a distinction 
between normal warfare and the policies of the Spanish. Offering a broad interpretation of the 
war, McKinley faulted both parties, noting, “The civilized code of war has been disregarded, no 
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less so by the Spaniards than by the Cubans.”87 By including the Cubans in his assessment of 
uncivilized warfare, McKinley was setting up his future argument: Cubans were unable to end 
the war and govern themselves, thus American intervention and leadership were needed on the 
island. McKinley’s logic was if they cannot follow the proper civilized conduct of warfare, how 
will they be able to perform the duties necessary to run a state? In McKinley’s opinion, neither 
the Cubans nor Spanish were civilized peoples or fit to govern Cuba. While McKinley accused 
both combatants with charges of uncivilized warfare, the remainder of McKinley’s argument 
focused on Spanish atrocities, as any future military intervention rested on providing a casus 
belli against Spain. 
Returning to the topic of Spanish policies, McKinley declared the reconcentrado policy 
as an “utterly failed” measure of war. The policy was “not civilized warfare,” but 
“extermination,” according to McKinley. Yet, McKinley was not finished with his criticism, 
continuing, “During all those years an utter disregard of the laws of civilized warfare and of the 
just demands of humanity, which called forth expressions of condemnation from the nations of 
Christendom, continued unabated.”88 Concluding the verbal assault, McKinley described Cuba 
under Spanish rule. Cuban lands were laid to waste, dwellings destroyed, with “desolation and 
ruin” pervading the countryside. Cuba was in chaos, and Spain had lost the ability to maintain 
order on the island. Civilization and an end to the fighting were nowhere in sight. Spain’s 
continual failure to live up to the standard of civilization was pointed out repeatedly by 
McKinley, who was slowly laying the groundwork for intervention by the United States.  Spain 
had failed to uphold some of the most basic tenants of the standard of civilization, including 
protecting foreign nationals and their property, maintaining a judicial court system for native and 
foreign citizens, and breaking international norms of warfare. Under such breaches of 
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civilization, Spain, being the ruler of Cuba, must rectify the situation or face potential 
consequences from the international community, including military intervention by an outside 
power. Spain’s failure provided McKinley with a powerful warrant for potential future military 
action.  
The deterioration of the situation in Cuba caused McKinley to reevaluate America’s 
options. In a major shift from his inaugural, McKinley’s “First Annual Message” opened the 
possibility of using force to restore order and civilization in Cuba. McKinley’s preferred 
resolution to the insurrection was diplomacy through international arbitration. McKinley again 
praised international arbitration as the way the “civilized world is moving,” with treaties 
originating from arbitration embodying “humane principles.” For McKinley, international 
arbitration was the civilized method for handling disputes between mature and honorable 
nations, while war was the first option of the barbaric and savage hordes. Peaceful arbitration 
ensured a civil process for resolving differences between nations, without the loss of life or 
honor, which can occur either through military defeat or “uncivilized” military conduct. 
However, McKinley was not a pure idealist, believing the era of war was past, especially those 
between the civilized and uncivilized world. In his “First Annual Message,” McKinley added a 
caveat: if arbitration failed, it would be America’s “duty imposed by our obligations to ourselves, 
to civilization and humanity to intervene with force, it shall be without fault on our part and only 
because the necessity for such action will be so clear as to command the support and approval of 
the civilized world.”89 McKinley still preferred his first option, arbitration. However, if war 
came, it was not because of actions by the United States. Rather, war would be a result of 
Spanish intransigence and America’s duty to uphold the standard of civilization. 
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Civilization was the key rhetorical term warranting a possible change in American policy 
from non-intervention to intervention in Cuba. Described above in detail, McKinley created an 
exigence in need of solving, framing his argument around Spain’s uncivilized conduct. Cuba had 
become a chaotic situation, standing in stark contrast to the peaceful, industrious progress of the 
United States. As a civilized nation, the United States had a duty to contain, and if possible, end 
the chaos in Cuba. Spain, as a European colonial power, could no longer protect the rights or 
property of foreigners in Cuba, and their barbarous military conduct was held in higher contempt 
because they were supposed to be a more “civilized” people. Throughout his “First Annual 
Message,” McKinley reiterated his openness and preference for peace but warned of war if the 
situation was not properly handled. McKinley warned Spain, stating, “Throughout all these 
horrors and dangers to our own peace this Government has never in any way abrogated its 
sovereign prerogative of reserving to itself the determination of its policy and course according 
to its own high sense of right and in consonance with the dearest interests and convictions of our 
own people should the prolongation of the strife so demand.”90 Throughout 1897, civilization 
acted as the key rhetorical marker dividing the civilized United States from uncivilized Spain and 
Cuba. Civilization, or the lack of, defined the situation in Cuba as unacceptable. McKinley’s 
discourse prepared Americans to act in its defense. McKinley’s rhetorical groundwork paid off in 
April 1898 when he requested a declaration of war, after the situation deteriorated even further. 
 1898: From Peace to War to Peace Again 
McKinley hoped to resolve the Cuban problem through peaceful measures, ideally 
international arbitration, but by his “First Annual Message” in December 1897, McKinley 
opened the door to using force to solve the issue. While McKinley spoke of force publicly, 
privately it was an option he hoped he would not have to use. Critics of McKinley labeled him a 
61 
 
“jingo,” a term used to describe a person overwhelmed by nationalistic sentiments who wages 
war for expansionist ambitions, but McKinley was no such person. McKinley disdained the idea 
of seizing parts of the Spanish empire.91 In the first few months of 1898 McKinley did his best to 
uphold the premise of his inaugural by exhausting every peaceful option before war, but tensions 
between Spain and the United States reached a near breaking point in February. First, a private 
letter from Spanish Minister Enrique Dupuy deLome was made public and revealed Spanish 
reforms were merely cosmetic action designed to please the Americans. Yet, this was not the 
most explosive section. In the letter, deLome’s harshly criticized McKinley. deLome wrote of 
the Weyler situation and McKinley’s response, thusly, “It once more shows what McKinley is, 
weak and a bidder for the admiration of the crowd, besides being a would-be politician who tries 
to leave a door open behind himself while keeping on good terms with the jingoes of his party.”92 
As McKinley’s credibility was under question, an explosion aboard the U.S.S. Maine docked in 
Havana on February 15, 1898, killed 250 men and two officers.93 The Maine incident sparked 
domestic pressure for war, though McKinley still did not budge, requesting an inquiry into the 
incident to stave off the possibility of bloodshed. After the Maine and deLome incidents, 
McKinley knew in his heart “that intervention was but a matter of time.”94 Preparation for war 
was underway.  
In early March, McKinley requested and received $50 million to be spent on the army 
and navy. By late March, after working to reassure the business community that the economy 
would not reenter a recession akin to the crises of 1893-96, a telegram from political adviser and 
journalist W.C. Reick to McKinley stated, “Big corporations here now believe we will have war. 
Believe all would welcome it as relief to the suspense.”95 McKinley, not one to quickly rush off 
to war, made one last ditch attempt to hold off the war, issuing a series of terms for Spain to 
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accept to avoid U.S. intervention on the island. Spain agreed to arbitrate the causes of the 
Maine’s sinking, accepted relief aid from the United States to Cuba, repealed the reconcentrado 
policies, and granted an armistice. However, they rejected McKinley’s central demand allowing 
the United States to mediate the conflict without delay. A last-ditch attempt by the Vatican on 
Spain’s behalf was also rejected because the Vatican’s offer was only an armistice of hostilities 
and failed to grant direct U.S. involvement in Cuba, which was a necessity for McKinley and one 
Spain could never accept. With the failing of these last two efforts, on April 11, 1898, McKinley 
sent Congress a carefully worded declaration of war. The declaration was debated in Congress 
and officially signed by McKinley on April 29.96  
Before moving to the rhetorical analysis of McKinley’s “War Address,” there is one other 
important context to discuss: the legal context. The nineteenth century was filled with European 
and American legal writing on military conflict and international affairs. One of the leading legal 
texts was L. F. L. Oppenheim’s International Law A Treatise. In his section on intervention, 
Oppenheim defined it as “interference by a State in the affairs of another State for the purpose of 
maintaining or altering the actual condition of things.”97 Regarding the legality of intervention, 
Oppenheim concluded that though interventions were prohibited by the “Family of Nations,” or 
the civilized great powers, such nations could intervene without penalty in the affairs of lesser, or 
uncivilized, states. Oppenheim outlined five instances when, at the time, a state was justified in 
intervening in another state’s affairs. States may intervene to protect a protectorate, to protect 
citizens abroad, when a treaty was broken, or when the external affairs of another state was at the 
same time the affair of another state. The last set of circumstances was the vaguest and most 
pertinent to McKinley: “If a State in time of peace or war violates those principles of the Law of 
Nations which are universally recognised, other States have a right to intervene and to make the 
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delinquent submit to the respective principles.”98 What exactly constituted breaking the “Law of 
Nations” was open to interpretation. Failing to pay debts owed to foreign countries to not 
protecting foreign nationals or their property to “egregious violation of their human rights” were 
all possible rationales for breaking the Law of Nations.99 Regarding the issue of human rights, 
the abuse of such rights “within states is inconsistent with international order thereby justifying 
humanitarian intervention.”100 McKinley made clear in his “First Annual Message” that the 
Spanish had violated basic human rights through the reconcentrado policy. Such violations, 
along with the Maine, further justified McKinley’s decision. 
Symbolically, “Intervention lays bare what policymakers consider threatening to both 
domestic order and international security,” according to political theorists George Lawson and 
Luca Tardelli,101 To an extent, intervention was less of a decision and more of a necessity to 
maintain both state security and international order. It was especially necessary when other 
options, including aid and diplomacy, were perceived as either impractical or ineffective.102 By 
April 1898, humanitarian aid and diplomatic intervention had failed, with intervention the only 
remaining option left. 
McKinley’s Declaration of War 
In this section, I analyze McKinley’s “Message to Congress Requesting a Declaration of 
War With Spain,” which blended a legal argument, built around some of the principles outlined 
by Oppenheim, with a moral argument grounded in the United States’ obligation to humanity. I 
begin with McKinley argument focusing on Spain’s failure to protect American economic 
interests and citizens on the island, representing a breach of the standard of civilization. I then 
move to McKinley’s main argument focused on the United States’ moral responsibility to 
intervene. McKinley justified American intervention using the ideograph of civilization, with 
64 
 
two key rhetorical modifiers: humanity/humanitarian and duty. While appeals to civilization 
supported McKinley’s legal argument, his appeal to humanity was a more powerful moral 
warrant rallying the American people against Spain. Humanity prescribed that the United States 
should intervene in Cuba because the Cuban people were being oppressed, harmed, and 
exterminated. The United States must put an end to such atrocities because it was the right thing 
to do. Indeed, the duty to do the right thing necessitated action on the part of the United States to 
defend and uphold the principles embodied in civilization and humanity. If the United States 
believed it was a civilized nation, there was never a question of if they should intervene, but only 
when because the duty of a civilized nation demanded intervention. 
McKinley’s first argument for war was economic. In his request for a declaration of war, 
McKinley cited the “enormous losses to American trade and commerce” caused by the “exercise 
of cruel, barbarous, and uncivilized practices of warfare.”103 American dominance of Cuba’s 
economy at the time cannot be overstated. From 1859 to 1897, Cuban exports to the United 
States rose from a mere 42 percent of their economy to a full 87 percent. American investors had 
approximately $50 million in Cuban industries, and trade between the two countries totaled 
about $100 million.104 With the United States finally recovering from the 1893 recession, 
McKinley had to ensure American investments abroad were protected. Instability in the economy 
caused by chaos in Cuba could trigger another recession, potentially harming McKinley’s 
presidency. Spain’s failure to protect American property and trade in Cuba added to the 
characterization of their barbarity. The economy, however, was a minor grievance compared to 
Spain’s inhumane actions. 
To begin, Spain was already in a precarious position within the Family of Nations in 
Europe. While European states were generally considered civilized, or at least more civilized 
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than most of the rest of the world, Europe also created a racial hierarchy of nations on the 
continent. Atop this hierarchy were the Anglo-Saxons, which included the peoples of Great 
Britain and the United States. Germans were behind Anglo-Saxons because “they had lost their 
love of liberty.”105 Peoples of Slavic decent were next because “they had displayed great 
endurance, patience, and strength (if not intelligence and a knack for innovation) as they had 
slowly but irresistibly extended their control over much of the Eurasian land mass.”106 Lower on 
the ladder were the Latin people of Europe, including the French, Italians and Spaniards who 
“lacked vigor; they were sentimental, undisciplined, and superstitious; and consequently, they 
were of small account in international affairs.”107 Spain was already among the least influential 
and weakest European nations, and its people were not highly thought of by the rest of Europe. 
Most telling of this was the silence coming from other European capitals in support of Spain.108 
McKinley’s characterization of Spain as “cruel, barbarous, and uncivilized” further reinforced 
racial stereotypes of Spain. Spain’s continued failure in Cuba, coupled with their brutal tactics 
removed any standing among the civilized nations for Spain. The conflict in Cuba was now 
defined by McKinley, and accepted by many throughout Europe, as a military affair between two 
uncivilized nations, allowing America to enter the fray without fear of losing honor or 
international standing. The United States would enter the conflict “as a neutral to stop the 
war.”109 
To gain support for his call for war, McKinley invoked the vaguest legal and moral 
principle of civilization, the breaking of the principles of the Law of Nations, but also the 
principle with most rhetorical leeway. The United States entered the war not for selfish motives, 
but according to McKinley, the “dictates of humanity” called the United States to enter the 
conflict.110 Acting to end “the hopeless sacrifices of life,” offered a stronger argument, than 
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intervening solely to protect American businesses interests. Spanish atrocities had shocked the 
“sensibilities and offended the humane sympathies of our people.”111 Spain destroyed Cuba’s 
very means of survival and left “women and children, with aged and helpless men, enfeebled by 
disease and hunger.” According to McKinley, such acts were not acts of war, but of 
“extermination.”112 The conflict had become a test of physical exhaustion, with death being the 
only victor. Faced with the question of what to do, McKinley, breaking with America’s long-
standing non-intervention policy, replied, “It is no answer to say this is all in another country, 
belonging to another nation, and is therefore none of our business. It is specially our duty, for it 
is right at our door.”113 McKinley concluded, “In the name of humanity, in the name of 
civilization, on behalf of endangered American interests which give us the right and the duty to 
speak and to act, the war in Cuba must stop.”114 The case McKinley presented did not ask 
Congress whether the United States should intervene, but firmly stated why. The United States 
had a duty to civilization and humanity to stop the bloodshed and restore civilization.  
The key connection between civilization, humanity, and the declaration of war was duty. 
Civilization and humanity were ideological building blocks Americans believed in, a better 
world built on cooperation and justice between nations. A world where civilized people could aid 
and help those with less. A world where war was not necessary, and differences were settled 
through arbitration because all nations were civilized. But this world did not exist, and these 
terms were references to moral ideals. It was their connection to duty that spurned the United 
States into action. Duty necessitated action on behalf of these ideals. For McKinley duty, was 
“what must be done, the action demanded of a nation governed by humanitarian principles when 
confronted with specific circumstances.”115 Duty enacted these ideals and implied action. 
Whether the United States wanted to intervene or not became irrelevant because duty called forth 
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American intervention. Civilization, along with duty and humanity, oriented and prepared 
Americans to act in Cuba. But fulfilling America’s duty was more than just kicking the Spanish 
out of Cuba, it was also about aiding the Cuban people. 
To demonstrate America’s humanitarian motives, McKinley included in his “Message to 
Congress Requesting a Declaration of War With Spain” a request for Congress to immediately 
release humanitarian aid to Cuba. McKinley petitioned, “in the interest of humanity and to aid in 
preserving the lives of the starving people of the island I recommend that the distribution of food 
and supplies be continued and that an appropriation be made out of the public Treasury to 
supplement the charity of our citizens.”116 Besides conducting a civilized military campaign 
aimed against only Spanish forces, the United States would increase its charitable aid to the most 
vulnerable groups in Cuba, demonstrating their commitment to the principle of humanity. Once 
the Spanish were defeated, the United States would remain, aiding the Cubans in re-establishing 
peaceful institutions throughout the island. McKinley promised to secure “the establishment of a 
stable government, capable of maintaining order and observing its international obligations, 
insuring peace and tranquillity [sic] and the security of its citizens.”117 Furthermore, before 
Congress declared war, they added the Teller Amendment. The addition of the Teller amendment 
to the declaration of war ensured the United States could not annex the island. The amendment 
was further evidence of America’s pure motivations toward Cuba.118 McKinley’s message 
centered around humanity and the selfless character of the nation appealed to many Americans.  
McKinley’s declaration for war was met with enthusiasm across the nation.119 Reasons 
for enthusiasm ranged from the belief in political or economic benefits to a desire for vengeance 
for the Maine to the desire to sell more newspapers. However, the religious newspaper the 
Watchman dismissed these “base motives” for the groundswell of support. Rather, their rationale 
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was a “hatred of oppression and injustice that has aroused the hearts of the people.”120 The 
Western Christian Advocate supported McKinley’s humanitarian premise, stating, “he 
(McKinley) has refused to consider any of the historic causes for which wars have been waged, 
and signalizes the dawning of the twentieth century by making the cause of humanity the only 
cause great enough to justify the resort to arms.”121 They continued, “It is the beginning of a new 
and holier dispensation. It mocks the selfish cry of human greed. It puts martial glory in bonds to 
human advancement. It subordinates revenge to the holiest purposes of charity.”122 For 
McKinley, and many in the United States, civilization and humanity were not vague legal terms 
referring to rights possessed by certain nations, but moral terms denotating right and wrong, 
good and bad. For Americans, being a civilized nation, meant being a morally upright and a good 
nation with the ability to aid those less fortunate, and punish those who act wrongly.  
McKinley employed civilization, humanity, and duty together to call a nation to war, but 
he would continue to use these three concepts, and add in progress as a fourth key term, in 
support of his post-war foreign policy. The following section examines McKinley’s post-war 
rhetoric by turning primarily to his Annual Addresses and texts from two Midwestern speaking 
tours, with the inclusion of some additional speeches from Georgia and Boston given in the 
winter of 1898-1899. 
1898-1899 Speaking Tours: McKinley’s Quest to Defend Expansion 
 McKinley’s rhetoric did not go unchallenged, as the anti-imperialists spoke out 
adamantly against McKinley’s foreign policy. Comprised of a hodgepodge group with varying 
reasons and rationales, the anti-imperialists sought to prohibit American territorial expansion. In 
support of McKinley’s policy were various religious groups, who again saw the opportunities to 
aid the less fortunate. Finally, Social Darwinists’ were present on both sides of the debate. As 
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proponents of racial superiority, they saw the dangers of becoming rulers of primarily colored 
peoples, an anti-imperialist argument, but they also saw the advantages of being instructors and 
guiding lesser peoples along the path of civilization. 
Roadblock to Expansion: The Anti-Imperialist Challenge 
As the Spanish-American War concluded, the United States found itself with the newly 
acquired territories of the Philippines and Puerto Rico and some form of control over Cuba. 
However, not all segments of the United States were as happy with the situation as the McKinley 
administration. A group opposing McKinley’s actions, aptly named the anti-imperialists, were an 
eclectic group including German immigrant Carl Schurz, industrialist Andrew Carnegie, 
America’s leading philosopher William James, Republican Senator George Hoar, progressive 
social critic, co-editor of the North American Review, and art professor Charles Eliot Norton, 
founder of The Nation Edwin Lawrence Godkin, and former president Grover Cleveland. The 
anti-imperialists were critical of McKinley’s policies, especially his Philippines policy. Writing 
of McKinley, William James lamented, “I think that the manner in which the McKinley 
administration railroaded the country into its policy of conquest was abominable, and the way 
the country pucked up its ancient soul at the first touch of temptation, and followed as 
sickening.”123 Charles Eliot Norton similarly wrote, “We believe that America had something 
better to offer to mankind than those aims she is now pursuing, and we mourn her desertion of 
ideals which were not selfish nor limited in their application, but which are of universal worth 
and validity.”124 Norton concluded, “She [America] has lost her unique position as a potential 
leader in the progress of civilization, and has taken up her place simply as one of the grasping 
and selfish nations of the present day.”125 Rather than advancing the cause of civilization and 
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humanity, as McKinley claimed, the anti-imperialists saw the acquisition of foreign lands, and 
particularly the Philippines, as a radical break with American principles.  
Though anti-imperialist’s reasons for opposing McKinley were diverse, one objection 
was fairly common from all: the issue of race. The Philippines had few, if any, Caucasian 
inhabitants, and adding the islands would have increased the United States’ diversity to an 
alarming extent for the anti-imperialists. Godkin emphasized this notion in The Nation, writing 
there are “enormous difficulties into which we should be plunged by an attempt to rule 
dependencies inhabited by ignorant and inferior races, with whom it would apparently be 
impossible to get Americans to make any other union.”126 Carl Schurz feared once American 
expansion started it would not stop, and before long the United States would occupy Nicaragua 
to secure a canal. This would “bring us another lot of about 13,000,000 of Spanish-Americans 
mixed with Indian blood, and perhaps some twenty Senators and fifty or sixty Representatives, 
with seventy to eighty votes in the electoral college, and with them a flood of Spanish-American 
politics, notoriously the most disorderly, tricky and corrupt politics on the face of the earth.”127 
Race played an important factor for the anti-imperialists, but also for McKinley. The United 
States was a majority Anglo-Saxon country, and as one, McKinley believed this positioned the 
United States to lead other countries toward civilization. 
Civilization carried with it the weight of bifurcating the world into the civilized and the 
barbarians. The civilized world was almost exclusively, until the addition of Japan, European or 
of European decent, in the case of the United States. This heavy racial component was an 
important feature of European imperialism. European views of non-European societies turned 
cultural differences into racial differences to be explained away by the superiority of European 
genetic stock.128 In the United States, civilization’s racial component manifested more in the 
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United States’ belief in bringing American values and institutions around the globe to uplift 
peoples. As the anti-imperialist exemplify, there were strong racist currents in American society, 
but for McKinley he firmly believed in America’s mission. Though it was easy to criticize, 
historian John Dobson wrote, McKinley firmly “believed that whatever he did had his God’s 
blessing.”129 McKinley’s firm Methodist faith meant he had a responsibility to help those who 
were less fortunate, whether it was a poor person in need or an entire country in need of 
civilization, McKinley’s character and motives were genuine. Again, the religious community 
and papers of the United States supported McKinley’s policy. 
Religious newspapers across the nation provided their backing of America’s retention of 
Puerto Rico and the Philippines. Part of the reason for such fervent support was for the 
expansion of missionary opportunities. The religious press was filled with articles calling for 
missions “to assume the mantle of civilization where soldiers could carry it no further.”130 The 
other rationale was for Americans to fulfill their responsibility to the downtrodden of the world. 
The Presbyterian New York Observer wrote in mid-August 1898 regarding McKinley’s options, 
“this government entered upon war for humanitarian reasons, to rescue a suffering people from 
misrule and oppression. The widening of the conflict has placed it in our power, if it has not 
made it our duty, to render a like service to another people suffering from the same intolerable 
tyranny.” Similar arguments appeared in the Independent, Christian Evangelist, and South 
Carolina’s Baptist Courier.131 Newspapers and pastors across the United States reiterated 
McKinley’s rhetoric of America’s duty to civilization and humanity. By 1900, there were 26 
million church members in the United States, out of a population of 76 million. And, this number 
could be a low estimate, since religion and religiosity often escape census takers and are difficult 
concepts to categorize.132 When McKinley spoke about duty and civilization, large portions of 
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the population were familiar with America’s duty to civilization from a religious perspective, but 
McKinley transformed their religious belief into political action. For those not persuaded by 
religious appeals, a scientific rationale, in the form of Social Darwinism, offered support for 
American territorial expansion. 
In line with the era’s emphasis on scientific thinking, Social Darwinism “gave the patina 
of science and modernity to feelings that were unscientific and ahistorical.”133 Proponents in the 
United States included popular lecturer John Fiske and general secretary of the American 
Evangelical Alliance Josiah Strong. Both Fiske and Strong believed in Anglo-Saxon superiority, 
citing Anglo-Saxon’s talent for self-government and “pure spiritual Christianity” as the main 
reasons for their superiority.134 Germany was below the Anglo-Saxons, having all the racial 
traits, but German support of free institutions was not as strong as Great Britain and the United 
States. The remaining European nations followed in some order, depending on social and 
cultural achievements, and racial makeup. All other nations and ethnicities, including China, 
ranked below these races and nations based on their lack of “strong” characteristics. Anglo-
Saxons were thought to dominate the racial pyramid with their technological advancements, and 
general preference for more liberal political and economic policies. The British-American 
rapprochement after a century of unease sparked Social Darwinist’s dreams of an Anglo-Saxon 
union to dominate the globe, spreading liberal policies around the globe. 
McKinley Takes the Offensive 
 McKinley, never one to take risks on policy without public support, decided to undergo 
two different speaking tours of Midwestern states in October 1898 and October 1899. The 1898 
tour began in Iowa on October 11, 1898, and ended in Ohio on October 21, with stops in 
between in Illinois, Missouri, and Indiana. Over the ten-day span McKinley gave 57 speeches in 
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various small towns and large cities to garner support for the forthcoming peace settlement. The 
second Midwestern tour began on October 6, 1899, and ended on October 18. McKinley toured 
Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Wisconsin, North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa and Ohio, giving 79 
speeches over the twelve-day period. Also, over this time period, McKinley delivered his 
Second, Third, and Fourth Annual Messages to Congress, and an important series of speeches in 
Georgia in December 1898, and a speech in Boston at the “Home Market Club Dinner” in 
February 1899. These are the primary texts included in the rhetorical analysis of how McKinley 
employed the terms civilization, humanity, duty, and progress to create support for his retention 
of the Philippines and Puerto Rico. 
McKinley’s speaking tour was an opportunity to discern public opinion about expansion, 
but it was also a chance for McKinley to reiterate the connection between war and humanitarian 
principles. On a stop in Springfield, Illinois, in 1898, McKinley claimed a great victory for all of 
humanity stating, “We have won great triumphs for humanity. We went to war, not because we 
wanted to, but because humanity demanded it. And having gone to war for humanity’s sake, we 
must accept no settlement that will not take into account the interests of humanity.”135 
Concluding his 1898 speaking circuit in his home state of Ohio, while speaking in Columbus, 
McKinley stated, “for new territory, no motive of aggrandizement, but that we might stop the 
oppression of a neighboring people whose cry we could almost hear.”136 McKinley’s post-war 
speaking tour used the same set of ideographs, as his request for war, to justify American action. 
Either humanity demanded or the United States had a duty to civilization and humanity to act, 
reinforcing his audience’s belief of America’s mission to civilize other nations. Previous 
American wars—the Revolution, War of 1812, Mexican-American, and Civil War—were all 
fought in self-defense or for freedom, value based military conflicts for sure, but always on 
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behalf of the American people. McKinley’s justification of intervening in another country, on 
behalf of its people and humanity, created new possibilities and responsibilities for the country. 
American intervention could now occur whenever and wherever the United States believed 
people were being oppressed. 
Whether the United States’ superiority came from its religious belief or its racial 
composition, the designation of being a leader in the world carried with it certain responsibilities. 
Political theorist Michael Hunt synthesized how the role of race factored into the issue of the 
Philippines: “To return the archipelago to Spain would be cowardly and inhumane. To leave the 
Filipinos to their own devices would be irresponsible and dishonorable. Racial superiority 
carried obligations that could be ignored only at the cost of throwing doubt on that superiority 
itself.”137 Such responsibilities manifested themselves in McKinley’s rhetoric with a familiar trio 
of words: civilization, humanity, and duty. This time, rather than going to war, Americans had a 
duty to the people who now found themselves under American rule. Speaking in Savanah 
Georgia in December 1898, McKinley emphasized these new duties: 
If it was duty to send them there, and duty required them to remain there, it was 
their clear duty to annihilate the fleet, take the city of Manila, and destroy the 
Spanish sovereignty in the archipelago. Having done all that in the line of duty, is 
there any less duty to remain there and give to the inhabitants protection and also 
our guidance to a better government, which will secure them peace and order and 
security in their life and property and in the pursuit of happiness?...Are we to sit 
down in our isolation and recognize no obligation to a struggling people whose 
present conditions we have contributed to make?...My fellow-citizens, whatever 
covenants duty has made for us in the year 1898 we must keep.138 
 
Fulfillment of one duty, ending Spanish oppression, begot a new set of duties for the United 
States. Unlike entering the war, the new set of responsibilities were a direct result of American 
military intervention. The United States was responsible for the Philippines because it was 
American forces that liberated the island, and now it was America’s responsibility to re-establish 
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civilization on the island. McKinley framed this final agreement as a covenant between the 
American people and duty. As a covenant in religious terms denotes an agreement between God 
and a chosen people, McKinley’s covenant was an agreement between the United States, God’s 
chosen nation, and a higher principle, civilization. 
McKinley’s most ardent defense of America’s covenant, and newfound world status, was 
delivered in Boston at the “Home Market Club Dinner,” in February 1899. Intervention in the 
affairs of uncivilized states did not require the consent of those people. In Boston, McKinley 
enquired, “Did we need their consent to perform a great act for humanity?...Was it necessary to 
ask their consent to capture Manila, the capital of their islands? Did we ask consent to liberate 
them from Spanish sovereignty, or to enter Manila Bay and destroy the Spanish sea-power 
there?”139 Responding for the audience, McKinley firmly averred, “We did not ask these things; 
we were obeying a higher moral obligation, which rested on us and which did not require 
anybody’s consent. We were doing our duty by them as God gave us the light to see our duty, 
with the consent of our own consciences and with the approval of civilization.”140  Civilization 
and duty work together creating a warrant for future intervention abroad. Similar to America’s 
duty to protect the Philippines, the United States had an obligation to protect civilization. Where 
chaos threatened the institutions of civilization, the United States could intervene to contain and 
pushback the uncivilized threat. No approval was needed, as a duty to the moral and legal 
authority of civilization permitted American intervention in the affairs of uncivilized states. 
Civilization separated the world into two camps: nations that could intervene and those that 
could not. Civilized nations were subjects with the power to act, while uncivilized states lost 
autonomy and were acted upon by civilized states. Yet, for McKinley the United States faced 
consequences if it failed to live up to its obligations. 
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McKinley returned to his religious theme in his “Third Annual Message,” delivered in 
December 1899, but added consequences for the United States if America broke its covenant. 
Accepting its responsibility in the Philippines brought with it “a great opportunity,”141 but failure 
to live up to its responsibility, such as abandoning the islands, would dishonor the United States 
in the eyes of the civilized world. Worse yet, the Philippines would be left to first “anarchy and 
finally to barbarism.” This uncivilized state was bad enough, but an even worse fate awaited the 
islands. McKinley worried that the islands would be flung like “a golden apple of discord, 
among the rival powers, no one of which could permit another to seize them unquestioned.”142 In 
reference to the golden apple, McKinley referenced the apple that tempted Adam and Eve in the 
garden of Eden, leading to the downfall of humankind. For McKinley, the Philippines were the 
golden apple that would bring other great powers into conflict over the islands. Thus, further 
warfare, destruction, and death would be brought to the islands if America shirked its 
responsibility to civilization. British and French officials even urged McKinley to retain the 
islands, so that Germany could not annex the islands.143 Such was the temptation of the 
Philippines to European powers, and the fragility of relations between them, that one 
disagreement over a prized port and fueling station might lead to a great power war—a war 
delayed until 1914. A dereliction of American duty in the Philippines was a failure by the United 
States to uphold the standard of civilization. “Such an arrangement,” McKinley concluded, 
“would involve at the outset a cruel breach of faith.”144 If the United States failed to live up to its 
treaty obligations, its covenant with civilization would be breached. For McKinley, the United 
States must act in accordance the principles of civilization and humanity, otherwise the honor 




Toward a Better Tomorrow: The Progress of the World 
 The United States had been expanding its territory and institutions westward since its 
inception. With the conclusion of the wars against the American Indians in the late nineteenth 
century, the Census Bureau concluded the American frontier had closed in its 1890 report. The 
Census Bureau wrote, “Up to and including 1880 the country had a frontier of settlement, but at 
present the unsettled area has been so broken into by isolated bodies of settlement that there can 
hardly be said to be a frontier line. In the discussion of its extent, its westward movement, etc., it 
can not [sic], therefore, any longer have a place in the census reports.”145 American progress on 
the continent had ended, and historian Fredrick Jackson Turner seized upon these words 
critiquing the importance of the frontier in American history.  
In his thesis, Jackson concluded, “The existence of an area of free land, its continuous 
recession, and the advance of American settlement westward, explain American 
development.”146 For Jackson, the frontier was “the meeting point between savagery and 
civilization.”147 The availability of this frontier offered Americans a continual renewal deeply 
influencing the character of the nation. “This perennial rebirth, this fluidity of American life, this 
expansion westward with its new opportunities, its continuous touch with the simplicity of 
primitive society,” noted Jackson, furnished “the forces dominating American character.”148 The 
frontier also offered the “most rapid and effective” means to Americanizing immigrants. The 
frontier offered an opportunity for all people to escape the hardships they had by moving west. 
Between 1820 and 1840, 700,000 immigrants arrived in America. The next twenty years saw 4.2 
million immigrants arrive. But the wave of immigration between 1870 and 1910 was the largest 
by far with some 20 million foreigners entering the United States.149 With the frontier closed and 
new land no longer available, the United States’ progress was halted. The Spanish-American 
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War and the newly gained territories offered McKinley, and the United States, a new frontier. In 
this section, I present three main arguments. First, the concept of progress was critical to 
civilization’s health. Progress was a necessary component of a civilized state. Second, the 
materialization of progress took many different forms from post-offices to self-governing 
institutions. Third, McKinley presented a vision of a world order built around progress and 
American liberalism. 
As early as October 1898, McKinley recognized progress as the key driving force behind 
civilization. Speaking at a banquet in Chicago, Illinois, McKinley told his fellow countrymen: 
The progress of a nation can alone prevent degeneration. There must be new life 
and purpose or there will be weakness and decay. There must be broadening of 
thought as well as broadening of trade. Territorial expansion is not alone and 
always necessary to national advancement. There must be a constant movement 
toward a higher and nobler civilization, a civilization that shall make its conquests 
without resort to war, and achieve its greatest victories pursuing the arts of peace. 
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Civilizations needed to progress. Without progress, civilizations stagnate in all areas of society, 
from economics to scientific and technological research to cultural advancements. To maintain 
their place among civilized nations, the United States needed to find areas to push its boundaries, 
whether physical or ideological. Progress was a key defining trait of a civilized society. 
Uncivilized nations failed to move forward, eventually entering entropy, decaying, and finally 
dying. Viewing war as a destructive and backwards process, McKinley wanted to move the 
country forward, finding new peaceful ways to advance American civilization. With American 
traditions of progress being grounded in the liberal beliefs of individual freedom, the free 
exchange of goods and services, and representative democracy, the peaceful tutelage of lesser 
nations was a possible avenue to expand America’s frontier.151  In pursuing peace, the United 
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States had an opportunity to progress American civilization outside of its borders by spreading 
liberal institutions to the Philippines.  
The benefits of civilization were diverse, and included education, self-government, and a 
modern postal system. After outlining a broad belief in progress, a few months later in December 
1898, McKinley delivered his “Second Annual Message.” In it, he proposed creating a postal 
system in the Philippines. McKinley described the postal system as part of a “well-ordered 
union.” He further expounded, “It would be strange were the nations not in time brought to 
realize that modern civilization, which owes so much of its progress to the annihilation of space 
by the electric force, demands that this all-important means of communication be a heritage of all 
peoples, to be administered and regulated in their common behoof.”152 Postal services were a 
sign of civilization, shrinking the time it took for a message to travel from one place to another, 
whether over an ocean or vast continent. Postal services defined a nation as civilized because it 
represented the manipulation and control of time and space through technological progress. 
Having the power to control information, its transmission, and the speed of transmission was a 
symbol of civilization. Being part of this civilized world, meant coming together with other 
civilized governments to agree on the technical standards and common procedures for 
international rail transport, post, and telegraphy.153 Thus, McKinley connected being part of the 
postal system with being part of the larger civilized international community. Civilized nations 
made technological contributions to the international community, making the manipulation of 
time and space possible. As well as agreeing on the standards for communication and travel, 
civilized states controlled how information flowed, who could travel, and where they could go. 
Civilized nations needed to continue to push these boundaries and make these technological 
advancements, otherwise their societies would stagnate and be left behind. Either other nations 
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would surpass them or the whole of human civilization would decay and move backwards. Key 
to continuing progress was better education and more access to better education. 
John Stuart Mill, in 1836, recognized education was necessary to rectify any defects of 
civilized society and to continue civilization’s progress.154 Without it, societies would crumble. 
Education was a key theme in both McKinley’s Third and Fourth Annual Messages to Congress. 
A proper education would help the Filipinos progress as a people. Though the Filipinos were not 
ready for self-government in 1899, a proper education might allow them to follow in America’s 
footsteps in the future. In his “Third Annual Address,” McKinley stated, education was the basis 
for “future moral and industrial advancement of the [Filipino] people.”155 A proper education 
helped improve the lives of citizens on the island and was necessary for uncivilized people 
around the world to join the ranks of civilized states. Such an education “will commend to them 
[the Filipinos] in a peculiarly effective manner the blessings of free government.”156 By 
McKinley’s “Fourth Annual Address” in 1900, the United States was the legal protector and 
instructor of the Philippines. As their mentor on the path toward civilization, it was the United 
States’ responsibility to aid in the proper instruction of the Filipinos. In his “Fourth Annual 
Message,” McKinley proclaimed, the “fundamental requirement for all people” was the access to 
a good education. As responsible emancipators of the Philippines, it fell upon the United States, 
according to McKinley, to “promote and extend, and . . . to improve the system of education 
already inaugurated by the military authorities.”157 A good education created the basis for a 
cultured and prepared citizenry, making self-government possible. Being an educated people was 
a necessary requirement of being a member of civilized society. The Filipinos in 1899-1900, 
were not able to be a self-governing people because they lacked the formal education that makes 
good democratic citizens, but under American tutelage they could one day.  
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Education was only one aspect of society necessary for a civilized nation, and the larger 
task placed before McKinley and the United States was not going to be easy. Enumerating the 
benefits of accepting America’s civilizing vision for the world, McKinley provided a vision of an 
international society built on nineteenth century American liberal values. His vision was a crude 
precursor to Wilson’s liberal internationalism. In his 1899 speech at the Boston banquet, 
McKinley boldly accepted responsibility for the future of the Philippines. The United States 
would not rule as imperial overlords. Rather, they offered the Filipinos a “guiding hand and the 
liberalizing influences, the generous sympathies, the uplifting education, not of their American 
masters, but of their American emancipators.”158 Nineteenth century liberalism often sought to 
“offer ‘tutelage’ to people facing barriers of political, economic and cultural ‘backwardness’ that 
hindered their ‘maturity.’”159 Later in his Boston speech, McKinley argued for a brighter future 
for the Philippines, by bringing civilization and all of the blessings it brings. McKinley spoke 
about the transformation and his final vision of the islands: 
a land of plenty and of increasing possibilities; a people redeemed from savage 
indolence and habits, devoted to the arts of peace, in touch with the commerce 
and trade of all nations, enjoying the blessings of freedom, of civil and religious 
liberty, of education, and of homes, and whose children and children’s children 
shall for ages hence bless the American republic because it emancipated and 
redeemed their fatherland, and set them in the pathway of the world’s best 
civilization.160 
 
McKinley described the United States as the protagonist in this narrative, redeeming the hopeless 
Filipinos from a life of barbarism. Through hard work over many years, the United States—and 
civilization—would prevail over the dark forces of savagery and barbarism. The Philippines 
would be a mini-United States complete with civil and religious liberties. Similarly, Turner 
Jackson’s theory of how the United States’ frontier Americanized immigrants offered another 
insight. The new frontier of conquered territories would Americanize the native inhabitants, 
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making them civilized peoples in the mold of the Americans. McKinley defined civilization as a 
progressive force in the world, and the United States was the main actor who enacted 
civilization’s liberalizing vision. 
Europeans thinkers of the era began to connect notions of progress, especially the idea of 
civilized superiority, as a long historical progression from Ancient Greeks to modern day 
Europeans. For civilized nations, progress itself was “considered to be self-generating through 
characteristics internal to the West.”161 This interpretation of progress buttressed European’s 
belief in their superiority, as though progress was a genetic characteristic expressed in European 
thinking. American ideas of progress were different. Writing of the United States, historian Eric 
Hobsbawm observed, “in the United States ‘progress’ was a national ideology.”162 Americans 
were of “the popular belief that the seat of civilization had over the centuries traveled west, from 
ancient China to Rome to Great Britain and finally to America.”163 The physical frontier of the 
United States may have closed in 1890, but the ideological frontier was just opening. A world 
full of potential, with peoples yearning to accept America’s liberal institutions awaited. Progress, 
similar to duty, necessitated the United States expand its ideological reach. As McKinley noted 
in 1898, a nation that does not progress, stagnates and decays. To remain strong, to remain at the 
forefront of civilization, the United States needed to spread its own unique conception of 
civilization. Unlike Europe, which dominated its colonies and did not openly embrace liberal 
political or economic policies, except Great Britain, the United States would spread liberal 
institutions and values. The American republic would emancipate uncivilized barbarians from 






Civilization represented a set of principles originally adopted by the great powers of 
Europe, with the United States and Japan being late adapters. The military and technological 
power of these countries forced this standard upon the rest of the world. However, it is important 
to note that for nations outside the “civilized” world progress and civilization were not seen as a 
blessing, especially at the expense of civilized nation tutelage. Rather, “‘Progress’ outside the 
advanced countries was therefore neither an obvious fact nor a plausible assumption, but mainly 
a foreign danger and challenger.”164 As Europeans enshrined the standard of civilization into 
international law, the “violence of the letter” Derrida observed separated and subordinated 
uncivilized cultures and nations to the standard of civilization. Progress was made at the expense 
of uncivilized states, as civilized powers implemented changes to their cultural, political, and 
social structures.  
Yet, much of McKinley’s rhetoric overlooked this potential pitfall. Rather, McKinley 
adopted the rhetoric of civilization, adapting it to fit the unique domestic contexts of the United 
States. He aligned America’s interpretation of civilization with its attitudes toward religion, 
progress, and race, tailoring his rhetoric to meet his audience’s beliefs. By doing so, McKinley’s 
discourse helped persuade Americans to support a war and peace settlement built on the legal 
and moral framework of civilization. Furthermore, in adopting a rhetoric of civilization, 
McKinley socialized the country into the Family of Nations. America’s motivations, 
encompassed in rhetoric, signaled to other great powers that the United States met not only the 
material requirements of being a great power but the principles of civilization as well.  
McKinley’s rhetoric focused on Americans’ duty to fulfill civilization’s precepts. First, 
during the Cuba crisis and Spanish-American War, the United States had a duty to civilization 
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and humanity. McKinley’s conception of duty necessitated action on behalf of the oppressed 
people of Cuba. To be a civilized nation, meant the United States could not overlook the barbaric 
atrocities happening at its doorstep. McKinley’s rhetoric aligned with the religious and moral 
beliefs of many Americans of the era. Furthermore, McKinley undertook war on behalf of 
humanity and civilization, setting the precedent for future interventions by the U.S. on behalf of 
oppressed peoples. Second, when deciding whether to keep the Philippines, McKinley again 
appealed to civilization and humanity. This time because the United States had a duty to help the 
Filipinos progress toward civilization. Progress was used as a key modifier to civilization, 
becoming a force pushing peoples around the world to reach for the standard of civilization. 
Third, for American citizens, progress meant more technological and scientific research, raising 
the standard of civilization even higher. Thus, creating a vicious circle where great powers push 
the boundaries of civilization further, forcing uncivilized nations to meet constantly moving 
goals. Such a cycle ensured the great powers kept their position and remained unchallenged by 
uncivilized states who could not meet such high standards. The connection between civilization 
and progress continued after McKinley, including in Woodrow Wilson’s rhetoric. Mary Stuckey 
wrote, “In this formulation, the ‘decay’ of ‘weaker’ civilizations had nothing to do with the 
actions of Americans or the American government but was the product of historical 
inevitability.”165 However, the term civilization underwent a dramatic change after World War 
II. 
 After McKinley, the world changed significantly over the course of the next fifty years. 
Highlighted by two catastrophic world wars and the downfall of most civilized states, the 
resonance of civilization faded. Civilization was closely tied to European colonialism, 
subjugating millions of native inhabitants to European rule. Post-World War II international 
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society saw a decolonial movement across much of the world, with native inhabitants 
overthrowing European colonial governments—the United States granted the Philippines 
independence in 1946. However, such a powerful ideograph did not simply disappear but 
morphed into something else. Political scientist Gerrit Gong offered two possible routes of 
evolution for civilization: “standard of human rights” and “standard of modernity.” For our 
purposes, the “standard of human rights” appears to resemble McKinley’s conception of 
civilization and humanity. Civilization did not disappear, rather it transformed into the legal 
standard and “principle of respect for and protection of human rights.”166 Such rights, including 
the protection of life, liberty, property, and individual dignity, were embedded in articles 55 and 
56 of the United Nations Charter and the Declaration on Human Rights.167 This new standard 
appears to encompass the more universal aspect of humanity from McKinley’s rhetoric, without 
the violent separation of the world into civilized and uncivilized states.
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Chapter 3 The Citizen-Soldier: Redefining Citizenship 
Over a ten-day span in 1898, William McKinley gave 57 speeches in various small towns 
and large cities across the Midwest to garner public support for the Treaty of Paris, which ended 
the Spanish-American War. The tour began in Iowa on October 11, 1898, and ended in Ohio on 
October 21, with stops in Illinois, Missouri, and Indiana. In 1899, McKinley went on a second 
Midwestern speaking tour, giving 79 speeches over twelve days. The second Midwestern tour 
began on October 6, 1899, and ended on October 18, making stops in Illinois, Indiana, 
Minnesota, Wisconsin, North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa, and Ohio. Throughout both tours, 
McKinley argued for keeping the territory won during the Spanish-American War, a major 
departure in U.S. foreign policy. McKinley asserted the American flag was already there and 
abandoning the islands would be dishonorable. The tours presented McKinley with many 
epideictic speaking opportunities, providing multiple occasions to reimagine American 
citizenship, aligning with his new foreign policy agenda. 
By the 1890s, the United States was neither a new country nor one unfamiliar with war, 
but it was unaccustomed to fighting wars on foreign soil. The nation gained its independence 
through a war, fought a costly Civil War, and, through a series of small wars against native 
inhabitants expanded across the continent. Yet, the Spanish-American War was the first foreign 
war for the country, asking Americans to fight and die on foreign soil. During the Spanish-
American War, Americans fought for country, but they also fought for civilization and the 
freedom of peoples ranging from those just off the American shore, in Cuba, to those in the 
middle of the Pacific Ocean, in the Philippines. This change in motive required a redefinition of 
both U.S. citizens and the United States itself. This chapter seeks to examine the former, with 
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Chapter 4 focusing on the latter. That is, this chapter explores the following question: How did 
McKinley reimagine American citizenship to fit with a more active U.S. foreign policy? 
I argue because of America’s new international role McKinley reimagined citizenship 
through epideictic discourse, highlighting national patriotism and unity, both of which became 
key characteristics of his new model of citizenship—the citizen-soldier. The citizen-soldier trope 
in rhetoric has been with the country since its founding, with rhetorical scholar Jennifer Mercieca 
calling it the patriot hero, one of the country’s founding fictions.1 Yet, the usefulness of this 
trope was limited by its connection to the past, as the patriot hero defended the U.S Constitution 
and Americans but did not go abroad to fight for U.S. values or end tyranny. Therefore, 
McKinley needed to update the trope, reflecting the new situation the country found itself in the 
autumn of 1898. McKinley used the epideictic opportunities of his speaking tours to redefine and 
imbue the citizen-soldier with the values needed as the country became a great power.  
To make this argument, I examine citizenship during the Gilded Age, focusing on Mary 
Stuckey’s work on Cleveland’s conception of U.S. citizens. Cleveland conceived of citizens as 
good workers, discussing citizenship in terms of money and work, but such framing, as I argue, 
buckled under the economic pressures of the era requiring a new definition of citizenship. I 
follow this by discussing how presidents can use epideictic rhetoric to shape the country’s values 
and reconstitute the American people. In my analysis, I make four main arguments. First, 
McKinley appealed to Americans sense of national patriotism and service. Second, McKinley 
used the Civil War as a public memory of disunion, replacing it with the Spanish-American War 
as a new memory of unity. McKinley’s use of epideictic rhetoric sought to invigorate a sense of 
unity and patriotism in the country, overcoming economic and cultural divisions. Third, 
McKinley emphasized the citizen-soldier’s commitment to duty and republican civic virtue, 
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acting as a model for Americans and peoples throughout the world to follow. McKinley’s 
citizen-solider was also defined by his manliness, affirming men’s place in society. Finally, 
McKinley’s rhetoric promoted the ideology of republican motherhood, relegating women to the 
private, non-political sphere.  
A Divided Nation: A Need for A New Definition of Citizenship 
When Grover Cleveland won the presidency in 1884 and again in 1892, he was charged 
with maintaining, balancing, and preserving order within the United States, a task that was 
becoming increasingly difficult as the nation expanded. America’s ability to assimilate 
multitudes of new immigrants, along with an increasingly active women’s movement and 
various other groups vying for political salience, created tensions throughout the nation. 
According to Mary Stuckey, Cleveland balanced these demands “in ways that legitimized 
persistent ascriptive hierarchies, encouraged the disciplinary project of assimilating citizens, and 
naturalized continuing economic stratifications.”2 During Cleveland’s two non-consecutive 
terms, money remained the one reliable indicator of an individual’s worth. As Stuckey succinctly 
explained, “Citizenship was about money,” and a citizen’s “civic duty was thus rendered into the 
language of commerce.”3 Cleveland defined a good citizen as a good worker. Good citizens 
found their place in the national hierarchy, accepted their role, and did their job, understanding 
and trusting others in society to faithfully execute their assigned role to achieve the best results 
for the country. Cleveland’s rhetoric of hierarchy, social stratification, and commerce may have 
been successful during his first term (1885-1889), but during his second term (1893-1897) it 
exacerbated social and sectional tensions in the country. Moreover, a citizenship framed in 
economic terms did little in the face of McKinley’s exigency of the Spanish-American War and 
America’s new role in the world. 
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The United States at the end of the nineteenth century was still divided, slowly healing 
from the Civil War, but still suffering setbacks. Though the Civil War had ended 25 years before 
the dawn of the 1890s, many in the North “still judged the South to be a backward and blighted 
region trapped in delusions of the Lost Cause.”4 Vanessa Beasley described the era thusly, “As 
the population’s differences grew at the end of the nineteenth century’s end, so did its 
discontents. At times, the only thing that the American people seemed to share was a federal 
government.”5 Even the federal government seemed to treat its citizens differently, giving whites 
full protection of the law, while minorities, especially blacks, faced increasing discrimination. 
White and black Americans were equals in the eyes of the Constitution, but in practice 
very little had changed since the Civil War. The United States, as it is still today, was embroiled 
in racial tensions, with the continued injustice of black Americans being treated as second class 
citizens in their own country. The case of Plessy v. Ferguson, decided in 1896, is perhaps most 
emblematic of the recodification of racial segregation throughout the South. Plessy vs. Ferguson 
enshrined the phrase “separate, but equal” into American political lexicon, until 1954 when 
Brown vs. Board of Education reversed it. Plessy ushered in the era of Jim Crowe laws, making 
blacks invisible in Southern politics. Writing about African American citizenship in the latter 
half of the nineteenth century, Mary Stuckey concluded, “Finally visible, but as yet 
undifferentiated, their exclusion was justified by characterizations of them as inimical to the 
national order, characterizations that applied to the group as a whole.”6 President Cleveland’s 
rhetoric included blacks in the polity, but in Cleveland’s rhetorical hierarchy, blacks were on a 
lower, if not the lowest, rung of society. Such a hierarchy allowed Cleveland to rhetorically 
maintain all citizens had guaranteed rights, but the lack of political power of minority groups, 
including women and blacks, meant Cleveland paid them little rhetorical attention. While 
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appearing to be oppressive and undemocratic, Stuckey argued, Cleveland did not see it this way 
because “each place [on the social hierarchy] was equally important, each place served the 
greater good, just in different ways…serving cooperatively in one’s appropriate place became 
the means for equal treatment.”7 Race was a problem Cleveland could bypass because of black’s 
anemic political power, but there were larger issues undermining Cleveland’s notion of 
citizenship that he could not dodge as easily. 
Cleveland’s conception of citizenship relied on the language of money and industry, but 
the Panic of 1893, a disastrous economic downturn, undercut the language of money. The Panic 
brought American industry and the economy as a whole to a standstill. Historian H.W. Brands 
described the effects of the Panic of 1893: “Consumers stopped purchasing, retailers canceled 
orders, factories shut down, workers drew pink slips, and commodity prices plunged. The iron 
and steel business was flattened overnight. Big, well-financed corporations retrenched and lived 
off reserves; smaller firms dissolved. Credit contracted with a suffocating sound.”8 Especially 
hard hit by the Panic was the farming community, primarily located in the West and South.  
An Atlantic article described the toll of the Panic on farmers, “Following the loss of profit 
has come also a certain loss of dignity. The tiller of the soil, who in the days of our fathers was 
the embodiment of economic independence and of civic virtue, has passed away. He is a stock 
figure no longer the orator, but only of the humorist. His relative social standing has been lost. 
The ‘sturdy yeoman’ has become the ‘hayseed.’”9 The agrarian West and South blamed falling 
agricultural prices on the Tariff Act of 1890. The tariff’s passage set off a political storm, 
polarizing the country, as historian H.W. Brands noted thusly, “as the agrarian West and South 
lined up against the tariff and the industrial Northeast lobbied in favor.”10 Farmers took offense 
that protected industries benefited from a higher tariff but almost no farmers did. Moreover, 
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farmers found it onerous that they had to buy their equipment on a protected market, with no 
competition, but had to sell on an unprotected and competitive market.11 
The West and South also took issue with United States currency policy, specifically the 
gold standard. The 1873 Coinage Act slipped through Congress and was signed by president 
U.S. Grant essentially demonetizing silver. The Act firmly put the United States on the gold 
standard, abolishing the right and ability to turn silver bullion into legal tender.12 With the 
economic downturn in 1893 and the discovery of silver deposits in Nevada, Colorado, and Utah, 
many Western silver mine owners referred to “the demonetization of silver as ‘the Crime of 
’73.’” Indebted farmers, mainly located in the West and South, also “took up the epithet…as they 
felt the tightening pinch of ‘sound money’ and looked to inflation for relief.”13 Those in the 
South and West found their champion in William Jennings Bryan, the Democratic nominee in 
1896, who decried these economic policies in his “Cross of Gold” speech. In it, Bryan 
concluded, “We will answer their demand for a gold standard by saying to them: You shall not 
press down upon the brow of labor this crown of thorns; you shall not crucify mankind upon a 
cross of gold.”14 Northeast business fears were palpable in the New York Times headline the 
following day: “THE SILVER FANATICS ARE INVINCIBLE: Wild, Raging, Irresistible Mob 
Which Nothing Can Turn from Its Abominable Foolishness. SOUND-MONEY MEN SURELY 
DOOMED TO DEFEAT.”15 Economic issues split the nation and the election of 1896, with the 
South and West voting heavily in favor of the bimetallist and populist Bryan, while McKinley 
heavily won the industrial northeast and Middle Atlantic.16 The nation seemed more divided by 
region and class, with labor strikes threatening to undo the economic hierarchy. 
The good citizen as a good worker formula of citizenship was straining under the 
pressure of the Panic of 1893. The souring of the economy saw some of America’s largest and 
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most violent labor strikes in its history—the Homestead and Pullman Strikes.17 Contemporary 
historian Brooks Adams wrote of the American economy at the time, “friction will infallibly 
exist between capital and labor,”18 but the U.S. economy will falter only “if her administrative 
machinery generates friction unduly.”19 Adams placed the undue friction in the American 
economy at the feet of capital’s treatment of labor, writing, “Derange them [the workers] and 
there would immediately follow an equivalent loss of energy [in America’s economic 
machinery].”20 Citizens were finding it more difficult to find and stay in their designated place in 
Cleveland’s economic hierarchy. 
Cleveland’s definition of citizenship and rhetorical hierarchy were failing. Citizens found 
it harder to fulfill their role, while others prospered off their backs. The United States was 
becoming the land of the working poor, with factory workers and farmers finding it increasingly 
difficult to make ends meet, while owners accumulated vast amounts of wealth. A new definition 
of citizenship was needed. The Spanish-American War offered McKinley the chance to redefine 
Americans, as the war had momentarily united the country against an outside enemy. 
McKinley’s decision to go on two speaking tours offered him epideictic opportunities to recast 
American citizenship, using the feelings of national unity and patriotism to solidify his new 
definition. 
Creating Rhetorical Community Through Epideictic Rhetoric 
 Presidents face a difficult task in creating unity in the United States because of the 
diversity of races, creeds, and other identifying beliefs in the United States. “Americans at any 
given time have different sets of identities,” according to Mary Stuckey, “which, taken together 
in their contradictory complexity, are variously composed of their experiences of national and 
international history, race(s), class, gender, region, sexuality, and life history.”21 However, 
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through the use of epideictic rhetoric, presidents are able to reconstitute the American people, the 
Inaugural Address being the most notable opportunity, but also through other epideictic 
occasions. As Campbell and Jamieson have written, “all presidents have the opportunity to 
persuade us to conceive of ourselves in ways compatible with their views of government and the 
world. At the same time presidents invite us to see them, the presidency, the country, and the 
country’s role in specific ways.”22 Presidents can use epideictic’s value appeals to create a shared 
identity. Vanessa Beasley observed, “U.S. presidents can use these themes not only to speak 
about allegedly constitutive American ideals, the backbone of the shared belief hypothesis, but 
also to promote more specific attitudinal postures that these ideals necessitate.”23 Epideictic 
occasions for presidents provide them with opportunities to reaffirm and reinvigorate communal 
values, but also to lay the ground work for policy initiatives.24 Epideictic rhetoric, through its 
praise and censuring functions, plays an important role in a president’s ability to reshape 
communal values and definitions of citizenship. The remainder of this section discusses the 
rhetorical strategies available to presidents during epideictic encounters. 
 Epideictic rhetoric presents rhetors and audiences with opportunities to reflect, 
contemplate, and reimagine communal definitions and values. In discussing epideictic rhetoric 
and reflection, Gerard Hauser remarked epideictic rhetoric encourages “the constitutive activity” 
of “reflecting on public norms for proper political conduct.”25 During the epideictic encounter, it 
is the rhetor’s responsibility to carve out and create a “timeless, consubstantial space” for 
reflection.26 These moments of reflection “help us to scrutinize our own privately and publicly 
held beliefs and prejudices, to evaluate them, and to decide whether to reaffirm or reform 
them.”27 In this timeless space, epideictic rhetoric can act as a “force for change.”28 Epideictic 
speech, according to Cynthia Sheard, “moves its audience toward a process of critical reflection 
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that goes beyond evaluation toward envisioning and actualizing alternative realities.”29 Alternate 
realities are a possibility, because despite the apparent permanence of epideictic narratives, as 
Denise Bostdorff noted, “they actually are quite fluid, for rhetors choose which narratives they 
wish to promote and which values and heroes they want to privilege.”30 The rhetor may employ 
new or reimagine older rhetorical symbols, imbuing them with the virtues they want to instill in 
the community. These symbols can be used to “inculcate change” and “challenge old prejudices 
and imagine new worlds.”31 As the new symbols and narratives coalesce through the epideictic 
encounter, one, “real” world is made probable through epideictic performance. John Murphy 
explained that such a world comes into being through “a collaborative creation of speaker and 
audience as they establish the appropriate relationship between each other in a new world.”32 
Through epideictic rhetoric’s reflective function, rhetors can shape cultural values by 
emphasizing particular values and narratives above others. This reordering of values, or the 
introduction of new values, creates a new vision and alternative paths forward for communities. 
 As one new reality becomes evident during the epideictic encounter, it is in these 
moments presidents can reimagine citizenship. To be successful, there are a few critical 
rhetorical strategies presidents can use. Epideictic rhetoric is part of a larger set of communal 
ritual performances intended to “preserve cultural traditions, collective memory, and political 
order—not to stand apart from or transcend them.”33 As part of communal rituals, epideictic 
rhetoric instructs “audiences in communal rights, duties, and responsibilities by contrasting 
praiseworthy to blameworthy customs of conduct.”34 Epideictic rhetoric allows a rhetor to instill 
cultural values in a community by praising particular virtues or blaming other unwanted values. 
Another strategy, according to rhetorician Scott Consigny, in his study of Gorgias, is the ability 
to adapt terminology to the audience and to deploy commonplaces or accentuate their 
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importance.35 Celeste Condit expounded upon these ideas by creating pairs: 
definition/understanding and shaping/sharing of community. For each pair, the first term 
indicates the function for the speaker, and the second the function for the audience. When some 
event, person, group or object is confusing, troubling or new, speakers employ epideictic rhetoric 
using the define/understand function. Here, rhetors use the power of epideictic to explain the 
social world, defining and explaining events facing a society in terms of the audience’s values 
and beliefs. In the case of McKinley’s rhetoric, the new exigency was the United States fighting 
a war overseas. To explain this new event, McKinley would need to define the United States’ 
and American citizens’ roles in terms familiar and relatable to them. Through this function, the 
speaker gains the power to define the issue or event, while the audience gains a better 
understanding of what is occurring. The second pairing, shaping/sharing community is closely 
related to the first. A sense of community, be it local or national, is developed and maintained 
through epideictic rhetoric and relies on shared heritage and identity. By taking time to work 
through new experiences and definitions, in the shared reflective space of the epideictic 
encounter, rhetors, especially presidents, can strengthen the bonds between individuals by 
explaining to them what virtues and values they share. Presidents will likely employ familiar 
rhetorical symbols and tropes, helping reaffirm a community’s sense of belonging, heritage, and 
identity, fulfilling the shaping/sharing function. 
In the subsequent sections, I explore McKinley’s use of epideictic rhetoric, its 
transformative power, and the changes in American citizenship it articulated. Epideictic rhetoric 
offered McKinley a powerful rhetorical strategy to praise the values of national patriotism and 
unity, reimagining Americans as exemplars of these virtues. To support his argument, McKinley 
used the commonplace of the citizen-soldier as a model of republican citizenship, giving citizens 
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an ideal to imitate. By using these strategies, McKinley tore down the stratified economic 
hierarchy of Cleveland. He replaced it with a citizenship based on service that was theoretically 
open to all Americans, fostering internal cohesion in the country. While he does not transform 
Americans into the transcendent global citizens based on a shared ideology of Woodrow Wilson, 
he does begin the rhetorical shift of strengthening America’s shared national, not regional, 
identity based on universal values that can be exported. 
An Era of Patriotism: The Beginnings of a New Citizen 
Following the Spanish-American War, McKinley undertook his two speaking tours of the 
Midwest. On these tours, he had over a hundred epideictic speaking opportunities. Seizing on 
epideictic’s transformative characteristics, McKinley began to reimagine U.S. citizens to fit with 
the new reality facing the country, one which required the nation and its citizens to take a more 
active role. Throughout the tour, McKinley continually reinforced the importance of American 
patriotism. Patriotism has been a critical value since the founding of the United States. As 
Mercieca has written, “There was little room for a ‘patriot subject’ in the old monarchical fiction, 
but once monarchical subjects were cast as republican citizens, patriotism could be the defining 
characteristic of every American.”36 An American patriot at the Founding “was one who 
defended the constitution from corruption, thereby acting above party and faction to preserve 
liberty of all.”37 By 1885, patriotism under McKinley’s predecessors, Grover Cleveland and 
Benjamin Harrison, was defined in monetary terms. However, similar to Cleveland’s definition 
of citizenship, this definition of patriotism was buckling under the economic turbulence of the 
era. Before examining McKinley’s conception of patriotism, where he redefined patriotism as a 
citizen’s service to the country, I want to overview Cleveland’s and Harrison’s rhetoric of 
economic patriotism and its pitfalls. 
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Cleveland’s patriotic rhetoric, like his rhetoric of citizenship, was framed in the language 
of money and work. Speaking about the tariff in his “Third Annual Message,” Cleveland stated, 
“But if in the emergency that presses upon us our manufacturers are asked to surrender 
something for the public good and to avert disaster, their patriotism, as well as a grateful 
recognition of advantages already afforded, should lead them to willing cooperation.”38 The 
corporation was the patriotic entity sacrificing for the country, not the citizen, who was relegated 
to a passive role. In his “Fourth Annual Message,” Cleveland recognized the growing wealth gap 
between capital and labor, remarking, corporations are “fast becoming the people's masters.”39 
To restrain these interests, Cleveland called upon the patriotic citizen, stating, “it is our duty as 
patriotic citizens to inquire at the present stage of our progress how the bond of the Government 
made with the people has been kept and performed.”40 But this request from Cleveland 
contradicted his own definition of citizenship. For Cleveland, Americans were to be satisfied 
good workers, working diligently and not disrupting the system. But here they were supposed to 
question the bonds between citizen, government, and corporation, a role hardly suited for the 
good citizen finding his place in the hierarchy and remaining there. Continuing in his “Fourth 
Annual Message,” Cleveland admitted to the dangers of a language of money, stating, “The 
existing situation is injurious to the health of our entire body politic. It stifles in those for whose 
benefit it is permitted all patriotic love of country, and substitutes in its place selfish greed and 
grasping avarice.”41  
Cleveland’s successor and predecessor, Benjamin Harrison also framed patriotism in 
economic terms. Remarking on the friction between labor and capital over wages, Harrison 
stated, “A general process of wage reduction can not be contemplated by any patriotic citizen 
without the gravest apprehension.”42 The interest of the patriotic individual was framed in 
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relation to how much he could earn or how much he would lose by acting. Sacrifice for the 
country became a cost/benefit analysis, with the love of one’s country replaced by the cold, 
calculating thought of how much an action benefited each citizen. Economic patriotism would 
not be an effective model during the Spanish-American War or going out into the world because 
it created friction and division, not unity, between citizens. It limited a citizen’s role to being a 
worker, with no responsibility for protecting or promoting American values, and was based on 
the language of money, not the language of sacrifice, duty or love of one’s country. 
Dividing the United States was a set of economic and cultural issues; however, McKinley 
declared throughout his two speaking tours the end of sectionalism and the birth of an era of 
patriotism. For McKinley, he praised patriotism as a virtue all citizens should possess and 
defined patriotism through a citizen’s service to the nation. According to McKinley, at a stop in 
St. Paul, Minnesota, “The patriotism of the American people takes the place of a large standing 
army.”43 In Aberdeen, South Dakota, McKinley stated, “You got it from your fathers; and it is a 
patriotism that never deserts and never encourages desertion.”44 American patriotism had always 
defended the nation because it was embodied in the spirit of every citizen from generation to 
generation. Unlike a patriotism based on money, McKinley’s definition of patriotism of service 
was available to all (male) Americans, not just the wealthy or the powerful. For McKinley, the 
visible demonstration of a citizen’s patriotism was their willingness to serve the nation. In Cedar 
Rapids, Iowa, McKinley remarked of the patriot’s willingness to volunteer, “To the Executive’s 
call for volunteers no more prompt response was received than came from the patriotic people of 
the South and the West.”45 Patriotism as service to America was a virtue that resided in the hearts 
of all Americans, and stirred them to action upon McKinley’s request. 
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Americans’ patriotism was the virtue that conquered the disputes between capital and 
labor, between Northerner and Southerner, and between Republican and Democrat. For citizens, 
part of being a patriot was placing their love of country over regional disputes, supporting the 
federal government and the constitution. In an 1898 stop in Denison, Iowa, and an 1899 stop in 
Quincy, Illinois, McKinley announced an era of patriotism. Patriotism was responsible for 
erasing political party lines and partisanship of past generations. The voice of partisanship was 
hushed, with only “the voice of patriotism . . . heard throughout the land.”46 “Patriotism is an all-
conquering sentiment in the American heart,” according to McKinley in Lake Preston, “It 
triumphs over mere politics.”47 For McKinley, a patriotic citizen placed his or her love of the 
country above any one political issue. McKinley praised the patriotic citizen, who forgot about 
the animosities he held against other Americans and instead joined together for the good of the 
United States. The true American citizen thought of himself as an American first, and any other 
identity second. 
Patriotism was praised as a virtue of a good citizen, while the unpatriotic voices opining 
against McKinley’s policies were harshly condemned. Speaking in Canton, Illinois, in 1899, 
McKinley declared, “He who would stir up animosities between North and the South is denied a 
hearing in both sections.”48 Upon reaching Cedar Falls, Iowa, ten days later, he stated, “The 
orator of hate, like the orator of despair, has no hearing in any section of our country.”49 In both 
cases, speakers seeking to sow division were labeled and criticized for their unpatriotic behavior 
and insidious motives. And in both cases, McKinley was supremely confident that these “orators 
of hate” would receive no hearing from the American people, who were unified in purpose and 
cause. McKinley most clearly articulated political unity as his motive for censuring un-patriotic 
speech in an 1898 speech in Creston, Iowa. He stated, “As we have been united and therefore 
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strong and invincible in the war, we must continue united until the end of this struggle; we must 
have no differences among ourselves while we are settling differences with another government. 
When we have made that settlement in the interest of justice and civilization and humanity, then 
we can resume our own domestic differences.”50 The great fear for McKinley was the recurrence 
of a divided home front during peace negotiations with Spain, threatening the peace treaty. 
While such denouncements may conjure images of totalitarian regimes, McKinley did not 
seek the end of political debate in the United States, only the divisiveness politics had become. 
While the military victory won a decisive peace for the United States, if the home front fractured 
along the squabbling sectional lines of 1896, America’s hard-fought peace could be in jeopardy.  
Echoes of this argument were present in a speech in Galena, Illinois, in 1899. There McKinley 
remarked, “We are now a united country, and we are united for the right; we are united for 
liberty; we are united for civilization; we are united for humanity; And being thus united, we are 
invincible.”51 Patriotic Americans recognized the importance of domestic unity in light of 
America’s larger role in the world. They could express their patriotism in two ways: volunteer 
and serve in the military or support those who did. 
 Patriotism united Americans in their service to the country, coming from every region to 
join one army under the flag of the Republic as citizen-soldiers. Such service demonstrated the 
connection between citizenship and military service.52 The citizen-soldier represented the true 
spirit of the patriot, whose obligation, in stark contrast to the career soldier or draftee, was 
unsullied by “state coercion and thus arguably more true to the citizen-soldier ideal.”53 
Americans displayed their patriotism throughout the war, as McKinley remarked in 1899, “Our 
troops represented the courage and conscience, the purpose and patriotism, of their country. 
Whether in Cuba, Porto Rico, or the Philippines, or at home awaiting orders, they did their full 
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duty, and all sought the post of greatest peril. They never faltered.”54 The American citizen-
soldier and the support of their fellow citizens represented the true mark of American patriotism. 
Unlike European states, who had large professional armies, the United States relied on the patriot 
to defend the nation. The citizen-soldier tradition arose in America from a fear of large standing 
armies being used as a tool of tyranny against its citizens. The earliest iteration of the citizen-
soldier was the patriot hero. As Jennifer Mercieca described, “the American citizen was now 
conceived of as the patriot hero who would defend liberty by eschewing parties and factions and 
supporting and defending the constitution.”55 Therefore, in the United States, a tradition arose of 
all free adult men responding to the call of duty, an act of political service, when a powerful 
tyrannical force threatened the freedom of U.S. citizens. Unlike previous iterations of patriotism 
and the citizen-soldier, McKinley’s conception traveled overseas. Wherever the American flag 
flew, the patriot’s heart and desire to defend the United States followed. 
Not every citizen, especially women, could serve as a citizen-soldier in 1898. For these 
citizens, McKinley relied on an early formation of the patriotic rhetoric of “Support the Troops.” 
Rhetorical scholar Roger Stahl wrote about the evolution of the rhetoric of “Support the Troops,” 
a common phrase to any of us remembering the post-9/11 George W. Bush years. There has 
always been patriotic rhetoric in the style of “Support the Troops,” but as Stahl observed, the 
twentieth century’s discourse was subtler in directing public attitudes toward conflicts. Stahl 
noted, such rhetoric “works as a regulatory mechanism for disciplining the civic sphere itself—
that is, it functions to subvert citizen deliberation.”56 McKinley’s rhetoric during his two October 
speaking tours promoted an early conception of this “support the troops” discourse for non-
citizen-soldiers. All Americans rushed to support the flag. Americans fighting overseas literally 
followed the flag into battle, while those at home supported the troops. For these citizens, there 
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was one requirement: support those who did go to war, in any way possible. Speaking in Lake 
Preston, South Dakota, in 1899, McKinley commented, “If the patriot, for any good reason, does 
not go to war himself, he always supports the soldier who does, and shelters and cares for his 
family while the head of it is at the front.”57  The orders were clear, for those who were unable to 
go to war, they must support those who could and help their families as well. Every American 
was expected to make sacrifices for the country during a time of war, those able should serve in 
the military, while those at home needed to support the war effort. 
McKinley’s conception of national patriotism was rooted in the citizen’s service to the 
country, either through directly volunteering to serve in the military or supporting the troops. He 
believed it was the citizen’s duty to serve, protect, and support the nation. Unlike placing citizens 
into a hierarchy, McKinley’s definition of citizenship was open to all and required their unity, as 
equals in supporting the United States. 
An End to Sectionalism 
McKinley’s speaking tour praised patriotic citizens who supported the citizen-soldier and 
McKinley’s foreign policy. Implied in this patriotic discourse was a second virtue: national 
unity. Americans’ should forget about the divisions at home, putting aside sectional issues, and 
focus on being a united nation. Throughout his speaking tours, McKinley needed to persuade 
citizens they were Americans first and Southerners or Northerners or Westerners second. 
Patriotic Americans support for their fellow citizens united the nation, lessening the 
sectional tensions that had divided them. The new reimagined citizenry of the United States 
would be united in duty and purpose, as McKinley sought to rhetorically mold citizens to fit the 
United States’ new position in the world. In Cedar Rapids, Iowa, in October 1898, McKinley 
stated, “No development of the war has been more gratifying and exalting than the complete 
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unification of the nation. Sectional lines have been obliterated; party differences have been 
hushed in the great chorus of patriotism which has been heard from one end of the country to the 
other.”58 Near the beginning of his 1899 tour, in Canton, Illinois, McKinley reiterated this point. 
In Canton, he remarked, “We are no longer a divided people.”59 However, such proclamations 
were hollow if citizens did not act on their desire to be a patriotic and united nation. Americans 
demonstrated their new national unity by answering the presidents call to serve. In Hoopestown, 
Illinois, McKinley remarked, “every State of the Union, North and South, rushed forward by 
hundreds of thousands to serve their country; and they will not abate their patriotism till every 
rebellion everywhere and by whomsoever conducted shall be put down.”60 Americans’ 
patriotism and response to McKinley’s call to serve helped ease divisive regional differences. In 
Fargo, North Dakota, in 1899, McKinley remarked, “The last eighteen months have born 
impressive testimony of the patriotism of the American people. The call for two hundred 
thousand troops was promptly responded to by the people of the United States, without respect to 
party, creed, section, or nationality.”61 McKinley’s emphasis on volunteerism and service united 
Americans across the country, lessening the importance of local identities in the face of external 
exigencies. Americans could focus their energy on combating the dangers lurking in the 
international sphere, not confronting each other over tariff or monetary policy. 
However, the largest regional difference has yet to be addressed: the divide between the 
North and South. As the last president to serve in the Civil War and someone who remembered 
the damage done to the nation by it, McKinley needed to heal and replace the memory of 
disunity with a new memory of unity. In his rhetoric, McKinley used the collective memory of 
the American Civil War to tell a narrative of disunity between North and South, and replaced it 
with the new memory of the North and South united, under one flag against a common enemy. 
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While the past was not completely replaced, McKinley used epideictic rhetoric to restructure the 
social bonds between North and South to tell the tale of a unified nation. Before analyzing 
McKinley’s use of memory, I want to briefly discuss memory’s application and connection to 
epideictic rhetoric, and rhetorical studies in general. 
 In Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson’s work on the presidency, they 
found that in epideictic rhetoric memoria or collective memory of a shared past was an important 
resource for the rhetor.62 Memoria is different from history. History refers to “those punctuations 
of the time that have been accepted by the majority of intellectual communities as an authentic 
record of the past.”63 Whereas collective memory is “the public acceptances or ratifications of 
these histories on the part of broader audiences.”64 Kirt Wilson added, “Memory is not 
comprised simply of facts about the past, nor is it solely myth. It is, instead, a rhetorically 
negotiated commingling of history and commemoration, each form dictating slightly different 
exigencies.”65 Rhetorically, collective memory has three important functions—it helps create 
individual and collective identity, it maintains cultural traditions, and it lets communities forget.  
Rather than recounting the past as a set of static facts, rhetors invoke collective memory 
to emphasize certain narratives for their audience. By artistically portraying the past, rhetors 
hope to instill certain values in their audience through praising or blaming the actions of 
characters. Kirt Wilson stated of epideictic moments of commemoration, it “is an epideictic 
enterprise that builds communal identity and values.”66 Epideictic address offers a condensation 
of symbols constituting “the value, meaning, and communal relationship that a society has with 
its past.”67 In this way, commemoration and epideictic rhetoric celebrating collective memory 
instructs communities by telling them who they are and what values they should embody. 
Bostdorff added that in certain cases rhetors may draw on collective memory to unite highly 
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fragmented audiences.68 A skilled rhetor can restructure the past in light of new events, creating 
a unified narrative for a previously divided community. As Wilson noted, “The speech acts that 
comprise commemoration are not concerned primarily with accuracy, but place a greater 
emphasis on emotional resonance and the utility of a narrative to warrant judgment or to 
structure social relationships.”69 By shaping the audience’s perception of the past, rhetors create 
a shared interpretation of the past. This is especially true when the rhetor and audience are 
further removed from the original event. Lastly, but most importantly, Marouf Hasian Jr. and 
Robert Frank observed collective memory involves selective forgetting. As new memories are 
formed, some old memories are forgotten or replaced. With every new generation, a debate 
occurs, recirculating and renegotiating which memories will be retained in our texts, museums, 
and minds.70  
McKinley’s epideictic opportunities on his speaking tours offered him a chance to 
reshape U.S. domestic identity, replacing the memory of the divisive Civil War with the Spanish-
American War, exemplifying the unity of the American people. A common refrain heard from 
McKinley, as typified in Canton, Illinois, was “The boys of the South with the boys of the North 
fought triumphantly on land and sea in every engagement of the war.”71 But, McKinley also used 
more specific examples, as this excerpt from Boone, Iowa, in 1898 demonstrated: “It is a sight 
inspiring to behold that in our war the troops of the North brigaded with the troops of the South; 
that Iowa troops were brigaded with the troops of Georgia, and commanded by that distinguished 
ex-Confederate, whose name is so familiar in the annals of the Civil War, so that once more we 
were all together.72 “Our war” was a new memory constructed by McKinley, where a new 
generation put to rest the animosities of the past to forge a new bond. As McKinley stated in 
Evansville, Indiana, in 1899, “The best men of the South came—the sons of the old Confederate 
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soldiers; the best men of the North—the sons of the old soldiers of the republic. All joined 
together in heart and hand to maintain the flag of their country and follow wherever it might 
lead.”73 The sons of disunion came together, to create a new and lasting bond built on fraternity 
and sacrifice for each other.  
The disunity of the Civil War faded into the past, as McKinley emphasized the unity and 
fraternity Americans felt toward each other in the wake of the Spanish-American War. As 
McKinley encapsulated in Chicago, “Fraternity and union are deeply embedded in the hearts of 
the American people. For half a century before the Civil War disunion was the fear of men of all 
sections. The word has gone out of the American vocabulary. It is spoken now only as a 
historical memory.” 74 The Civil War’s memory was one with little power over the unity of 
people. Americans were now united in purpose and loyalty to the federal government. As 
McKinley declared in Tipton, Indiana, the North and South are united “with one aim, with one 
purpose, and with one determination—to stand by the government of the United States.”75 Now, 
united in a common effort and purpose, the United States would have “its widest influence” in 
the realm of international relations, as McKinley stated in St. Louis.76 The Civil War’s disunity 
was a historical footnote, a memory of the past, dividing and weakening the nation at home and 
overseas. Americans found a new purpose, in the Spanish-American War, uniting citizens from 
both the North and South.  
To support his rhetoric and the unity embodied in the new memory, McKinley employed 
two rhetorical strategies. First, he used religious rhetoric to seal a new covenant between the 
American people. Second, he relied on the symbolism of the American flag, with all Americans 
fighting under one flag, exemplifying the end of division between North and South. 
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To seal this new bond and complete the new memory, McKinley spoke in religious terms. 
Religious themed rhetoric has been particularly useful in creating social cohesion in the United 
States, given its ethnic and cultural diversity. Rhetorician Vanessa Beasley argued, “American 
civil religion offers the same promises that most religions do: rebirth, redemption, and renewal—
the ability to overcome the past by becoming part of the Novo Ordus Seclorum.”77 Speaking in 
St. Louis in 1898, McKinley declared, “North and South have mingled their best blood in a 
common cause, and to-day rejoice in a common victory. Happily for the nation to-day, they 
follow the same glorious banner, together fighting and dying under its sacred folds for American 
honor and for the humanity of the race.”78 Six days later, in Tipton, Indiana, McKinley described 
the new bond between North and South as a “holy alliance.”79 A year later, in Evansville 
Indiana, McKinley reiterated the shared sacrifice, stating, “We have been more than 
reconciled—cemented in faith and affection; and our reuniting has been baptized in the best 
blood of both sections of our beloved country.”80 The Spanish-American War blood-shedding 
offered the United States an opportunity of rebirth, through a new baptism. Unlike the Civil War, 
the North and South did not fight each other in fratricide; rather, they fought together to achieve 
a new victory together. They shared sacrifice, through spilling of blood together on the 
battlefield, to consecrate America’s new union. Their mingling of blood sealed the new 
collective memory between North and South. Prior to the Spanish-American War, unity was a 
concept with no tangible symbol. After the war, the symbolic consecration of mixing blood 
through sacrifice united the nation. The United States post-1898 was a new, united country after 
going through the ritualized “baptism of foreign fire.”81  
McKinley employed one more commonplace of American patriotism to symbolize unity: 
the American flag. In Boone, Iowa, McKinley stated, “Every section of this country loves the old 
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flag dearly, and we have but one flag, and that the glorious Stars and Stripes.”82 While speaking 
at a banquet in Chicago, McKinley declared, “The Blue and the Gray march under one flag. We 
have but one flag now, ‘the same our grandsires lifted up, the same our fathers bore’—that flag 
which you kept stainless and made triumphant.”83 Symbolizing America’s new unity was 
American soldiers, from all corners of the nation, as McKinley noted consistently, marching and 
fighting under the flag of the United States. In McKinley’s rhetoric, the flag served as the symbol 
of a unified America. While marching and fighting under the flag demonstrated unity to the 
United States, it also demonstrated loyalty to the President, the Constitution, and the federal 
government. The American flag symbolized the values of the United States embodied in the 
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, which the South rebelled against. Now, by 
marching under the flag, the South displayed their loyalty to the Union. The memories of the 
Blue and Gray, and multiple flags under which Americans fought, were over. The United States 
was united, under one flag, with one set of principles and values moving forward.  
The Citizen-Soldier 
 So far, I have focused on U.S. citizens being patriotic and united, but McKinley also gave 
his fellow Americans an idealized model of citizenship: the citizen-soldier. This section 
examines who the citizen-soldier was and what traits he exemplified. The citizen-soldier was 
among the best and brightest of his generation, following a long line of American volunteers who 
served their country. The citizen-soldier was willing to fulfill his duty and sacrifice for the 
country, but also happy to return to civilian life, living the life of an active citizen of the republic. 
He was the embodiment of republican virtue and self-government. The citizen-soldier was also 
male, and in all but a few cases, he was white. McKinley’s emphasis on masculinity represented 
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a new model of masculinity for men to follow after massive unemployment caused men to 
question their masculinity and place in society. 
The citizen-soldier came from a long line of U.S. patriots, with McKinley placing the 
latest group of volunteers from the Spanish-American War in historical context. In 
Marshalltown, Iowa, McKinley stated of the volunteers, “They did just as the old soldiers of the 
other volunteer army did—they did their whole duty, and were willing to bare their breasts to the 
enemy’s bullets, and sacrifice their lives, if need be, for the honor of the government of the 
United States.”84 In Redfield, South Dakota, at a stop in 1899, McKinley stated, “We have never 
lacked soldiers to defend any cause in which the country has been engaged, from the days of 
1776 down to the present hour.”85 The American citizen-soldiers of the Spanish-American War 
were just like the soldiers who won the Revolution, the Mexican-American War, and all the 
other armed conflicts they were called upon to serve. Moreover, the citizen-soldier was the 
average man, not some mythic unattainable hero, from the U.S., exemplifying patriotic spirit. At 
the Trans-Mississippi Exposition, McKinley continued praising the ordinary soldier, stating, 
“New names stand out on the honor-roll of the nation’s great men and with them, unnamed, 
stand the heroes of the trenches and the forecastle, invincible in battle and uncomplaining in 
death. The intelligent, loyal, indomitable soldier and sailor and marine, regular and volunteer, are 
entitled to equal praise as having done their whole duty, whether at home or under the baptism of 
foreign fire.”86 While the great names would be remembered by history—one can think of 
Admiral Dewey or Teddy Roosevelt and the “Rough Riders”—McKinley honored the unnamed 
soldiers, who did their duty without complaint. The citizen-soldier represented the regular 
American citizen, an unnamed man from any region of the country, answering the president’s 
call and performing his duty in service of the country. 
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Citizen-soldiers were dutiful, serving the nation in its time of need because that was how 
a good citizen acted. At a stop in Duluth, Minnesota, McKinley explained, “It [the government] 
is defended, whenever it is assailed, by its citizen soldiery.”87 It is this attitude that McKinley 
described as “a glorious citizenship,” in a speech in Ames, Iowa, in 1898.88 For this citizenship, 
according to McKinley, continuing in Ames, “meets every emergency and responds to every 
crisis in the life of the nation. The American people have never failed, no matter how great the 
emergency, no matter how grave the crisis, to measure up to the highest responsibilities of honor 
and duty.”89 In lieu of a standing army, the U.S. relied on its citizen-soldiers to fulfill their duty 
when the nation was threatened, reflecting the relationship between citizen and state.  
State militias, comprised of citizen-soldiers, “came to be identified with liberty and 
constitutional government, which effectively made military service in time of war a 
responsibility of citizenship.”90 McKinley used the First South Dakota, a unit of volunteers, as an 
exemplar of a citizen’s patriotic duty and responsibility. In an 1899 speech, in Huron, South 
Dakota, McKinley affirmed, “The First South Dakota refused to accept the advice of the 
unpatriotic and stayed and upheld the flag. They did not come home until they had placed that 
flag stainless and spotless in the hands of the new army we sent.”91 McKinley described it as 
their choice to stay and fight, demonstrating the freedom American volunteers have, even as 
soldiers on the battlefield. Such a choice to stay or run was an example of a soldier exercising 
“his personal liberty, his freedom to govern his life as he saw fit.”92 Both choices fell into the 
construct of self-government, but McKinley praised staying and fighting, demonstrating for 
future generations the virtue needed to be a good citizen. The citizen-soldier’s bravery to stay 
symbolized his commitment to the nation. It was the duty of U.S. citizenship for men to be 
available for military service when the nation called. 
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The U.S. citizen-soldier was a volunteer, not a draftee forced to defend his nation. Thus, 
the rapid response of male citizens throughout the nation filled McKinley with pride, and 
reinforced the volunteer nature of American military service. As McKinley stated, during a 
speech in Decatur, Illinois, “More than two hundred thousand soldiers responded to the call of 
country, coming from homes of our fellow-citizens everywhere, the bravest and the best.”93 The 
American soldier was a neighbor, a friend, a person every American knew and interacted with 
daily. They were not professionally trained military warriors, like the professional armies of 
Europe. Also, unlike their European counterparts, American citizen-soldiers were volunteers. 
Speaking in Atlanta, Georgia, McKinley declared, “The army whose valor we admire, and the 
navy whose achievements we applaud, were not assembled by draft or conscription, but from 
voluntary enlistment. The heroes came from civil as well as military life. Trained and untrained 
soldiers wrought our triumphs.”94 The two hundred thousand volunteers mixed with the small 
trained Army of the United States, but all American soldiers went to war willingly. As historian 
Ricardo Herrera observed about American volunteerism and its connection to self-government, 
“Enlistment was a contractual agreement freely entered into by soldiers and the government. 
Between two contracting parties, equity could be achieved and maintained only by a soldier who 
was sure of his right and ability to govern his own life.”95 McKinley’s praise of the volunteer 
nature of America’s army, and the rapid response of citizens to his call, reinforced the values of 
self-government and citizens’ freedom to choose their destiny. Such choice to serve 
demonstrated “the patriot’s spirit of obligation,”96 compared to the forced coercion of draftees by 
the government. Americans’ willingness to respond so positively and quickly to McKinley’s call 
was the manifestation of the “era of patriotism” described by the president. 
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The economic troubles of the 1890s left many men in need of work and income to 
support themselves and their families. Men went from being independent farmers or craftsmen to 
dependent industrial workers or indebted farmers. Stuckey wrote of male citizenship, during this 
time, “The attitude of manliness, so important to the late nineteenth century, could be exhibited 
by a wageworker, so long as he retained the manly attitude toward that work.”97 The manly 
worker was idealized for having the virtues of forthrightness and independence, he was vigilant 
and unafraid, serving as a model of citizenship in the industrialized age.98 However, such a state 
of mind was only possible for a few, as many farmers, laborers, and other disconnected men 
became dependent on others for a wage, creating a crisis in male identity across the nation. By 
placing the citizen-soldier in historical context of proud, male citizens, McKinley established an 
identity for male citizens to assume. 
The citizen-soldier was exclusively male, with his traits being an example for Americans 
and those around the world to imitate. In a 1898 speech in Clinton, Iowa, McKinley described 
the war as a trying period, during which the United States “stood together as one man.”99 
Throughout both speaking tours, McKinley described the “sons” and “boys” serving overseas as 
the “best” and the “bravest,” men who were “sacrificing” for their country, fulfilling their 
“duty,” and who were “heroic,” “noble,” and “vigilant.”100 Historian Candice Bredbenner 
explained this male dominated rhetoric, stating, “The badge of civic membership distinguished 
as the country’s most honorable and demanding—the obligation to fight for the defense of the 
nation during wartime—has remained firmly affixed to the resident male.”101 A male citizen’s 
availability to serve the state in a time of emergency enhanced the worth of his citizenship, and 
this availability also provided the country with comfort whenever the nation was threatened.102 
Late nineteenth century women’s suffrage arguments “were turned aside because they had failed 
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to contribute demonstrably to nation’s defense—reflecting both the gendered nature of 
militarized republicanism and its continuing hold over the American imagination.”103 The male 
citizen embodied the basic virtues necessary for a stable republican government. He was a 
faithful civilian, attuned to the politics of the nation, but also self-sufficient and focused on his 
work. The citizen-soldier fulfilled his duty to the state, through his military service in times of 
crisis, and then returned to a peaceful civilian life. McKinley’s focus on male citizen’s 
responsibility and duty reinforced the male’s standing in the nation, emphasizing the dominant 
rhetorical space for white males in the political sphere and social hierarchy. 
 With these vivid descriptions of the American citizen as a volunteer soldier, one could 
easily think the main function of the citizen was to serve in the military. Yet, the true identity of 
America’s citizen-soldier, like his patriot hero predecessor, was fundamentally civilian. 
Patriotism called men to serve their country and defend it against threats, but at their core, 
Americans were a peace-loving people. In St. Paul, McKinley stated, “The patriotism of the 
American people takes the place of a large standing army. We do not need such an army in the 
United States. We can have an army on any notice if the nation is in peril or its standard is 
threatened. Eager is every American citizen to answer the call to arm, and just as eager to come 
back to the paths of peace when the emergency is past.”104 At Hoopestown, Illinois, McKinley 
similarly stated, “Our people become soldiers of the republic to defend their lives and what they 
love; but the moment the emergency is over, that moment they rush back to the peaceful walks of 
citizenship.”105 Political theorist Eliot Cohen commented on the citizen-soldier’s dual role: no 
matter how skilled one becomes or adapts to military life, “in the core of his being, [he is] a 
member of civil society.”106 McKinley echoed such sentiments in Egan, South Dakota, stating, 
“We, as a people, never go to war because we love war. Our chief glory is not in the triumphs of 
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arms, but in the in the triumphs of peace. We love peace; we abhor war.”107 As members of civil 
society, the volunteer citizen-soldiers believed they “were active participants in the republican 
experiment through their military service…They illustrated what many soldiers believed was the 
inseparable connection between citizenship and bearing arms on behalf of the Republic.”108 
Fighting to defend the nation or its principles was just one function of citizenship. Once the 
threat had passed, the citizen-soldier enthusiastically went back to his peaceful life because his 
core characteristic was peace. 
Following the peaceful core of its peaceful people, McKinley could be assured the 
American government would act in accordance with such peace-loving principles. In 
Hoopestown, Illinois, McKinley stated, “The government of the United States rests in the hearts 
and consciences of the people. It is their government; it represents them; it is the agent of their 
will; and while we are not a military government or military people, we never lack for soldiers in 
any cause which the people espouse.”109 The government of the United States reflected the will 
of the people, and according to McKinley that will was peace. McKinley’s argument rested on 
the hearts and minds of the American public returning to civilian life after the Spanish-American 
War, just as he described Americans from past wars returning to their peaceful paths. This 
representation of the American people also fits with Chapter 2, and both the analysis of 
American’s duty to act and McKinley’s own personal aversion to war. McKinley had exhausted 
every diplomatic option before finally requesting a declaration of war. The American people, 
according to McKinley, were a peaceful people, provoked to military conduct by uncivilized acts 
in Cuba. In McKinley’s new conception of citizenship, neither the nation nor its people would 
allow American values to be desecrated and devalued overseas. However, it would also not go 
abroad in search of fights either. McKinley praised the path of peace, citing in his Annual 
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Messages a desire for arbitration to international problems. Furthermore, on his tours McKinley 
touted America’s small standing army and its national shield. Referring to the shield, McKinley 
stated, there “are to be found the olive-branch and the arrows, indicating our power in war and 
our love of peace; but be it said, to the glory of the American nation, that we never have drawn 
the arrows from their quiver until we have tended to our adversary the olive-branch of peace.”110 
Employing national symbols, and the universal symbol of peace in the olive branch, McKinley 
defined the temperament of the American people, and his citizen-soldiers, as peaceful but still 
always ready and willing to defend the nation and its principles. 
Non-White Males and Women: The Other Roles in American Society 
The citizen-solider, a white man, was McKinley’s model of U.S. citizenship throughout 
his speaking tours after the Spanish-American War. However, a question remained: what about 
non-white male citizens and women? Good citizens rushed to meet the call of the president, but 
not every American could volunteer for service due to age, gender, and physical capability. 
Black men could and did serve their country, but, like Cleveland, McKinley spent little time 
discussing them. However, his sparse remarks do lend insight into their place in society. Women 
were not able to serve in the military, yet they played an important role as republican mothers for 
McKinley. 
Non-white males, unlike women, could volunteer and serve in the military, and at least in 
theory had political power, but there was little discussion of the racial make-up of the volunteer 
army. Speaking in primarily white towns, the assumed citizen-soldier was male and white, 
except for two speeches when McKinley explicitly noted a race. In his speeches in both 
Columbus, Ohio, and at the Quinn Chapel in Chicago, McKinley observed the fidelity, 
patriotism, and loyalty of black men serving in the military.111 At Quinn Chapel, McKinley 
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stated, “Your race has demonstrated its patriotism by its sacrifices, its love of the flag by dying 
for it. That is the greatest test of fidelity and loyalty. The nation has appreciated the valor and 
patriotism of the black men of the United States.”112 McKinley thanked black men for their 
military service and their demonstration of patriotism. They had passed the toughest test one can 
take, putting one’s life on the line for their country. In this way, McKinley opened up a rhetorical 
space to include black men in the political realm. They were recognized, like white citizen-
soldiers, for their patriotism and service to the country. Yet, McKinley went no further in 
discussing how their military service might translate into progress in the political or social 
sphere. In Columbus, McKinley remarked, “All honor to the regulars and the volunteers, and to 
the marines, black and white, of every nationality who marched under the glorious banner of the 
free to a victory for God and civilization.”113 Theoretically, the ideal make-up of America’s 
volunteers was supposed to represent the state, coming from all backgrounds. The ideal, 
represented in Columbus by McKinley, was a volunteer force comprised of “rich and poor, black 
and white, Christian and Jew [serving] alongside one another in similarly Spartan surrounding—
at least in theory.”114 Ideally, all boundaries, whether regional or racial, had given way to a 
volunteer army representative of the nation. Yet, these remarks about black men or of a multi-
racial military were few and far between. Black men only made an appearance when they were 
the target audience or when McKinley wanted to make a broader observation about the make-up 
of the volunteer forces. Otherwise, they disappeared into the background. The idealized citizen-
soldier was still male and white, privileging their service and granting them rhetorical and 
political salience.  
McKinley’s portrayal of another politically disadvantaged group, women, differed little 
from previous presidents. As Vanessa Beasley observed, “when presidents of this era did 
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mention American womanhood in any detail, they seemed more intent on promoting previous 
conceptions of gender rather than on commenting, either negatively or positively, on current 
and/or emergent ones.”115 Indeed, McKinley’s rhetoric reinforced women’s role in society as the 
republican mother. Conceived in the classical formulation of the Spartan mother, American 
women were to raise sons prepared to sacrifice for the common good, providing “an apparent 
integration of domestic and political behavior, in a formula that masked political purpose by 
promise of domestic service.”116 According to Beasley, “some aspects of the ideology of 
Republican motherhood suggested that American women would be most effective as political 
agents if they remained behind the scenes of U.S. society.”117 While men were occupied with 
self-interested pursuits of business and politics in the public sphere, women, keeping with the 
expectations of republican motherhood, were in charge of the home, the private sphere. Here, 
women were expected “to be loving, full-time mothers, devoted to raising their children to be 
Godfearing, solid citizens.”118 Women’s expressions of patriotism were best exemplified by the 
“principles they inculcated in their children.” Women demanding the right to participate equally 
with men in the public sphere “were deemed not real women by the ideologists of True 
Womanhood.”119 Rather, the ideal woman “made the pursuit of virtue in a separate sphere 
centered on the home the touchstone of feminine identity.”120 During the late nineteenth century, 
women expanded their public role from just church attendance to social clubs.121 However, these 
movements failed to influence presidential rhetoric in the era, as Beasley concluded, “we can 
hear the most powerful men in the free world ignoring, and thus perhaps resisting, social changes 
that were already in motion all around them.”122  
McKinley’s rhetoric does little to alter Beasley’s claim; rather, his discourse celebrated 
women’s role in raising civic minded and virtuous children. In an 1898 speech, in Chicago, 
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Illinois, McKinley praised the home, women’s traditional sphere, stating, “The power of the 
republic is in the American fireside. The virtue that comes out from the holy altar of home is the 
most priceless gift this nation has; and when the judgments of the people are spoken through the 
homes of the people.”123 The home, for McKinley, was the central symbol of stability, a place 
where virtue resided, a sacred realm, the heart of the nation uncorrupted by outside forces. In 
Marshalltown, Iowa, McKinley described the home as providing citizens with the “holiest [of] 
sentiment,” a place where “virtue resides.”124 The overseer of the home, in the United States, was 
the mother. Speaking in Brainerd, Minnesota, he stated, “There is not a man anywhere in our 
country who, remembering the affectionate counsels of his mother, has not been helped in 
resisting wrong and adhering to right. It is that American home, where love is found and virtue 
presides, that is the hope of our republic.”125 It was in this idyllic home where families met, and 
family life, according to McKinley, “lies at the very foundation of this popular government of 
ours.”126 “As long as we keep the home pure,” McKinley reasoned, “so long will we keep our 
government pure.”127 The American home inculcated virtue in its citizens, and was the bedrock 
of American society. The strength of the American government was drawn from the virtuous 
home and the honorable and upright American citizens residing there. Women contributed to the 
public sphere by protecting the purity of the home, for creating a loving, stable home and rearing 
the next generation of Americans. This was their sole role and duty in the public sphere. 
Conclusion  
If the United States was going to be an active participant in world affairs, the concept of 
what it meant to be an American needed to be reimagined. Throughout his two speaking tours of 
the Midwest, McKinley sought to redefine citizenship in the model of the citizen-soldier. 
Wherever the American flag went, the citizen-soldier was sure to follow, acting as a mini 
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ambassador to foreign peoples around the globe. The citizen-soldier, through his adherence to 
republican values and ideology, served as a model for people everywhere to emulate. The 
citizen-soldier was educated, patriotic, inculcated with American republican virtues, and fulfilled 
his duty to the common good. Citizen-soldiers expressed their republican principles by choosing 
to serve, defending the nation and its principles globally, while returning to civilian life once the 
crisis had ended. Their willingness to volunteer demonstrated their commitment and patriotism 
to the United States. They were not professional warriors, in the mold of European armies, but 
farmers, businessmen, and statesmen, all coming together for the love of country. When a 
foreigner met a citizen-soldier, he was meeting an example of the United States.  
By using foreign policy to unite the country, McKinley reestablished internal cohesion in 
the nation. The “other” for citizens became the vast uncivilized world, not their fellow factory 
worker or farmer or Democrat or Republican. The citizen-soldier embodied the virtue of 
patriotism, acting as a symbol of unity in a divided country. Uniting a nation still divided by the 
aftermath of a civil war, sectional animosity about race relations, and economic policies was not 
an easy task. Citizen-soldiers represented the country’s unity, coming from all corners of the 
country and answering the president’s call to serve in a time of need. The intermingling of their 
blood on the battle field consecrated a new covenant between America’s diverse regions. Aiding 
in McKinley’s goal of unity was the construction of a new public memory, with the virtue of 
unity imbued in the Spanish-American War replacing the divisiveness of the Civil War. 
Replacing the memories of North fighting South were memories of Northerners and Southerners 
fighting together under one flag, the flag of the Union. The Blue and the Gray were used to mark 




Not every citizen could be a citizen-soldier, but their model of patriotism was an example 
for others. If the citizen-soldier fulfilled his duty by sacrificing his time and possibly his life for 
the country, then other citizens could support the troops by making small sacrifices on the home 
front for the war. Yet, McKinley’s rhetoric primarily focused on politically viable groups, white 
males. Black males only factored into McKinley’s rhetoric when they were the target audience, 
which was rare, demonstrating their insignificant political power. Women’s role in this new 
conception of citizenship changed very little from previous iterations, with a focus on republican 
motherhood, education, and raising virtuous, civic minded children. Mothers were expected to 
maintain the private sphere, refraining from prominent roles in the public sphere. However, the 
private sphere of the home was important to McKinley’s conception of the United States as a 
world actor. In the next chapter, I shift focus from reimagining citizens to McKinley’s 
reimagining of the country. Part of McKinley’s argument was the nation’s values would not 
change even as it was more active in the world. McKinley grounded this belief in women’s 
ability to preserve the hearth of liberty and freedom, the home, providing stability domestically 
and a bedrock for the government to act abroad. However, McKinley never explicitly made this 
link that would have increased women’s salience politically or rhetorically. Rather, McKinley 
privileged the male public sphere and deeds of the citizen-soldier, over the private sphere. 
American citizenship under McKinley was in transition. The social hierarchy and 
language of money of the Cleveland administration and Gilded Age crumbled under the 
economic and social pressure of the era. The exigency of the Spanish-American War and the 
ensuing territorial occupation afterward necessitated a united citizenry. A divided domestic front, 
with infighting between regions, would undercut U.S. power abroad. McKinley’s goal was to 
persuade Americans that they had more in common than different. McKinley began the effort of 
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uniting the nation that Woodrow Wilson would assume as a given during his presidency. Wilson 
assumed an ideological cohesion in the United States. This American ideology was so potent that 
it transcended the nation and could possibly encompass the world.128 McKinley settled for 
uniting the nation behind a set of common virtues and symbols, with a citizen’s primary identity 
being national, not local or regional. McKinley’s national identity was important because, unlike 
Cleveland’s hierarchy which limited citizens to a rung on the economic hierarchy and limited 
their potential, McKinley’s national identity was theoretically open to all Americans, including 
minorities. While McKinley did not privilege or validate minority claims, a national identity 
based on universal rights for all Americans opened up the rhetorical space for future claims of 
inclusion based on a shared ideology and universal values.
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Chapter 4 American Exceptionalism and Interventionism: Redefining America 
America’s economic downturn in 1893 had numerous causes, but many believed one of 
the main causes was the oversaturation of the domestic market. Moreover, many thought the 
solution was finding new markets abroad for American goods. American diplomat Charles 
Denby, who headed a United States delegation to China, extolled China’s potential as a market 
for American goods.1 Even some anti-imperialists, including Edward Atkinson, Carl Schurz, and 
Andrew Carnegie opposed the Spanish-American War on moral grounds but were in favor of 
economic expansion into Asia, especially China. Denby, Atkinson, and others saw the potential 
of four hundred million Chinese, trapped in a traditional agrarian economy, as potential 
customers for all of America’s manufactured goods.2 These four hundred million Chinese 
represented the fabled ‘China market,’ a panacea for America’s economic troubles. One reason 
for Americans to view China as a new large market was it fell outside colonial influence by a 
single great power.3 Since 1844 and the signing of the Treaty of Wangxia, the U.S. was granted 
most-favored-nation status in China, automatically giving the Americans any trade rights the 
Chinese ceded to other nations.4 Simply, China was viewed as being open to American business, 
as Atkinson predicted in a speech delivered to the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce in April 1898, 
American cotton exports would soon find a market in China.5  
In March 1898, British diplomats broached the subject of China with their American 
counterparts. Specifically, the British inquired if the United States was interested in joining the 
British to oppose Europe’s continental powers from expanding their power in China. At that 
time, McKinley’s attention was solely focused on America’s collision course with Spain over 
Cuba. Therefore, McKinley declined, citing he was unaware of any occupation of China that 
promised to interfere with American trade.  When John Hay, America’s ambassador to Great 
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Britain, returned to Washington in June, the subject was broached again. McKinley, engrossed in 
the war, again declined. However, Secretary of State William Day, writing to John Hay, replied, 
“the outcome of our struggle with Spain may develop the need of extending and strengthening 
our interests in the Asiatic Continent.”6 “To most Americans China was a dim and mysterious 
continent of its own,” according to McKinley biographer Wayne H. Morgan, “presided over by 
yellow orientals of fabled cunning and devious designs.”7 Its culture, art, people, and history 
were all obscure subjects for most Americans, creating a sense of mystery and enchantment, as 
few Americans could discuss China intelligently. However, with America’s acquisition of the 
Philippines, a stepping stone to reach China, Americans were about to receive a crash course in 
China and its complex international situation.  
From 1899 to 1901, China would serve as the first test run of America’s new 
interventionist foreign policy. After the Spanish-American War, the McKinley administration 
increased its efforts in China, working with the great powers of Europe to secure unfettered 
access to Chinese ports and markets. An anti-foreign uprising in 1899 brought a new set of 
challenges, and a new course in American foreign policy. With Americans under siege by 
Chinese rebels, McKinley sent American troops to fight alongside European powers, putting 
down the rebellion. However, McKinley sent the troops without a declaration of war, causing 
some domestic rumblings during the 1900 presidential election. Clearly, He needed to 
rhetorically justify his actions. Furthermore, by the time of his death, McKinley was a proponent 
of American action in the world, citing the shrinking of the world and increased 
interconnectedness between all nations. Through America’s involvement in China, McKinley 
redefined U.S. national identity. 
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 Chapter 3 examined McKinley’s redefinition of U.S. citizenship, dealing with America’s 
changing position in the world. This chapter examines how McKinley redefined the country’s 
role in the world. Specifically, this chapter explores the following question: How did McKinley 
redefine America’s role in the world after the Spanish-American War? Throughout this chapter, I 
argue McKinley redefined America’s role in the world by employing the rhetorical trope of 
American exceptionalism, transitioning the nation from a primarily exemplarist nation to a more 
interventionist one. In doing so, McKinley framed America’s interventionism in moral and 
economic terms, setting up America’s informal empire. To make this argument, I will begin by 
looking at McKinley’s post-war critique of America’s victory and his decision to keep the 
Philippines. This section’s texts will be drawn from his two Midwestern speaking tours, just like 
Chapter 3, selecting representative texts of McKinley’s rhetoric. In his post-war tours, McKinley 
emphasized U.S. territorial expansion was a natural historical consequence of America’s destiny 
to be a great nation. I then explore McKinley’s justification for military action in China, without 
Congressional approval, by examining his “Fourth Annual Message.” My analysis continues by 
critiquing two instances of McKinley’s use of the phrase “prophet or orator of evil,” used at a 
Banquet speech in Boston in 1899, and his “Second Inaugural Address.” Such a phrase was used 
to unite Americans against a rhetorical “other,” providing support of McKinley’s new 
interventionist policies. I conclude by analyzing his last speech delivered in Buffalo, paying 
close attention to his argument for U.S. engagement in the world, specifically, the importance of 
American economic engagement and foreign trade. 
Before beginning my analysis, the concept of American exceptionalism needs to be 
outlined. First, I explore the principles of American exceptionalism, its two strains—
exemplarism and interventionism, and American exceptionalism’s influence on U.S. policy and 
125 
 
rhetoric. I then overview how American exceptionalism evolved in the United States prior to 
McKinley, mainly exploring how past presidents interpreted and used it. After this set up, I move 
onto my analysis of how McKinley transformed the nation from exemplarism to interventionism. 
I conclude by discussing the implications of such a change. 
A Special Nation: American Exceptionalism 
 Americans often think of themselves as different from Europeans and the rest of the 
world. In the American version of its past, “it is America’s isolation and detachment from 
Europeans that are stressed: the forging of a separate political tradition; the making of an 
American ‘exceptionalism.’”8 Europe was left to toil in dynastic, class, and ethnic struggles, 
while Americans were left to create their own future pursuing freedom liberated from the 
shackles of the Old World. To Europeans, the United States with its colossal scale, lack of a 
standing army and small navy, and decentralized government was hardly a state at all. The 
United States was free to develop on its own with little outside interference, but this was 
primarily due to the maritime dominance of Britain’s Royal Navy and no major European power 
wanting to ruin the peace of 1815. With little interference from Europe, American 
exceptionalism took root acting as a frame for both domestic and foreign policy debates.9 To 
investigate America’s development, I will first discuss the main principles of American 
exceptionalism, followed by how presidents discussed foreign policy prior to McKinley. 
American Exceptionalism 
 Belief that America and Americans are unique, different, or an outlier from other nations 
in the world has been present since the first colonists arrived on the shores of Massachusetts. 
Seymour Martin Lipset summed up the ideology of American exceptionalism in five words: 
liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, populism, and laissez-faire.10 These five values make up 
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the American Creed. Americans, unlike other nations, derive their sense of themselves not 
through a common history or biology but through an ideology called Americanism. Lipset 
explained, “In Europe, nationality is related to community, and thus one cannot become un-
English or un-Swedish. Being an American, however, is an ideological commitment.”11 
Americanism is not a matter of birth but of values. Accepting or rejecting these values is what 
makes an American. These values often make repeated appearances in political rhetoric 
throughout American history, as politicians reinforce the importance of these value in American 
culture. No politician employs American exceptionalism more than U.S. presidents.  
David Zarefsky observed American exceptionalism incorporates a feeling of 
“chosenness… (presumably by God) to play a distinct role on the stage of history.”12 Americans 
have been “given a special mission to fulfill,” with God “guiding and directing them.”13 
According to Zarefsky, there are five consequences to rhetorically employing American 
exceptionalism. First, it imbues policy discussions with a moral tone. Or as Lipsett put it, 
“Americans are utopian moralists who press hard to institutionalize virtue, to destroy evil people, 
and to eliminate wicked institutions and practices.”14 Therefore, policy deliberations are not 
rational discussions of how to achieve goals; they are moral choices between good and evil. 
Second, compromising on commitments becomes harder because Americans believe such 
commitments are divinely sanctioned. Put simply, compromise goes against God’s 
predetermined plan for the nation. Third, it provides a teleological explanation for events: that 
God’s people will be redeemed in the end, no matter the obstacles placed before them. Fourth, it 
minimizes the need for self-reflection or self-doubt due to the belief that America’s actions must 
be right or God would not have had America undertake them. Fifth, justifying policies to 
external audiences is minimal because God’s will does not require the approval of other 
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nations.15 Overall then, American exceptionalism is a powerful argumentative tool because it is 
used to justify policies while simultaneously shutting down debate about alternatives by pointing 
to a teleological explanation of God’s will.  
The dexterity of exceptionalism makes it a useful rhetorical strategy, especially for 
presidents. However, it is important to note that exceptionalism is not a static concept but “a 
fluid and adaptive idea that can be interpreted in different ways.”16  Indeed, there are two main 
strands of American exceptionalism: exemplarism and interventionism. Advocates of both 
strands share the main assumptions of Americanism including America’s divine role in the world 
and not being subjected to international norms. However, they differ as to the means for how to 
achieve America’s destiny. 
While proponents of both strands hold the belief that America is a unique nation chosen 
by God to fulfill a special destiny in the world, exemplarists believe America should remain 
aloof and disengaged from the world. To realize its destiny, the United States “should engage in 
activities that make itself a beacon for others to emulate.”17 Such domestic activities include 
“perfecting American institutions, increasing material prosperity, integrating diverse populations 
into one America, and continuing to strive for more civil rights.”18 A core principle of 
exemplarism is perfecting democracy at home and refraining from intervening in foreign affairs. 
According to political scientist Trevor McCrisken, intervention overseas “would probably harm 
the other nation but also would most likely undermine the American experiment at home.”19 
Moreover, American values cannot be spread overseas through active engagement, but other 
nations will see the example set by Americans and choose to accept American principles. 
Therefore, in the realm of international affairs it would be best if Americans remained “aloof 
from the world’s troubles,” with only “peaceful trade relations abroad.”20  
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 By contrast, interventionism rejects exemplarism’s passive role in foreign affairs. 
Interventionism argues “that the United States must project this exceptionalism through active 
engagement of the world not only economically, but politically, culturally, and socially.”21 
America should not only be active, but it is responsible for “leading the world in continued 
progress and defending those who subscribe to similar ideals.”22 Whereas European nations 
sought to rule over their new colonial territories making people their subjects, interventionist 
exceptionalism rejects this path for the United States contending that “unlike other nations, the 
United States is incapable of seeking dominion over other peoples in its self-interest.”23 
Interventionists “believe that inside every foreigner there is the potential, even the desire, to be 
an American.”24 After all, being an American is not necessarily a birthright “but the willingness 
to believe in a certain set of political and social principles and values.”25 American 
exceptionalism makes it impossible for the United States to act like any other nation.  
America’s turn to interventionism was rooted in the Spanish-American war and 
McKinley’s rhetoric. The United States was primarily an exemplarist nation from its first settlers 
in Virginia and Massachusetts to the 1890s. There was a short interlude in this exemplarist 
tradition when America expanded westward under the rhetoric of manifest destiny, but it 
nevertheless rejected expansion beyond American soil—land that was contiguous with the North 
American continent. Therefore, McKinley’s understanding and strategic rhetorical development 
of an interventionist American exceptionalism represented a dramatic shift in exceptionalism’s 
interpretation. To understand just how dramatic that shift was, what follows is a very brief 





Exemplarism: An American Tradition 
America’s exemplarist roots began with John Winthrop’s famous declaration: “For we 
must consider that we shall be as a city upon a hill, the eyes of all people are upon us.”26 
However, less well known are the lines immediately following this declaration. In those lines, 
Winthrop warned that if these new Americans failed to uphold God’s promise they “shall shame 
the faces of many of God’s worthy servants, and cause their prayers to be turned into curses upon 
us, till we be consumed out of the good land whither we are going.”27 American exceptionalism 
began as a challenge to Americans to be righteous and upright people or face the wrath of a 
vengeful God. Americans were to be an example to all people not because of divine providence 
but because of their moral living and righteous action. Colonists, though of European decent, 
clearly viewed themselves as distinct peoples from their European backgrounds, but not until 
after the American Revolution could a uniquely American foreign policy develop. 
This exemplarist perspective remained through the establishment of the Republic. George 
Washington provided the guiding principle for how the newly established America should 
interact in the world. In his “Farewell Address,” Washington warned, “It is our true policy to 
steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world.”28 America’s connection 
with Europe should extend as far as commercial relations but “as little political connection as 
possible.”29 For Washington and many of his generation, Europe’s concerns were foreign and of 
little importance to America. According to Washington, “it must be unwise in us to implicate 
ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her [Europe’s] politics or the ordinary 
combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.”30 America’s policy toward the world 
would be one of neutrality and non-intervention. America assumed a defensive stance toward the 
world to ensure its basic institutions remained free from corruption. During the Napoleonic 
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Wars, Thomas Jefferson reiterated Washington’s declaration of neutrality. Jefferson called for 
friendship with all belligerents and desired open harbors for American goods. In his “Third 
Annual Message,” Jefferson defined America’s identity, stating, the United States was “to merit 
the character of a just nation, and maintain that of an independent one, preferring every 
consequence to insult and habitual wrong.”31 Three decades later, John Q. Adams continued an 
exemplarist interpretation of America’s role in the world. 
Adams, echoing Winthrop, reasserted America’s exemplarist roots, stating in a speech 
before the House of Representatives, America was “a beacon on the summit of the mountain, to 
which all the inhabitants of the earth may turn their eyes for a genial and saving light, till time 
shall be lost in eternity, and this globe itself dissolve, nor leave a wreck behind. It stands forever, 
a light of admonition to the rulers of men; a light of salvation and redemption to the 
oppressed.”32 These citizens of a new nation were associated with “civilized men and christians 
[sic]…bound by the laws of God, which they all, and by the laws of the gospel, which they 
nearly all, acknowledged as the rules of their conduct.”33 Turning to foreign relations, Adams 
acknowledged the United States’ traditional policy of respecting the independence of other 
nations. When conflicts emerged, the United States abstained from interfering, even, according 
to Adams, “when the conflict has been for principles to which she clings.”34 The United States 
not only acted as a beacon to all other nations, but it was critical it remained free from engaging 
in conflicts abroad, no matter how strong the case for intervention appeared. Adams concluded, 
the United States does not go “abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to 
the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own. She 
will recommend the general cause, by the countenance of her voice, and the benignant sympathy 
of her example.”35 Clearly, Adams maintained America’s exemplarist role. The United States 
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was to be a beacon of freedom and a moral voice in international affairs, even when intervention 
could spread American principles. However, by the late 1830s and 1840s, westward expansion 
brought with it new rationales for expansion under an interventionist interpretation of the United 
States’ role. 
Manifest Destiney: From Sea to Shining Sea 
Three hundred American families moved into Texas from 1819-1821, and by 1830 there 
were a total of 15,000 Americans living in Texas. When Mexico took away the rights of many 
Texan-Americans, they rebelled. After a quick war, Texas gained its independence and 
eventually sought statehood. Added to Texas’ petition was the need for the United States to 
expand its economic markets and increase its land for agriculture. These twin needs drove many 
Americans west to California and Oregon.36 These events sparked new rationales for American 
expansion under the term manifest destiny, which incorporated many of exceptionalism’s 
missionary beliefs. Though not explicitly termed manifest destiny in 1839, John L. O’Sullivan 
made its principles known. America was not a nation led by “emperors, kings, nobles, demons in 
the human form called heroes,” but by patriots who had “no aspirants to crowns or thrones.”37 
Americans were not “led by wicked ambition to depopulate the land, to spread desolation far and 
wide, that a human being might be placed in a seat of supremacy.”38 Rather, America sought to 
“establish on earth moral dignity and salvation of man…America [has] been chosen; and her 
high example shall smite unto death the tyranny of kings, hierarchs, and oligarchs.”39 Six years 
later the term manifest destiny appeared in arguments for annexing Texas. Arguing that England, 
France, and others had intruded on the continent to inhibit America’s greatness, O’Sullivan 
charged them with preventing America from fulfilling “our manifest destiny to overspread the 
continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions.”40 
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However, American president John Tyler was not so quick to indict Europe, hoping for a more 
peaceful existence. In his “Second Annual Message,” Tyler stated, “Our great desire should be to 
enter only into that rivalry which looks to the general good in the cultivation of the sciences, the 
enlargement of the field for the exercise of the mechanical arts, and the spread of commerce--that 
great civilizer--to every land and sea.”41 Competition between Europe and the United States 
should stick to these arenas, omitting politics or political alliances. Tyler maintained America’s 
traditional policy of abstention “from interference in all questions exclusively referring 
themselves to the political interests of Europe.”42 Tyler hoped America’s non-interference stance 
would induce a similar stance from Europe toward America.  However, many Americans 
believed Texas and other territories on the North American continent should be incorporated into 
the United States if they so desired. 
Ultimately, Tyler’s rhetoric could not prevent the spread of the term manifest destiny in 
American’s discourse. Manifest destiny was quickly appropriated in the Congressional debate 
over annexation. On January 3, 1846, Massachusetts Representative Robert C. Winthrop 
employed the term in defense of annexation  
I mean that new revelation of right which has been designated as the right of our 
manifest destiny to spread over this continent. It has been openly avowed in a 
leading administration journal that this, after all, is our best and strongest title; 
one so clear, so pre-eminent, and so indisputable, that if Great Britain had all our 
titles in addition to her own, they would weigh nothing against it. The right of our 
manifest destiny! There is a right, for a new chapter in the law of nations; or 
rather, for the special laws of our own country; for I suppose the right of a 
manifest destiny to spread, will not be admitted to exist in any nation except the 
universal Yankee nation!43 
 
Defenders of manifest destiny, including Representative Frederick P. Stanton of Tennessee, 
made clear “it is our destiny to possess the whole of Oregon; but this destiny does not make it 
right; it is our destiny, because it is right.”44 Representative Edward Dickinson Baker of Illinois 
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added, “We had a continent before us in which to spread our free principles, our language, our 
literature, and power; and we had a present right to provide this future progress.”45 The 
proponents of manifest destiny adopted the principles of intervention believing America’s spread 
across North America furthered the progress of civilization. However, it is important to note the 
limits of manifest destiny compared to the interventionist strain in the 1890s. Manifest destiny 
applied only to the continental United States, and was not a warrant for American involvement in 
Europe, Asia or any territory outside of North America. Representative Stanton recognized these 
limits, stating, “the law of nature…forbids that nations on one continent shall have rights on 
another by implication, extension, contiguity, or by any other invisible, intangible, metaphysical 
principle whatever.”46 Baker’s rationale for expansion was “to secure our safety, in the widest 
and highest sense.”47 He had no desire to expand overseas. Jacob Brinkerhoff from Ohio more 
explicitly limited manifest destiny, stating, “it strikes me that our ‘manifest destiny’ is never to 
prepare for war till war comes. It arises from the character of our institutions—from the character 
and habits of our people, who are a peace-loving people and devoted to the industrious pursuit of 
the arts of peace.”48 Stanton added that the peoples of the “United States owe it to themselves—
they owe it to this continent, and the world—to resist the application of those principles.”49 The 
principles Stanton referred to were the military conquest of East India by Great Britain. America 
may inhabit the land between the Atlantic and Pacific, but any action outside its borders was 
considered dangerous and an abandonment of its core principles. 
The Mexican-American War was an outlet for citizens’ energy over manifest destiny, but 
the invasion of Mexico made even John L. O’Sullivan fear the United States went too far. 
O’Sullivan stated, “I am afraid it was not God that got us into the war, but that He may get us out 
of it is the constant prayer of yours very truly.”50 Echoing John Winthrop, O’Sullivan warned if 
134 
 
Americans acted poorly, God would punish them. The Mexican-American War ended with a 
victorious United States and an expansion of America’s western territory.  
However, America’s expansionist tendencies cooled, and American presidents reasserted 
a restrained foreign policy strictly adhering to America’s traditional non-interventionist policy. 
Zachary Taylor, one of the heroes of the Mexican-American War, extended sympathy for all 
peoples seeking civil and political liberty, but believed America should refrain from taking any 
action to support such action. In his “Inaugural Address,” Taylor affirmed this position citing 
“the admonitions of history and the voice of our own beloved Washington to abstain from 
entangling alliances with foreign nations.”51 Millard Fillmore asserted America could lead the 
march toward civilization, rather than following others, by adhering to a doctrine of neutrality.52 
Franklin Pierce believed the United States demonstrated little in its history of aggression. 
Furthermore, for Pierce, the United States only sought the cultivation of peaceful relations with 
the world. During his administration, he intended to “leave no blot upon our fair record.”53 A 
major reason these presidents turned away from intervention was increasing tension over slavery 
on the domestic front. Americans did not lose interest in foreign affairs completely, but, 
according to historian Walter LaFeber, they “went about dealing with foreign policy 
differently.”54 After the Civil War, U.S. citizens turned their attention to settling the vast western 
territory of the United States, fighting a series of wars with American Indian tribes. 
After the Civil War: The World Comes Calling 
Andrew Johnson, the first post-Civil War president, was initially an unyielding 
exemplarist, citing Washington’s recommendation to remain free from intervening abroad. He 
noted the general “harmonious” relations between Europe and the United States. However, he 
did observe democratic revolutions abroad, offering many tempting opportunities for the United 
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States. Yet, initially at least, Johnson settled on an exemplarist, non-intervention foreign policy, 
stating in his “First Annual Message, the United States has “wisely and firmly refused to become 
propagandists of republicanism.”55 However, as the years passed, there was an increase in 
democratic revolutions throughout the world, especially in Latin America, needing and 
requesting American support. The post-Reconstruction era saw American interest and power 
expand into Latin America, and a few, very small inroads in Asia. The United States had become 
a continental power, with little ambition for international glory or power, but the countries 
surrounding America did offer opportunities for action.56  
By his last annual message, Johnson had shifted his thinking. He recognized the United 
States has done too little to support the states surrounding it. Johnson, in a rhetorical shift that 
represented this change, stated, “too little has been done by us, on the other hand, to attach the 
communities by which we are surrounded to our own country, or to lend even a moral support to 
the efforts they are so resolutely and so constantly making to secure republican institutions for 
themselves.”57 United States preoccupation with preventing European colonization had caused it 
to go blind to the establishment of harsher and more tyrannical governments throughout Latin 
America. These governments were worse, according to Johnson, “than any known to civilized 
powers.” Johnson proposed a new policy, sanctioning “the acquisition and incorporation into our 
Federal Union of the several adjacent continental and insular communities as speedily as it can 
be done peacefully, lawfully, and without any violation of national justice, faith, or honor.”58 
Johnson argued, annexation was equally or less injurious, than the “chronic revolution and 
anarchy” already present. Under such a policy, Johnson would not tolerate any unlawful 
expeditions to expedite American intervention. What the U.S. could offer Latin America was aid 
to help solve its “political and social problems.”59 Johnson urged the U.S. to adapt its’ national 
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policies to deal with the decline of European power in its neighborhood. Johnson’s shift would 
not be implemented, as he was impeached within a year, ending his presidency. 
However, the proposal supporting U.S. neighbors, with greater involvement in Latin 
America, was an idea future presidents considered. The United States, since the Monroe 
Doctrine, had sought to achieve one major foreign policy goal: hegemony in the Western 
Hemisphere. It would be a hemisphere without European colonization or the threat of a rival 
great power. With European powers concentrated on colonies in Asia, Africa, and the Indian 
subcontinent, the United States was given nearly free reign in North and South America.  
President U.S. Grant recognized a new world, one that Johnson may have wished for, 
with the spreading of American values and institutions around the hemisphere. In his “Second 
Annual Message,” Grant observed the change by stating, “While we make no effort to impose 
our institutions upon the inhabitants of other countries, and while we adhere to our traditional 
neutrality in civil contests elsewhere, we can not be indifferent to the spread of American 
political ideas in a great and highly civilized country like France.”60 However, Grant also noted 
that the spread of American values did not always go to such civilized countries like France, a 
country with no need of American support. Rather, referring to San Domingo, Grant noted, they 
“are not capable of maintaining themselves in their present condition, and must look for outside 
support. They yearn for the protection of our free institutions and laws, our progress and 
civilization. Shall we refuse them?”61 Grant’s solution to San Domingo’s problem was 
annexation by the United States, with Grant referring to its stable government, large consumer 
population for American goods, and adherence to the Monroe Doctrine as rationales for 
American annexation. Grant’s proposal failed, but it is important to recognize a shift in 
American thinking. Countries espousing a desire to adopt U.S. values, but without the know how 
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to implement its style of government, were potential places for the United States to help. The 
United States would not intervene to spread democracy, but if a country asked for help, Grant 
reasoned the U.S. should not at least think about aiding them. 
Rutherford B. Hayes thought so when he discussed possible U.S. intervention in the 
Samoan Islands. A representative from the Islands who requested the U.S. government 
“recognize and protect their independence, to establish commercial relations with their people, 
and to assist them in their steps toward regulated and responsible government.”62 Hayes 
acknowledged the progress the Samoans had made “in Christian civilization and the 
development of trade” and worried that without American support they would be unable to 
“maintain peace and independence.”63 Yet again, the United States balked. The country was not 
ready for overseas territories—the Islands would be acquired by McKinley in 1899. In both 
Grant and Hayes’ rhetoric, traces of a change in the United States’ attitude can be detected, but 
neither Grant nor Hayes proposed going to war to spread American values. U.S. citizens were 
steadfast in their exemplarist beliefs, with the next two presidents, Grover Cleveland and 
Benjamin Harrison, strongly reasserting exemplarism.  
During his two non-consecutive terms as president, Cleveland emphatically maintained 
the exemplarist stance. Cleveland symbolized this tradition, as he refused on multiple occasions 
to annex the Hawaiian Islands. In her work on this refusal, Mary Stuckey has shown that the 
Cleveland administration believed Americans during the Gilded Age were most concerned with 
the domestic economy, not the exportation of American values. Citizenship in this era was 
“about money.”64 Cleveland defined the government as a neutral actor, making him hesitant to 
act abroad, as it would require the government to be more than neutral. However, he was not 
unaware of the way the world was moving. Cleveland clearly saw a distinction between civilized 
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and uncivilized nations. In his opinion, these two worlds could not coexist. He clearly stated this 
opinion in his “Second Annual Message,” in 1886, opining, “But barbarism and civilization can 
not live together. It is impossible that such incongruous conditions should coexist on the same 
soil.”65 The logical conclusion from Cleveland’s rhetoric was a clash between civilized and 
uncivilized was inevitable, forcing the United States to act, whether it wanted to or not. But, it 
would not be Cleveland who forced this confrontation. Benjamin Harrison, who was both from 
Ohio and the same political party as McKinley, flatly rejected any sort of interventionism. In an 
address in Rochester, New York, Harrison affirmed America’s exemplarism stating, “We are 
happy in our great national isolation-happy, as your distinguished orator has said, that we do not 
need to burden our people to maintain standing armies, and do not live under a perpetual threat 
that the chariot wheels of war may roll through our peaceful villages.”66 Harrison firmly believed 
America was forever safe from invasion because of the oceans. “No nation in the world is able to 
wage war, on our soil,” Harrison averred, “and when the generous work upon which we have 
entered of building, equipping, and manning a suitable navy is completed, no nation in the world 
will be hasty to engage us upon the sea.”67 Any territorial expansion outside of these safe 
continental borders weakened America’s natural defensive barrier of the Atlantic and Pacific. 
The safest strategy for the United States to pursue was perfecting democracy at home, 
maintaining peaceful trade with all willing nations, and refraining from any military adventures 
abroad or annexing any other territory. 
American presidents from Washington to Cleveland primarily employed a rhetoric of 
exemplarism, with many of the presidents citing Washington’s famous “no entangling alliances’ 
line as the basis for their foreign policy. America for its first one hundred twenty years was 
primarily an exemplarist nation, working to perfect its institutions at home, while remaining 
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neutral abroad. Presidents saw the nation as part of the civilized Christian world, but 
fundamentally different and separate from Europe. The political concerns of Europe were of little 
or no concern to the United States. However, the winds of change were blowing. As American 
power grew, so too did its ambitions and scope. Andrew Johnson, U.S. Grant, and Rutherford 
Hayes, all sought to change American policy to help lesser nations on the path of toward 
democracy and civilization. While there was rhetorical evidence to indicate changes in 
presidential rhetoric, there was no political follow-through, as in each of these instances 
Congress and the American people rejected these calls. But these presidents could not have 
proposed these policies without some domestic support. As I discussed above, interventionist 
ideas of men like Alfred Thayer Mahan were gaining traction in U.S. society, urging America to 
look abroad and see its future. U.S. citizens were slowly changing their opinion. If presidents 
reflect the population that elected them, then McKinley’s election and discourse will lend insight 
into why his attempts to redefine the nation, and its policy, were successful when others had 
failed. To understand this political and cultural change, I explore McKinley’s foreign policy 
rhetoric beginning with his Midwestern tour of 1898 and ending with his last speech in 1901. 
America Enters the World Stage 
 As discussed in previous chapters, McKinley came into office with a relatively unknown 
approach to foreign affairs, and the first year of his presidency did little to clarify his thoughts on 
the subject. Over the first year in office, his rhetoric reflected a continuation of past presidents on 
the subject. In his inaugural, McKinley embraced American exceptionalism, stating, “Our faith 
teaches that there is no safer reliance than upon the God of our fathers, who has so singularly 
favored the American people in every national trial and who will not forsake us so long as we 
obey His commandments and walk humbly in His footsteps.”68 He also continued America’s 
140 
 
long standing non-interference policy, remarking, “We have cherished the policy of non-
interference with affairs of foreign governments wisely inaugurated by Washington, keeping 
ourselves free from entanglement, either as allies or foes, content to leave undisturbed with them 
the settlement of their own domestic concerns.”69 But after his first year in office, America’s 
position in the world changed dramatically. Over the next four years he presided over a war, 
annexed islands in the Caribbean and Pacific, sent 5,000 troops to China as part of an 
international coalition, and petitioned the great powers of the world to keep China open to trade. 
 I begin my analysis with texts from McKinley’s Midwestern tour and a speech to soldiers 
at an encampment in Boston, which he delivered right after the Spanish-American War. The 
texts selected are representative of McKinley’s redefinition of American national identity and the 
role it should play in the world. Next, I examine McKinley’s “Fourth Annual Message” to 
Congress, justifying military action against the Boxers in China. My analysis continues by 
analyzing a unique phrase, “the prophet or orator of evil,” and how U.S. opposition to the 
prophet of evil necessitated an active nation abroad. The phrase appeared in an 1898 speech in 
Boston, an 1899 speech in Illinois, and his “Second Inaugural Address.” I also include 
McKinley’s final address in Buffalo, New York, in the final section. Here, McKinley presented 
his most cogent arguments for an interventionist definition of the country. 
God’s Victory: The Spanish-American War and Its Consequences 
 McKinley justified the Spanish-American War as a war to protect and advance 
civilization. The conflict in Cuba had been going on for decades, with America’s exemplarist 
beacon doing little to change the situation on the island. The perceived threat of anarchy and 
barbarism was too close to American shores for the country to do nothing. McKinley reasoned 
America’s honor would suffer more if he allowed the conflict to continue, rather than intervening 
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to stop it. The short duration of the war and the relatively easy American victory was a sign for 
McKinley of God’s blessing. As he traveled across the Midwest in 1898 and 1899, he propagated 
this belief, slowly changing the rhetorical trope of American exceptionalism. 
 Visiting soldiers in Boston in 1899, McKinley praised their victory, declaring, “You 
fought in a holy cause, which, under the providence of God, triumphed.”70 As noted in the 
previous chapters, part of what made the soldiers exemplar citizens was their ability to perform 
their duty. Included in this duty was obediently following God’s plan for themselves and the 
nation. By structuring the victory as a “holy cause” and under God’s protection, McKinley 
framed the debate in religious and moral terms. To support his argument, McKinley cited 
America’s history and quick victory as signs of God’s work. Speaking in Rushville, Indiana, in 
1898, McKinley recounted America’s victory, stating, “Providence has been very kind to us. We 
have been through a war which lasted only a little more than one hundred days, a war happily not 
on our own, but on distant shores.” McKinley continued, “And yet in that short period we have 
achieved a victory which will be memorable in history. There has been nothing like it recorded 
in military annals.”71 The short duration of the war, fought on foreign soil, with America being 
victorious, were all signs of God’s plan in action. God did not want to punish the country with a 
long, costly, destructive war, but instead rewarded the United States for its obedience to His plan 
with a quick and decisive victory. Further proof was given at a stop in Carroll, Iowa, in 1898. 
There, McKinley placed the victory in-line with the country’s blessed history, stating, 
“Providence has been extremely kind to the American people—kind not only in the recent 
conflict of arms, but in every step and stage of our history from its very beginning until now. We 
have been singularly blessed and favored.”72 The Spanish-American War was another sign of 
Providence’s role in a long line of victories for the country. 
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 While I argued earlier that McKinley justified military action for civilization and 
humanity, he also employed American exceptionalism to retroactively justify his decision to 
involve the country in the affairs of Cuba and the Philippines. Part of America’s exemplar past, 
stretching back to Winthrop, was that God would punish the United States if it strayed from his 
plan. But America’s quick and decisive victory was evidence that McKinley had acted wisely 
and in accord with God’s will. Unlike past moments of interventionism, which took place on the 
continent, the Spanish-American War demonstrated the United States could act abroad without 
paying a divine price. McKinley argued the United States had a moral duty to declare war, but 
prior to the U.S. victory the trope of American exceptionalism was limited because there was 
little evidence from God that this was the right set of actions. However, once victory was 
secured, McKinley believed all the United States had to do was perform their moral duty and 
God’s preplanned destiny would follow. This belief was encapsulated in Chicago, in 1898, with 
McKinley stating, “Duty determines destiny.”73  With the success of the war and God’s destiny 
unfolding, McKinley used the trope of American exceptionalism to further justify action 
overseas.  
 Speaking in St. Louis in 1898, McKinley looked toward the future, stating, “We must 
gather the just fruits of the victory. We must pursue duty step by step. We must follow the light 
as God has given us to see the light, and he has singularly guided us, not only from the beginning 
of our great government, but down through every crisis to the present hour.”74 Heading into the 
future, the United States must be guided by God, and as a nation it should be obedient to His 
will. At the Trans-Mississippi Expo in 1898, McKinley declared, “Right action follows right 
purpose. We may not at all times be able to divine the future, the way may not always seem 
clear; but if our aims are high and unselfish, somehow and in some way the right end will be 
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reached.”75 Similar to how McKinley did not know how the Spanish-American War would 
unfold, he could not know how the post-war settlement would develop. However, a lesson of the 
Spanish-American War was the United States performed its’ duty and acted morally, by helping 
a less fortunate people throw off the bonds of imperialism. Therefore, moving forward the 
United States should continue to act in accordance with these moral principles to ensure the 
teleological end God had planned for the country. McKinley continued at the Expo, stating, “The 
genius of the nation, its freedom, its wisdom, its humanity, its courage, its justice, favored by 
divine Providence, will make it equal to every task and the master of every language.”76 In the 
end, because Americans were God’s chosen people, they were equipped with the necessary skills 
to overcome any obstacle they may face. The country would avoid the pitfalls of European 
imperialism because God and righteous duty guided the United States. As long as the United 
States remained committed to God, His values, and His plan, God would see the country through 
any difficulty overseas. This rationale for action was applied to the Philippines. 
 As previous chapters have discussed, one of the main arguments opposing McKinley’s 
postwar plans was the moral danger of annexing of the Philippines. The anti-imperialists, more 
ardently than others, argued annexation would tarnish the United States, a sin the country could 
never come back from. However, McKinley countered this argument in two ways. First, 
McKinley appealed to the United States’ past, demonstrating expansion had always been a part 
of the country’s history. Speaking in Redfield, South Dakota, in 1899, McKinley argued the 
United States had been adding territory since its inception. America had not only been adding 
territory, but according to McKinley, “we have been adding character and prestige to the 
American name. We have planted our flag in Porto [sic] Rico, in Hawaii, and in the Philippines. 
We planted it there because we had a right to do so.”77 Adding territory was not abnormal, but a 
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regular occurrence throughout American history. Furthermore, the underlying rationale was if 
God had been guiding the nation since its inception, then God accepted and blessed the United 
States continued expansion. If God did not ordain this, then God would have intervened and 
prevented the United States’ expansion or at least punished the nation. Simply, the United States 
had been expanding since its inception. Expansion had always been a part of the United States 
character, and expanding to these new overseas, non-contiguous territories was merely the next, 
inevitable step in American history and of God’s plan.  
Second, the debate about the Philippines was over because God had given the United 
States the territory, and there was no going against God’s will. In Iowa Falls, Iowa, in 1899, 
McKinley declared, “It is no longer a question of expansion with us; we have expanded…I 
believe, my fellow-citizens, that this territory came to us in the providence of God.”78 More 
explicitly, McKinley stated in Youngstown, Ohio, in 1899, “They are there because, in the 
providence of God, who moves mysteriously, that great archipelago has been placed in the hands 
of the American people.”79 God gave the United States its new territorial possessions. The 
reasons may not be clear in the moment, but it was not for Americans to question God’s plan for 
the country. The right course of action, as had been proved by America’s history, was to be 
obedient to God, to follow his plan, and to act morally in their responsibilities. Questioning 
God’s plan could cause God to question Americans’ loyalty to His destiny for the country, a fate 
few Americans dared to undertake. Clearly, McKinley defined expansion as God’s gift to limit 
potential counter-arguments, framing the debate in favorable terms. 
 Additionally, McKinley’s defense of the United States’ territorial acquisition framed the 
debate in moral terms, making it about what was right and wrong, not about what policy was 
most effective or logical. McKinley had four possible options regarding the Philippines: 1) return 
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them to Spain; 2) turn them over to European imperialists; 3) grant them independence, leaving 
them to the whims of European imperialist and the world; or 4) keep them, educating and 
uplifting the Filipinos.80 Giving them back to Spain would directly go against God’s divine plan 
for the nation. God delivered victory over Spain, rejecting His gift was morally unacceptable. 
The second and third options followed similar logic, as both options merely exchanged Spanish 
oppression for either another European power or anarchy. Both were equally morally 
reprehensible, as well as realistically impractical. The United States would be giving up a new 
economic market and a key port to a rival or the third option would likely lead to a conflict 
between European powers for control of the islands. Thus, the fourth option was the most moral 
and logical option. The United States would be doing a good deed by uplifting and educating the 
Filipinos, as well as keeping their obedience to God by accepting and making use of His gift. By 
acting this way, the United States would prevail because God had chosen them for this mission 
in the world. However, America and McKinley did not turn completely away from their 
exemplarist roots. The United States could act in the world, but there were responsibilities the 
United States needed to fulfill to be successful. 
 McKinley, and those firmly supporting his position, believed the United States acting in 
the world was a positive change in American foreign policy. However, in McKinley’s speeches, 
he observed obligations the United States would need to meet to be worthy of its new position 
and destiny. Reflecting on the Spanish-American War in Chicago, in 1898, McKinley outlined 
the burdens of the war. Referring to the past five months, he stated, “They have been so full of 
responsibilities, immediate and prospective, as to admonish the soberest judgment and counsel 
the most conservative of action. This is not the time to fire the imagination, but rather to discover 
in calm reason the way to truth and justice and right, and, when discovered, to follow it with 
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fidelity and courage, without fear, hesitation, or weakness.”81 While America’s victories have 
been great, they were not a reason for ego or braggadocio because victory came with great 
responsibility. In Huron, South Dakota, in 1899, McKinley continued with the theme of 
responsibility, stating, “It is given to the strong to bear the burdens of the weak; and our prayer 
should be, not that the burdens should be rolled away, but that God should give us strength to 
bear them. And the burdens which this war placed upon the American people unsought and 
unexpected…came not to us of our seeking, but as one of the inevitable and unescapable results 
of that war.”82 America as a strong nation, with an upright and robust citizenry, had a 
responsibility to guide and help lesser nations. But again, such responsibilities require sober 
judgment and wise decision-making. By acting in the world, the United States accepted the 
responsibility of being a great people. They were responsible not only for their fate but for the 
fates of the people they were guiding. Therefore, they cannot shun the responsibilities God 
placed upon them. Americans needed to remain faithful to the values that brought them these 
new duties, otherwise, their failing would cause a moral decay throughout the citizenry.  
Interventionism did not relieve Americans from their moral responsibility to be 
exemplars of virtue; rather, it shifted the scene of exceptionalism from the continental United 
States to the shores of other nations. The U.S. was no longer an idle actor, intended to be 
imitated, but an active agent seeking to imbue others with American values. McKinley, as well 
as many of his fellow citizens, believed they were up for the challenge. 
 A core characteristic of American exceptionalism is that deep down, every person, no 
matter their creed, race, or country of origin, yearns to be an American.  What the United States 
would now bring to the world was its values. Returning to his 1899 speech in Iowa Falls, 
McKinley declared, “we mean to meet these responsibilities, and we mean to carry our education 
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and our civilization there.”83 The United States by accepting the responsibility it won in the 
Spanish-American War would act to spread its values to other peoples, helping them toward 
America’s vision of a world order. While there was definite racial discrimination in the United 
States, both in practice and thought, Americans deeply believed all peoples yearned for their 
values and would accept them as their own. McKinley summarized this conception of 
Americanness in an 1899 address in Chicago, stating, “In boundless wealth of soil and mine and 
forest nature has favored us, while all races of men of every nationality and climate have 
contributed their blood and brains to make the nations what it is.”84 Unlike British or French or 
Russian or German imperialism, where natives could never become citizens because of their 
country of birth, being an American was not about birth or blood but the acceptance of a set of 
ideas and values. The United States did not need to colonize territory like Europeans, rather, the 
United States sought to export ideas, shaping the world in America’s image, not through force, 
but persuasion. Would its values conflict with other nations and occasionally need to be 
defended militarily? Yes, but McKinley and future presidents firmly believed an exemplar nation 
at home and spreading American ideas abroad, especially through trade, were not paradoxical 
and aligned the world with the United States. 
China: Justifying Military Action in McKinley’s Fourth Annual Message 
American actions in China from 1899 to 1901 demonstrated McKinley’s new 
interventionist approach to foreign affairs and international politics. Even before the war, market 
expansionists in the United States urged the country to establish a set of Pacific island outposts to 
reach China. American businessmen saw the 400 million Chinese, stuck in a mainly agrarian 
society, as the largest market available for American goods.85 With the Philippines under 
American control, there was no bigger proponent of American economic expansion in the Pacific 
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than Indiana Senator Albert Beveridge. Speaking to his colleagues in the Senate, Beveridge 
called the Philippines the key to the “illimitable markets” of China, adding China was “our 
natural customer.”86 Beveridge believed the Philippines acted as the Gibraltar of the Pacific, 
controlling trade to the East. For Beveridge, any American statesman that prohibited the United 
States from commanding the islands was committing a “crime against American trade.”87  
In September 1899, Secretary of State John Hay sent the first Open Door Note to the 
great powers of Europe and Japan. Hay’s impetus for sending the Note was the continued erosion 
of China’s sovereignty by Europe and Japan, threatening America’s most favored nation status in 
China.88 Hay sought a simple commitment and enshrinement of the status quo established 
decades before. The three main points were: 1) no interference in a treaty port, sphere of 
influence, or leased territory; 2) China’s treaty tariff would continue to apply and levied equally 
on all applicable goods, and the levies were to be collected by the Chinese government; and 3) 
the powers would not levy any higher dues on vessels frequenting their port or using their 
railroads than shall be levied on vessels of its own nationality.89 With the exception of Russia, 
Hay received relatively quick and positive responses to his request. Russia, after long diplomatic 
negotiations, eventually consented on the first two points, but was silent about the third. Hay 
took it as a positive response and on March 20, 1900, he published a circular stating all the 
nations replied favorably and the issue had been settled “as final and definitive.”90 Important to 
note, China did not have a say in the Open Door Note or the continued growth of the great 
powers’ hold over the country. 
After decades of foreign dominance and humiliation, it should be no surprise that anti-
foreign sentiments in China boiled over into an open rebellion against the foreign powers. 
Originating in northeast China, the Boxer Rebellion lasted from 1898-1900. Leading the anti-
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foreign, anti-Christian resistance was a group of Tuans, military-style bands of individuals who 
had existed for centuries and had gained legal recognition by the Imperial Chinese government. 
The Tuan leading the uprising was the Society of Harmonious Fists, or Boxers for short. The 
Boxers recruited peasants, playing on the growing anti-foreign sentiment and targeting Christian 
missionaries and their few converts. By 1900, the Boxers had made their way to Peking, killing 
French and Belgian engineers and American missionaries. The Western powers, including the 
United States, tried sending small contingents of troops to protect their legations in Peking, but 
they were not able to get through.91 A larger multi-national relief force of 2,000 soldiers was sent 
to relieve the delegates. They captured the Chinese forts at Taku, outside of Tientsin on June 17. 
However, no Americans participated in the seizing of the forts, as American admiral Kempff 
ignored pressure from the other great powers to participate. On June 20, 1900, the Chinese 
government declared war on all foreign powers, including the United States and ordered all 
foreign diplomats to leave the country. German minister Baron von Kettler protested the order, 
but he was shot and killed in the street.92 News of the German minister’s death did not reach the 
outside world until July 1, 1900, as the foreign legations had been cut off from the outside world 
by the Boxers since June 20. The original multi-national relief force was unable to reach Peking. 
In light of these events, Hay circulated the Second Open Door Note on July 3, 1900. The 
Note was a little over 300 words long but indicated a major shift in U.S. foreign policy. In the 
Note, Hay wrote, “The purpose of the President is, as it has been heretofore, to act concurrently 
with the other powers, first in opening up communication with Pekin and rescuing the American 
officials, missionaries, and other Americans who are in danger.”93 McKinley, according to Hay, 
acted to guard and protect “all legitimate American interests.”94 However, neither Hay nor 
McKinley explicitly detailed what these American interests were. Exercising this broad mandate, 
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McKinley sent 5,000 American troops to join the other great powers to relieve the legations and 
end the rebellion. The United States joined a coalition of European powers, exercising military 
power on foreign soil, without a Congressional resolution authorizing McKinley’s action. By 
August 14, 1900, the multinational force reached Peking, relieving the embattled diplomatic 
legations. McKinley wanted to bring home the troops quickly, fearing the charge of imperialism 
could be used against him in November’s presidential election. He was not wrong to fear this 
possibility. At home, the Philadelphia Times derided McKinley, writing, “an absolute 
declaration of war by the executive without the authority or knowledge of Congress, and it is 
without excuse because it is not a necessity.”95 After deliberating among his cabinet, McKinley 
kept a small contingent of troops in Peking, with the rest returning to the Philippines. The subject 
of China was not broached in McKinley’s rhetoric until his “Fourth Annual Message” in 
December of 1900. The rest of this section will analyze part of McKinley’s “Fourth Annual 
Message” addressing the situation in China. 
McKinley’s first strategy relied on American preconceptions of the Chinese, with 
assumptions based on Social Darwinist thinking and implied racial stereotypes. McKinley 
depicted the Chinese as primitive people, making all their actions and beliefs seem foolish. 
McKinley concluded the Chinese were unable to handle the progress the great powers were 
bringing to China. Essentially, Americans and Europeans had advanced too far compared to the 
Chinese. He stated, “The telegraph and the railway spreading over their land, the steamers plying 
on their waterways, the merchant and the missionary penetrating year by year farther to the 
interior, became to the Chinese mind types of an alien invasion, changing the course of their 
national life and fraught with vague forebodings of disaster to their beliefs and their self-
control.”96 Signs Western nations recognized as civilization and progress were seen by the 
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Chinese as markers of a foreign invasion. After blaming anti-foreign agitation as the cause for 
the Boxer Rebellion, McKinley dug deeper, stating, “Their origin lies deep in the character of the 
Chinese races and in the traditions of their Government.”97 McKinley concluded his 
characterization of the Chinese government’s failure to curb anti-foreign sentiment, stating, these 
“inflammatory appeals to the ignorance and superstition of the masses, mendacious and absurd in 
their accusations and deeply hostile in their spirit, could not but work cumulative harm.”98 
Chinese attacks on Western progress could not be prevented because the Chinese were tragically 
flawed people, misinterpreting the progress of the world as an attack on their country.  
Similar to Cuba, China represented another case of an uncivilized people rebelling 
against Western progress and standing in direct contrast to his definition of the United States. 
McKinley’s elements of racial inferiority were underpinned by elements of Social Darwinism in 
American society.  Social Darwinism, a theory popularized by Herbert Spencer in the 
socioeconomic sphere, applied Charles Darwin’s theory of natural selection and survival of the 
fittest to races and nations. At the apex of nations were the United States and Great Britain, the 
leading Anglo-Saxon countries of the world. While American exceptionalism does not denote a 
specific race as exceptional, it does prioritize a set of beliefs. McKinley defined China as a 
backward civilization that was unfit, unprepared, and unwilling to accept American values or 
beliefs. For example, McKinley sought the liberty of faith for all in China, stating, “insecurity of 
those natives who may embrace alien creeds is a scarcely less effectual assault upon the rights of 
foreign worship and teaching than would be the direct invasion thereof.”99 Chinese society stifled 
basic freedoms Americans accepted as universal rights.  Moreover, a nativist sentiment on the 
West Coast, due to large numbers of Chinese immigrants, influenced Americans negative 
perceptions of the Chinese. McKinley’s rhetorical definition of China played to these larger 
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societal depictions of the Chinese in the United States. According to political theorist Michael 
Hunt, the Chinese were depicted as “servile” and “cheap labor” willing to destroy the 
workingman. As a source of cheap labor, they threatened white American’s economic position. 
Living in Chinatowns, huddled together with little interaction with whites, Chinese immigrants 
were labeled as a threat to the public’s health and wellbeing.100 Already depicted as a domestic 
threat to Americans, it was a small leap for them to see China’s anti-foreign and anti-Western 
attitudes as a threat to America’s position in Asia. China represented the perfect scapegoat to 
justify McKinley’s decision to send troops overseas. 
The Chinese, in McKinley’s description, were actively resistant, unwilling to accept 
American tutelage. The Chinese actively worked to undermine Western progress, while the 
Americans watched and waited, hoping for peace between all parties involved. Such a 
description was used to depict a factual accounting of events, removing American agency and 
making them a bystander to the rebellion. According to Denise Bostdorff, presidents use this 
rhetorical strategy of removing American agency to create a narrative of a “completely objective, 
factual state of affairs that has occurred as a result of some other party’s actions.”101 In 
McKinley’s narrative, the United States became the victim of circumstance, deflecting any 
potential action by the U.S. that may have attributed to the crisis.102 McKinley thoroughly 
detailed China’s actions against foreigners over the months leading up to the siege in Peking. He 
downplayed America’s role in the situation, stating, “The United States, while not participating 
in the joint demonstration, promptly sent from the Philippines all ships that could be spared for 
service on the Chinese coast.”103 American seamen did not participate in the attack, but were 
merely present with American soldiers onboard protecting the diplomats. It was the Chinese, 
with their primitive anti-foreign sentiment, who were responsible for the crisis over the summer. 
153 
 
McKinley provided further characterization, calling China a state in “virtual anarchy.” Taken as 
a whole, the scene was one of anarchy and disorder, with a set of characters comprised of 
unfriendly, uncivilized Chinese threatening passive American citizens. The situation called for 
quick and decisive action. A failure to intervene by McKinley, according to his past rhetoric and 
personal belief, would be a failure of his and America’s duty. 
However, there was hope. American intervention could help the Chinese. Americans 
living in China emphasized the weakness and vulnerability of China, reinforcing the nativist 
message, but they also believed American finance, trade, and mission work could turn or civilize 
China. However, to be civilized, the Chinese would need to be the passive student, learning from 
their American tutor.104 China’s weakness was an inherent character flaw that only Western, 
specifically American, guidance could help overcome. While McKinley relied on racial 
stereotypes to blame China for creating a situation mandating American action, he did not give 
up on the Chinese people altogether. 
Instead, McKinley placed most of the blame for the uprising on the “evil counselors” in 
China. “For the real culprits,” according to McKinley, were “the evil counselors who have 
misled the Imperial judgment and diverted the sovereign authority to their own guilty ends, full 
expiation becomes imperative within the rational limits of retributive Justice.”105 Evil took the 
form of a speaker or orator, someone whose words corrupt others for their own personal gain. 
The “evil counselors” were to blame for influencing the Chinese people to rise against Western 
traders and dignitaries. They seduced the Chinese people with tales of Western impropriety and 
corruption, fanning the flames of rebellion. Here, the evil counselors influenced China away 
from the path of progress and enlightenment, rejecting American values of hard work and 
sacrifice. The results of the Boxer Rebellion, like any false prophet throughout the Bible, was 
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failure and destruction. The Boxer Rebellion represented a divine administration of justice. God 
punished China for their foolishness and selfish acts, and the United States, acting as a moral 
agent and chosen people, acted, not with words, but deeds to restore the situation. McKinley 
designated the U.S. as an interventionist nation, tasked with the mission to confront evil 
throughout the world and restore justice. McKinley in his appeal to the Chinese government 
sought justice, not retribution or tribute. He requested that China “treat with just sternness the 
principal offenders, who are doubly culpable, not alone toward the foreigners, but toward Your 
Majesty, under whose rule the purpose of China to dwell in concord with the world had hitherto 
found expression in the welcome and protection assured to strangers.”106 McKinley did not seek 
vengeance, but justice. Vengeance was an immoral act, going against God’s will and America’s 
moral dictates. Whereas, justice redressed the wrongs perpetrated against God’s chosen people. 
Additionally, it was not every Chinese citizen who went astray, but only a few. Most of the 
Chinese could still be reached once these evil counselors were dispensed of, putting China back 
on the long path toward Americanization. 
McKinley’s rhetorical strategy in his “Fourth Annual Message” was an early example of 
justificatory rhetoric during a foreign crisis, using American exceptionalism as an underlying 
rationale for intervention. This strategy has been employed often since the Cold War as a 
deliberative strategy used during a crisis to explain why military action was taken. Its main 
function has been to explain to Congress and the American people why military action was 
undertaken in a situation, and at times, Congressional authorization.107 Crisis rhetoric, unlike war 
rhetoric, has a beginning, middle, and end, even being announced and concluded in the same 
statement. Because of the nature of the crisis and the different expectations of presidential 
rhetoric in 1900, McKinley could discuss the entire crisis in one speech a few months after the 
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crisis. This rhetorical strategy incorporated McKinley’s previous strategies, justifying American 
action based on an anarchical scene filled with threats to Americans and American interest. 
Playing off American exceptionalism’s moral framing, McKinley claimed the U.S. had to 
confront an evil in the world, making the decision one of good verse evil, not one from a host of 
possible policies. McKinley limited the scope of the intervention to rescuing the imperiled 
legation, obtaining redress for the wrongs incurred, securing the safety of American life and 
property, and preventing the spread of disorder, defining Hay’s ambiguous objectives in the 
Second Open Door Note.108 Having accomplished this limited scope, McKinley confidently 
stated, American forces “withdrew from active hostilities.”109 The quick resolution of the crisis 
did not call for further justification. McKinley had navigated and resolved the crisis, without 
incurring too many casualties. He rhetoric relied on the belief that the United States was 
qualitatively a different nation, seeking not territorial domain in China, but the end to a 
dangerous situation for Americans and Chinese citizens. His proof of this claim was the quick 
withdrawal of American troops after the crisis, leaving no lingering doubts about America’s 
intentions. Such justificatory rhetoric would become a staple of presidents explaining American 
military action overseas in the years to come from U.S. actions in Latin America to Dwight 
Eisenhower’s rhetoric about Formosa and the Middle East to Lyndon Johnson with the Gulf of 
Tonkin Resolution. 
Furthermore, McKinley’s victory in the election of 1900, where Bryan’s charges of 
imperialism against McKinley fell flat, ended the need for further rhetorical justification outside 
his annual address. By successfully concluding the crisis, McKinley could claim victory, creating 
a narrative with a beginning, middle, and end, without justifying where his new presidential 
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power derived from. All Americans needed to know was the Chinese threatened American 
interests, and their president responded, did his duty, and defended them. 
Pay Heed All Who Do Nothing: The Prophet of Evil 
As discussed in the last section, McKinley blamed the “evil counselors” in China for 
inciting the rebellion. However, this phrase was not a one-off phrase specifically related to 
China; rather, it was an important concept underpinning America’s new interventionist attitude. 
In this section, I examine two other instances of this phrase: in Boston, Massachusetts in 1899, 
and the other in his “Second Inaugural Address” in 1901.  
To unite Americans behind his vision, McKinley needed to depict a world filled with un-
American “others,” who posed a threat to American interests, giving warrant to a more 
interventionist policy. Parts of this argument are grounded in American civil religion. In her 
work on American national identity, Vanessa Beasley described how America’s civil religion 
can unite a culturally and ethnically diverse citizenry. It can also unite citizens around an 
articulated global mission for the United States. Beasley wrote, “they [presidents] can unite the 
American people by providing a global, un-American ‘them’ against which the citizenry can feel 
like a distinctive, united ‘us.’”110 Presidents do not merely articulate a set of principles American 
identity is based upon, but they employ “civil religious themes to promote a particular attitudinal 
pose as similarly constitutive.”111 McKinley created a distinctive other, the prophet of evil, 
standing against American principles, calling forth Americans to unite and rally against him. 
At a dinner banquet in Boston, in 1899, McKinley warned his audience about the prophet 
of evil, stating, “The prophet of evil would do nothing because he flinches at sacrifice and effort, 
and to do nothing is easiest and involves the least cost.”112 The prophet of evil takes the easy 
path, letting the doers take the responsibility and obligation of getting things done. The prophet 
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preferred America to refrain from acting, sitting on the sideline doing nothing. “If the doubters 
were in a majority,” McKinley warned, “there would, it is true, be no labor, no sacrifice, no 
anxiety, and no burden raised or carried; no contribution from our ease and purse and comfort to 
the welfare of others, or even to the extension of our resources to the welfare of ourselves.”113 
The prophet of evil preached pure exemplarism, an America watching the world, letting those 
suffer under the oppression of others—in this case the Cubans under Spanish oppression. It was 
true, the prophets path according to McKinley would be one of “ease.”114 Americans would not 
suffer death or risk the dangers of war. The country would be safe, sitting behind its two oceans, 
disturbing no one, but at what cost?  McKinley framed the debate around exceptionalism’s 
principle of good or evil, not a realist approach to American foreign policy. Two paths were 
presented for the country to follow. The first was the path of the righteous, selfless nation. The 
second was promoted by the prophet, the path of the voyeuristic sloth. The former promoted hard 
work and action, in the service of humanity. The latter seduced America with promises of ease 
and comfort—little work was required. The choice for McKinley was easy. For McKinley, the 
identity of the country was based on its citizens, and he would not let his nation of citizen-
soldiers falter in their duty against the prophet of evil. His redefinition of citizenship and of the 
country supported each other in their purpose of a more active United States. The traits of those 
following the prophet stood in opposition to McKinley’s definition of Americans. The citizen-
soldier was superior to the prophet because he did not shirk his responsibility to the nation or the 
world, he sacrificed for his fellow citizens, and helped those less fortunate in the world. For 
McKinley, America was filled dutiful citizens, destined to take McKinley’s path. 
 McKinley’s clearest rejection of the prophet of evil occurred in the final year of his 
presidency, in his “Second Inaugural Address.” In his “Second Inaugural Address,” McKinley 
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again criticized the prophets of evil, stating, they “were not the builders of the Republic, nor in 
its crises since have they saved or served it.”115 Rather, they “are obstructionists who despair, 
and who would destroy confidence in the ability of our people to solve wisely and for civilization 
the mighty problems resting upon them.”116 The prophet of evil became the antithesis of 
McKinley’s definition of America. The United States had always been a nation of optimistic 
builders, creating a better world. Now, the country was charged with the responsibility to act in 
the world, building a better world in America’s image. Yet, these prophets had disparaged the 
United States’ ability and mocked its responsibility from the founding. They were the naysayers 
warning of America’s doom, fearing the U.S. would lose its’ moral position in the world or God 
would abandon them. This was not the identity of the United States McKinley created 
throughout his first term, and he would not let the nation slide back into it during his second. 
McKinley then shifted to constituting a new policy, projecting American values outward 
to the rest of the world. Americans were guided by the faith of their fathers, a mighty force 
bringing progress to the world, not fear and inaction. Americans have always been entrenched in 
freedom at home, according to McKinley, but they also “take their love for it with them 
wherever they go, and they reject as mistaken and unworthy the doctrine that we lose our own 
liberties by securing the enduring foundations of liberty to others. Our institutions will not 
deteriorate by extension, and our sense of justice will not abate under tropic suns in distant 
seas.”117 McKinley’s words were the clearest rejection of exemplarism by a president to that 
point in American history. The United States did not lose its position in the world by acting, 
spreading freedom and liberty. Its institutions did not fall into disrepair with God abandoning the 
nation and its people. Rather, American values were bolstered by their spread and acceptance by 
other peoples. These values resided in the hearts of Americans, not a physical geographical 
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location. Such a belief embodied the belief every person can be an American if they accept its 
values. The country and world would be strengthened by the spread of American values, as more 
people would experience and accept the values of freedom and liberty. Strengthened by his 
successful first term, McKinley believed God wanted the United States to engage the world, 
being a positive force throughout the world. 
In regard to territorial expansion, McKinley stated, “As heretofore, so hereafter will the 
nation demonstrate its fitness to administer any new estate which events devolve upon it, and in 
the fear of God will ‘take occasion by the hand and make the bounds of freedom wider yet.’"118 
The United States would not wage war to acquire new territory, but if it gained territory from 
defending its ideals, it would not shy away from its responsibilities. Expansion should not be a 
punishment or curse, but an opportunity to spread freedom. All of this was possible if, and only 
if, the United States accepted the responsibilities God placed on them, blending the principles of 
interventionism and exemplarism. The United States must continue to be true to its values of 
freedom and liberty to be worthy of these blessings. Interventionism for McKinley was not a 
rhetorical trope of just acting in the world to act, and God will take care of the rest. Rather, 
interventionism was an effect of acting on American ideals, and believing all people deserved to 
live under their blessing. The prophet of evil was the rhetorical “other” American citizens could 
rally against, uniting the nation in support of a new interventionist policy. The world was 
changing, and the role of the United States in the world needed to change with it. 
Buffalo: Toward A New World 
In Buffalo, McKinley framed American interventionism in economic terms, establishing 
reciprocity as the official economic policy of the nation. He concluded, the policy of reciprocity 
would solve the nation’s overproduction problem. Such overproduction, according to McKinley, 
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“must be relieved through a foreign outlet and we should sell everywhere we can, and buy 
wherever the buying will enlarge our sales and productions, and thereby make a greater demand 
for home labor.”119 Reciprocity’s basic principles lowered or eliminated tariffs on products, 
creating a freer international market, with such policies becoming the basis for present day free 
trade agreements. American intervention overseas, under McKinley’s leadership, was not based 
on military interventionism, but economic. McKinley saw the shrinking of the world through 
communication, transportation, and technology—the forces of globalization—not as a threat to 
American industry, but the keys to its’ success. For McKinley, the world was one, large global 
market, opening to American goods, but first he needed to persuade the American people of this 
vision. 
The changing world led McKinley to Buffalo to speak at the first Pan-American 
Exposition. The world had been coming together since the 1750s, a process we would today call 
globalization. Between 1800 and 1913 the volume of world trade increased twenty-five-fold, 
with three-fourths of all international trade occurring between Europe, North America, and 
Australia-New Zealand. All of Europe West of the czarist empire had become a free trade zone. 
As historians Jürgen Osterhammel and Niels Petersson concluded, “There was simply no 
escaping one another.”120 In Buffalo, McKinley echoed that sentiment, stating, “Geographic and 
political divisions will continue to exist, but distances have been effaced. Swift ships and swift 
trains are becoming cosmopolitan. They invade fields which a few years ago were 
impenetrable.”121 Industrialization had made trade and travel between countries easier, quicker. 
Whether it was the telegraph bringing news from around the world in minutes, the steamship or 
railroad transporting people and goods quicker than ever before, or machines reaching new, 
previously unreachable lands, the world was moving forward. McKinley plainly put it, “Isolation 
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is no longer possible or desirable.”122 He concluded, “God and man have linked the nations 
together. No nation can longer be indifferent to any other.”123 The United States, and for that 
matter no country, could remain isolated from the rest of the world anymore. The United States 
could no longer sit behind its buffer of oceans, shining as a beacon to the rest of the world. 
America was going to have to interact with the world, whether it wanted to or not. 
McKinley favored economic engagement with the rest of the world. Whereas European 
powers settled on colonizing the world, engaging in military conquests throughout Africa and 
Asia, McKinley preferred the United States expand its economic power. Business was the true 
arena for civilized nations to engage. Without such competition, according to McKinley, “we 
would be clinging to the clumsy antiquated processes of farming and manufacture and the 
methods of business of long ago, and the twentieth would be no further advanced than the 
eighteenth century. But though commercial competitors we are, commercial enemies we must 
not be.”124 Business and economic competition brought progress, with progress came more 
universal and American values. McKinley’s interpretation of history saw economics as the key to 
success, not military conquest. McKinley believed no nation could compete with American 
industry in a free market. By opening up the world’s markets to U.S. products, McKinley 
believed the U.S. would fulfill its destiny by leading the world toward a more prosperous future. 
The problem facing the U.S. was not a military one, but an economic one. Specifically, 
few nations outside the U.S. and Great Britain believed in lower tariffs, much less free trade. As 
McKinley stated, “The expansion of our trade and commerce is the pressing problem. 
Commercial wars are unprofitable.”125 McKinley sought to expand America’s overseas markets 
by engaging in an economic policy called reciprocity. Reciprocity was defined as the mutual 
lowering of tariffs on list of goods between nations, resulting in an increase in exports by 
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relieving overproduction the domestic market could not consume. McKinley called it the 
“natural outgrowth” of America’s industrial development. Just as American territorial expansion 
after the Spanish-American War was deemed to align with America’s past, so to was America’s 
new interventionist spirit of opening new markets. McKinley described reciprocal trade 
agreements as being “in harmony with the spirit of the times.”126 If the United States was going 
to be a global power, spreading its ideals around the world, then one of the fastest ways to 
engage other nations was through trade. Freer trade provided the economic benefits of empire, 
without always resorting to military force, protecting the United States moral position in the 
world, while also allowing it to be a more active agent. American interventionism under the 
guise of American exceptionalism, during the McKinley presidency, was defined by economic 
expansion. Whether it was Puerto Rico, the Philippines or China, McKinley framed 
interventionism as an economic necessity to further the nation along God’s predetermined path. 
McKinley saw globalization and the interconnecting of the world as a challenge and an 
opportunity. The Spanish-American War was the transformative event that allowed McKinley to 
redefine the United States, and in the process, reshape the world in America’s image. Unlike 
Adams reluctance to act or Congress’ unwillingness to support Grant’s and Hayes’ ambition, 
McKinley believed it was America’s destiny, its divinely inspired path to help other nations. The 
United States went from being only a beacon of light to the world to also being an active agent in 
bringing that light to the world. 
Conclusion 
 McKinley’s presidency represented one of the more dramatic shifts in foreign policy 
rhetoric. In 1897, McKinley adhered to the exemplarist vision for the United States. The best 
America was an America perfecting its domestic institutions, serving as a beacon of hope for all 
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the nations of the world. As the world continued to shrink and crises arose threatening American 
interest, McKinley recognized the need for change. The Spanish-American War provided 
McKinley with the opportunity to redefine the nation. In the peace settlement, the United States 
gained overseas territories. Rather than seeing this as a perversion of American exceptionalism, 
McKinley saw its natural progression of America’s history, pivoting the nation away from 
exemplarism and toward interventionism. If the United States represented God’s chosen people 
and God gave the United States a quick victory, then the territories must be part of God’s plan 
for the country. The United States’ victory and territorial expansion made it a great power in the 
eyes of the world. This new status brought new responsibility. The first major challenge 
McKinley and the country faced after the war was a chaotic situation in China. 
McKinley’s actions in China and rhetoric afterward continued to reshape and redefine the 
nation. Even though McKinley saw the Philippines as part of God’s plan, he was still personally 
reluctant to wage war for territorial expansion. Rather, the United States’ destiny was in the 
domination of economic markets. A militarily weak position in China led McKinley to seek 
some sort of assurance from the other powers guaranteeing America’s economic rights. John 
Hay’s First Open Door Note should not be read as an edict dictating American policy, unlike 
present day statements with America being the lone superpower; rather, it was a framework 
intended to establish diplomatic agreement for the open door principles. It was a statement 
intended to continue diplomacy in China, rather than incite conflict and more partitioning of the 
nation. Hay achieved what he wanted, a commitment to keep the ports open to American trade 
without discrimination. When the Boxer Rebellion threatened American interests again in China, 
McKinley took the revolutionary step of sending American soldiers overseas to intervene, 
without congressional request or approval. What became evident after, and what Theodore 
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Roosevelt was more aware of and willing to employ as president, was America’s position in 
China and elsewhere depended on American military force.127 McKinley justified his actions by 
describing a nation in chaos and turmoil, blaming not the entirety of China, but a specific set of 
“evil counselors” who led China astray. Such depictions appeared in two other McKinley 
speeches, being employed as a rhetorical “other” to galvanize the nation behind a more 
interventionist foreign policy. 
Additionally, McKinley’s presidency enhanced the powers of the office in both military 
and economic spheres. His actions in China expanded presidential war power. Past presidents 
had used force against nongovernmental groups threatening American interests or citizens, but 
McKinley used force against a recognized government, without a declaration or authorization 
from Congress. England’s Spectator, writing about the changing conception of the American 
presidency, stated, it was “neither more nor less than elective monarchy, limited as to duration, 
and regulated as to finance, but otherwise nearly unfettered.”128  As president, he became 
responsible for finding and securing new overseas markets to keep the economy growing. Future 
presidents now had similar expectations to manage foreign trade, with his two successors using 
Big Stick Diplomacy (Theodore Roosevelt) and Dollar Diplomacy (Howard Taft) as their 
strategic economic policies. A more active economic policy correlated to a more active and 
interventionist U.S. foreign policy, as U.S. economic interests abroad needed to be protected and 
kept open through force, as the Boxer Rebellion exemplified. 
 The shift in McKinley’s rhetoric also marked the recognition of what we presently term 
globalization. McKinley redefined the nation because the world necessitated this change. 
Machines, industrialization, and technology reshaped the world. The world Washington lived in 
was vastly different than McKinley’s era. As McKinley observed in his last address, isolation 
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was no longer possible. However, just because the U.S. was going to be more active, this did not 
mean it had to abandon its’ core values. McKinley was not willing to abandon American 
principles embodied in exemplarism of being moral and a beacon to other nations domestically, 
but rather, McKinley’s rhetoric demonstrated a blending of exemplarism and interventionism. 
Americans would be both exemplars and active in the world. For McKinley, an interventionist 
U.S. meant it was a great power, chosen by God, and active in the world, if, and only if, 
Americans were faithful to their values. What made Americans exceptional was their values, 
their institutions, and their adherence to the rule of law. McKinley warned on multiple occasions, 
and nowhere more clearly than in his “Second Inaugural Address,” that America’s success at 
home and overseas depended on its fidelity to American values. Americans needed to be 




Chapter 5 Conclusion: McKinley’s Rhetorical Legacy 
On September 6, 1901, McKinley attended the Pan American Exposition in Buffalo, New 
York. That afternoon he was scheduled to attend a public reception at the Temple of Music. A 
little after four in the afternoon, as McKinley stood in the reception line greeting the public, 
anarchist Leon Czolgosz fired two bullets at the president. One bullet bounced off a button, 
while the other lodged inside McKinley. Czolgosz did not try to escape or kill himself, rather he 
was quickly wrestled to the ground. McKinley told George B. Cortelyou, a personal assistant to 
the president, not to harm Czolgosz. In that moment, McKinley believed Czolgosz was “some 
poor misguided fellow.”1 The president was rushed out of the building and immediately into 
surgery. The bullet inside McKinley could not be found. The doctors chose not to use an X-ray 
machine, even though the Exposition had one on display. As sun light faded, Doctor Rixey 
closed the incision without drainage, placing a bandage and antiseptic over the wound. For a 
week after the assassination attempt, there was an air of hope as McKinley regained 
consciousness with no complications and was in good spirits. However, a week after the 
shooting, McKinley spiked a fever and could not eat. Gangrene set in, as cleanliness and 
disinfection were still relatively new and rare in 1901. On Friday, September 13, McKinley’s 
wife Ida and a few close associates were allowed to see him. He said weakly, “Good-bye, good-
bye all. It is God’s way. His will, not ours, be done.” Then he murmured his favorite hymn, 
“Nearer my God to Thee,” before losing consciousness. A little over six months into his second 
term, McKinley passed away at quarter past two on the morning of Saturday, September 14.2 
 Writing of the importance of McKinley’s presidency, biographer Wayne Morgan noted, 
presidents after McKinley would employ the latent powers of the presidency McKinley had 
awakened to transform the office and the nation. However, such a transformation could not have 
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occurred without McKinley, who rekindled the power of the presidency and ameliorated the 
diverse forces that disturbed the country throughout the tumultuous 1890s. Part of McKinley’s 
success stemmed from his rhetorical power. McKinley’s power, according to Morgan, “lay in 
persuasion rather than force, and persuasion is seldom dramatic.”3 McKinley’s rhetorical style 
lacked the flair of his successor, but he was adept at synthesizing diverse views into policies that 
were acceptable to the majority of the country. 
Before continuing forward, I want to briefly summarize the main arguments I have 
presented. I began this dissertation with the claim that the unique contextual circumstances 
surrounding McKinley’s presidency presented him with the opportunity to redefine and 
reconstruct America’s foreign policy. Given this context, I proposed to explore and answer three 
questions: First, how did McKinley justify sending troops overseas to fight the Spanish-
American War? Second, how did McKinley transform and reimagine citizenship? Third, how did 
McKinley redefine the country? 
In answering the first question, I argued McKinley employed the ideograph of 
civilization, supported by the key modifiers of humanity, duty, and progress, to support his 
decision to go to war. The deterioration of the situation in Cuba created an external exigence, an 
uncivilized crisis necessitating action by the United States. Simply, inaction by the U.S. was 
unacceptable. Therefore, McKinley argued the United States had a duty to civilization and 
humanity to intervene, ending the war and bringing peace to the island. To answer my second 
question, I claimed McKinley appealed to the values of unity and patriotism to heal a divided 
nation. Through these appeals, McKinley employed the trope of the citizen-soldier to reimagine 
male citizenship and align with his foreign policy. Citizen-soldiers were ideal male citizens of 
the republic, defending the nation and its values when called upon and returning to their peaceful 
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civilian lives after the war. After the war, the United States had new responsibilities that required 
a redefinition of the country. In answering my last question, I argued McKinley redefined 
American exceptionalism from exemplarism to interventionism. McKinley claimed the United 
States should be active in the world. As God’s chosen people, the country was immune from the 
dangers of imperialism. To support this argument, McKinley reconstructed American history, 
claiming the country had always been expansionist and this latest turn did nothing to alter its 
core values. 
To conclude, I want to explore McKinley’s rhetorical legacy. I begin by tracking 
McKinley’s three main rhetorical moves—the ideograph of civilization, redefinition of 
Americans, and redefinition of the country—and trace their rhetorical trajectory after his 
presidency. After tracing McKinley’s rhetorical legacy, I take up two final arguments before 
concluding. First, I examine how all three rhetorical moves by McKinley worked together, 
setting the discursive boundaries for his successors. I concentrate on how each of the three 
moves supported each other, creating a cohesive and complete argument. Without one of them, 
McKinley’s argument would have faltered. Second, I reevaluate McKinley’s place in the 
rhetorical presidency. I conclude by reiterating the need for scholars, especially rhetoricians, to 
pay attention to transitional moments in American history. These moments offer presidents 
opportunities to redefine and reconstruct the nation. 
Tracing McKinley’s Rhetorical Legacy 
 McKinley’s premature death did not end his influence in the country. McKinley’s 
rhetoric set new precedents and paths for his successors to follow. This section looks at how 
Roosevelt and Taft continued McKinley’s discursive messages. However, before moving 
forward, I want to speculate on why presidents may look to their predecessors, continuing certain 
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rhetorical trajectories. In their examination of presidential genres, Campbell and Jamieson stated, 
“the genres analyzed in subsequent chapters are those we see as the structural supports for the 
edifice of the presidency. Through them, presidents perform functions that are useful, and 
sometimes essential, to maintaining the powers of the executive.”4 Campbell and Jamieson 
continued, stating, presidents “carved out genres that mark beginnings and endings, preserve the 
executive powers of the presidency, adapt it to changing conditions, and promote policy 
initiatives and respond to them.”5 Presidents continue to employ and replicate rhetorical genres 
because they serve several larger purposes from maintaining rhetorical traditions to serving 
certain civic rituals to continuing rhetorical strategies that were successful. Moreover, as Michael 
McGee argued, ideographs do not disappear from society, rather their meaning changes.6 
Therefore, certain ideographs in presidential rhetoric, like genres, could be employed 
consistently by presidents. Tracing their legacy will illuminate new understandings of 
presidential rhetoric. As demonstrated by my review of American exceptionalism as a rhetorical 
trope, I contend a similar argument can be made for examining its usage by McKinley’s 
successors, especially given the dramatic shift indicated by McKinley’s rhetoric. 
 A second reason for examining McKinley’s rhetorical legacy is because presidents, 
according to Mary Stuckey, “are inherently conservative in their political as well as their 
rhetorical choices.”7 Such conservatism is a product of the presidency as an institution. Legal 
scholar William Marshall wrote historical examples are often cited by defenders of expanded 
presidential power. According to Marshall, “The use of such powers by previous Presidents 
stands as authority for a current or future President to engage in similar actions.”8 Therefore, as 
Marshall concluded, “every extraordinary use of power by one President expands the availability 
of executive branch power for use by future Presidents.”9 As the institution of the presidency 
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acquired power, rather than give it back, the presidency retained power once it was gained. A 
similar argument can be made for rhetoric. Presidents have used rhetoric to defend their 
expanded power. If a president found a successful rhetorical strategy to defend their acquisition 
of power, then it would be logical to conclude they would continue such a rhetorical strategy 
until it no longer held sway. Campbell and Jamieson concluded, “The effect of earlier 
presidential rhetoric on the discourse of subsequent presidents is illustrated by presidential war 
rhetoric, in which the lines of argument available and the timing of its appearance, although not 
the essential form, have been strongly influenced by precedents.”10 Therefore, examining 
McKinley’s rhetorical legacy provides insight into how his successors viewed his rhetorical 
strategies and what strategies were helpful defending McKinley’s expansion of presidential 
power. 
I begin my look at McKinley’s rhetorical legacy by examining the term civilization, 
briefly tracing its continued use by Roosevelt and Taft, but also looking at its decline after World 
War I. I continue in the next section by focusing on how McKinley’s conception of the citizen-
solider helped shape America’s changing military policies. I conclude this section with an 
analysis of America’s increased intervention in Latin America and Asia.  
From Civilized States to First World: Transformation of an Idea 
 McKinley employed the ideograph civilization to delineate the difference between great 
powers and the rest of the world. Civilized powers were leaders of industry, technology, and 
military might, demonstrating a significant edge over the rest of the world. Civilized states prized 
education and literacy, looking down on those societies who lagged behind their standard. Most 
importantly, civilized nations brought order to the world. When Cuba and Spain continued to 
escalate their retaliatory attacks against each other, McKinley believed the United States had a 
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moral duty to civilization and humanity to intervene. McKinley’s war rhetoric used civilization 
as an ideograph to build a moral case for American intervention in a war where America’s casus 
belli was not self-evident. Supporting civilization were the key terms of duty, humanity, and 
progress. By employing duty in conjunction with civilization, McKinley argued the United States 
had a responsibility to bring order and peace to Cuba. By including the term humanity, 
McKinley strengthened his warrant for American action. The U.S. was not acting for some 
material gain but answering a higher moral call to end an uncivilized conflict. In the process, 
civilization would progress around the world, turning uncivilized states into civilized states. 
Would they reach the civilized status of great powers? Probably not, but McKinley believed 
through American guidance the world would progress to a better overall condition. Most 
importantly, McKinley’s emphasis on going to war for humanity’s sake created a new rationale 
for war or military intervention abroad: human rights. When people’s rights were threatened, the 
United States could argue intervention to end oppression was morally acceptable. 
Civilization as an ideograph was still viable to McKinley’s immediate successors, 
Roosevelt and Taft. Roosevelt continued employing civilization as a sorting tool between 
civilized and uncivilized peoples, with civilized nations becoming increasingly peaceful toward 
each other. In his “Second Annual Message,” Roosevelt opined, “As civilization grows warfare 
becomes less and less the normal condition of foreign relations. The last century has seen a 
marked diminution of wars between civilized powers; wars with uncivilized powers are largely 
mere matters of international police duty, essential for, the welfare of the world.”11 Following 
McKinley’s belief about globalization and interconnectedness of the world, Roosevelt put his 
faith in international institutions, like The Hague, as symbols of civilized states’ peacefulness. 
Roosevelt claimed, “More and more the increasing interdependence and complexity of 
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international political and economic relations render it incumbent on all civilized and orderly 
powers to insist on the proper policing of the world.”12 As a great civilized power, Roosevelt 
recognized, like McKinley, the United States needed to play a larger role in creating and 
sustaining peace around the globe. In his statement announcing the Roosevelt Corollary to the 
Monroe Doctrine, he stated, “In asserting the Monroe Doctrine, in taking such steps as we have 
taken in regard to Cuba, Venezuela, and Panama, and in endeavoring to circumscribe the theater 
of war in the Far East, and to secure the open door in China, we have acted in our own interest as 
well as in the interest of humanity at large.”13 Roosevelt used McKinley’s modifier of humanity 
to defend American interventionism and to appeal to the standard of civilization as a rationale for 
such action. 
Taft’s rhetoric maintained McKinley’s desire to help civilize uncivilized peoples. Under 
Taft, the U.S. began examining different options for working with other nations to uplift regions 
around the globe. In Taft’s “First Annual Message,” he stated, “This Government was among the 
foremost in the great work of uplifting the uncivilized regions of Africa and urging the extension 
of the benefits of civilization, education, and fruitful open commerce to that vast domain, and is 
a party to treaty engagements of all the interested powers designed to carry out that great duty to 
humanity.”14 Taft echoed McKinley’s discourse of duty, humanity, and civilization, while 
focusing on the need for civilized states to bring progress to uncivilized peoples. Civilization in 
presidential discourse from McKinley to Taft focused on how the U.S. could be a positive moral 
actor in the world, uplifting the downtrodden. However, civilization as an ideograph began to 
fade in 1914.  
Prior to World War I, civilizations, especially the European great powers, marveled at 
their progress and the backwardness of other nations. However, in a span of twenty years the 
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world’s “civilized” powers brought unprecedented death and destruction to the globe. As 
historians Jürgen Osterhammel and Niels Peterson observed, “Gone was the basic consensus on 
what constituted ‘civilized’ realpolitik and acceptable deportment that had been worked out over 
centuries of European diplomatic history.”15 Over the course of these calamitous decades, 
civilization as an ideograph collapsed. The destruction wrought by civilized states during two 
world wars exposed the gap between civilized and uncivilized as merely rhetorical. Progress as a 
modifier proved to be fragile, as a revisionist powers sought to reorder the international system.16 
By the end of 1945, the former imperial powers of Europe were now second tier powers, as the 
United States and Soviet Union, both strongly anti-imperialist, squared off in the Cold War. The 
French fought in Algeria and Indo-China, in hopes of keeping their colonies, but were defeated 
in both cases.17 Civilization has made a modest comeback, with the likes of Samuel Huntington’s 
The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. Yet, its resonance as an ideograph 
pales in comparison to its pre-World War I influence. 
Outside the sheer material destruction brought by war, a number of other reasons factored 
into civilization’s downfall. To begin, after the founding of the League of Nations and the United 
Nations, it became anachronistic and insulting to the larger number of non-European nations to 
be called uncivilized, as they became full political and legal members of international society. In 
1955, there were twenty-five Afro-Asian states in the U.N. Five years later there were fifty-three 
members, and by 1971, over 70 percent of the 132 members were non-European.18 The 
distinction between civilized and uncivilized states was unnecessary, as the Family of Nations 
had grown to include almost all nations. Furthermore, this excluded the fact that Egypt, Iraq, 
Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Syria were founding members of the U.N.19  
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A second major reason came from the non-European nations at the U.N. initiating a crisis 
in international law. Non-European and former colonial states sought to rid international law of 
all traces of the standard of civilization, removing the Eurocentric and oppressive language from 
treaties and agreements. Members of the U.N.’s International Law Commission asserted, “the 
Commission should refrain from using the expression ‘civilized countries’, even if article 38 of 
the Statue of the International Court of Justice used it. That expression dated back to the colonial 
era with its concept of the ‘white man’s burden’.”20 Anti-colonial movements gained steam 
throughout the post-World War II world. By December 1960, the U.N.’s “Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples” rejected delaying independence of 
colonies based on inadequate political, social, or educational preparedness. The declaration also 
affirmed the subjection of peoples as an impediment to world peace. But most importantly, it 
declared, “All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.”21 As the standard of civilization disappeared from international law, its meaning 
in public discourse was transformed. 
While the Third World sought to erase all rhetorical remnants of the standard of 
civilization, the West transformed their discourse and means of control. The world was no longer 
separated into civilized and barbarian states. Rather, nations were designated as either First or 
Third World, replicating the core-periphery international order established by the standard of 
civilization. Civilized states kept their ideology, but used different labels. There was, and still 
exists, a rhetorical gap between First and Third World. States labeled Third World were still less 
developed and lagged behind First World nations in terms of technology, military power, and 
other key indicators of prosperity. While former colonial powers no longer sought direct control 
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over Third World nations, they still felt the white man’s burden, manifesting in the need to help 
the Third World develop. As political theorists Buzan and Lawson stated, “The colonial 
obligation of the metropolitan powers to ‘uplift’ the natives morphed into an obligation on the 
part of the rich world to ‘assist’ in the ‘development’ and ‘modernization’ of the ‘Third 
World.’”22 Such a desire was couched in the rhetoric of human rights, as the First World believed 
it was a human right to have adequate nutrition, clean water, shelter, and education. By 
examining the downfall of civilization as an ideograph, it becomes apparent McKinley’s pairing 
of civilization and humanity together was a precursor to the First World’s discourse on humanity 
and human rights decades before the rest of the world.  
Citizen-Soldiers and the Rise of the National Guard 
McKinley’s rhetoric of citizenship focused on uniting the country against Spain and, 
more importantly, healing the regional divide highlighted by the lingering North/South division. 
This sentiment was short lived, not because McKinley failed but because he was successful. 
Delivering his “First Annual Message,” mere months after McKinley’s death, Teddy Roosevelt 
remarked about the Spanish-American War veterans, 
No other citizens deserve so well of the Republic as the veterans, the survivors of 
those who saved the Union. They did the one deed which if left undone would 
have meant that all else in our history went for nothing. But for their steadfast 
prowess in the greatest crisis of our history, all our annals would be meaningless, 
and our great experiment in popular freedom and self-government a gloomy 
failure. Moreover, they not only left us a united Nation, but they left us also as a 
heritage the memory of the mighty deeds by which the Nation was kept united. 
We are now indeed one Nation, one in fact as well as in name; we are united in 
our devotion to the flag which is the symbol of national greatness and unity; and 
the very completeness of our union enables us all, in every part of the country, to 
glory in the valor shown alike by the sons of the North and the sons of the South 
in the times that tried men's souls.23 
 
Not only does Roosevelt echo McKinley’s rhetoric of unity, he also employed McKinley’s 
symbolism of the flag, recognizing the unity between the North and South. McKinley’s 
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successful reunion of the nation allowed, and necessitated, a rhetorical shift of American 
citizenship by his successors. Roosevelt focused his attention on what made a good citizen and 
how one becomes a good citizen. The biggest concern in Roosevelt’s first term was addressing 
the wave of immigrants entering the country and naturalizing new immigrants into America’s 
culture. The use of the citizen-soldier was rare during both Roosevelt and Taft’s administrations, 
as the United States was not at war. However, there were some brief instances of its use that 
indicated major changes in U.S. society.  
In his “First Annual Message,” Roosevelt connected civilization’s spread with 
McKinley’s belief in the citizen-soldier. Speaking about the Army’s potential as a positive force 
in the world, Roosevelt stated, “In the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico it has proved itself a 
great constructive force, a most potent implement for the upbuilding of a peaceful civilization.”24 
Roosevelt redefined the Army’s role, transforming it from solely a fighting force to a 
multipurpose tool. The Army could be employed on humanitarian missions bringing elements of 
civilization with them. In this regard, citizen-soldiers were representatives of the United States, 
modeling the traits of republican citizenship for others to learn. While this is a minor shift 
rhetorically, it indicated an expansion of the military’s role in foreign policy. As the United 
States entered more foreign wars, U.S. soldiers were called upon more often. Larger and more 
expansive wars expanded their duties, including the occupation of territory, defending American 
ideals, rebuilding warn torn cities, towns, and states after wars, and bringing relief to those in 
need after natural disasters. These increased duties also represented America’s commitment to 
bringing civilization to all peoples of the world on what could now be termed humanitarian 
missions. Such a combination indicated American troops were not solely a fighting force, but 
also a moral force acting to create a better world.  
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 By Roosevelt’s “Eighth Annual Message,” a new threat to American unity was on the 
horizon, class consciousness. Similar to regionalism during McKinley’s presidency, class 
consciousness and economic stratification endangered American unity. Income inequality 
threatened to subvert citizens’ loyalty to the country by placing loyalty to their class over 
country. Roosevelt praised all Americans for their refusal to give into such divisive tendencies, 
following in McKinley’s footsteps by appealing to Americans’ patriotism. Echoing McKinley, 
Roosevelt stated, “they repudiated the effort to get them to cast their votes in response to an 
appeal to class hatred, have emphasized their sound patriotism and Americanism.”25 Such 
patriotism, according to Roosevelt, was “acting simply as good citizens, as good Americans, 
without regard to fancied--and improper--class interests.” He concluded, “Such an attitude is an 
object-lesson in good citizenship to the entire nation.”26 Patriotism was used both by McKinley 
and Roosevelt to unite Americans threatened by division. Roosevelt’s borrowed McKinley’s 
patriotic theme, defining a good citizen in terms of their patriotism.  
 Roosevelt’s appeals to the citizen-soldier were sparse, but the symbol had some residual 
potency during Taft’s presidency. After McKinley, returning Spanish-American War veterans 
and male citizens thought of themselves as citizen-soldiers. Returning volunteers could either 
serve in their local state guard or militia or the U.S. Army. The army was not an option for many 
Americans, as the U.S. still maintained a small standing force. However, citizens could express 
their patriotism by serving in the local guard or militia. A lasting effect of America’s acquisition 
of overseas territory and continued search for markets was more and more money, material, and 
men were required to maintain it. The problem was America’s citizen-soldiers, as members of 
the local or state guard, were not under federal jurisdiction and could not serve overseas. In 
1903, U.S. Secretary of War Elihu Root and Charles Dick, a Republican congressman from 
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Ohio, pushed through the Dick Act, establishing the National Guard in its modern form. The 
Federal government allocated money for state forces, in the form of training and equipment, 
making them subject to inspection and supervision by the army.27 By 1912, Taft recognized that 
providing just equipment and training was not enough, as these units were still state 
organizations and could serve overseas. In his “Fourth Annual Message,” he echoed McKinley’s 
citizen-soldier trope. Taft claimed, “The officers and men are ambitious and eager to make 
themselves thus available and to become an efficient national reserve of citizen soldiery.”28 The 
problem was not the citizen-soldier, but the limits placed on his service. Taft’s rhetorical effort in 
his “Fourth Annual Message” was reminiscent of McKinley’s discourse, as it assuaged any fear 
of a strong federal military by employing the term citizen-soldier and militia. Such symbolism 
reinforced the benign nature of this increased federal power, while expanding America’s military 
capabilities. Taft favored a new bill, supported by the War Department and representatives of the 
National Guard, that paid the National Guard from the U.S. Treasury. Passing this bill, according 
to Taft, provided the U.S. “with a first line of citizen soldiery, upon which its main reliance must 
depend in case of any national emergency.”29 Taft’s presidency ended before any such legislation 
was passed, but in 1916 Wilson signed the National Defense Act, requiring individuals to swear 
an oath of allegiance to both their state and federal government. This allowed either the governor 
or president to call up the national guard, permitting them to serve in America’s wars overseas. 
The citizen-soldier was no longer just a volunteer in a time of crisis or a member of the local 
militia; rather, he became a symbol of national defense, outfitted with equipment and training 





American Interventionism: Banana Republics in Latin America 
 Perhaps, no area of foreign policy under McKinley changed as drastically as America’s 
willingness to use military force overseas to secure its interests. McKinley declared war against 
Spain, but more importantly, he ordered American soldiers to intervene in China to maintain 
America’s economic privileges. McKinley was even willing to go as far as establishing a naval 
base off the coast of China. After the election of 1900, McKinley asked his ambassador to China, 
Edwin Conger, to investigate the possibility of an American base at Samsah Bay, in the Fukien 
Province. The Japanese, who had already begun to spread their influence in the province, advised 
the administration that this was a poor decision which they did not approve. The matter was 
closed.30 Nonetheless, McKinley’s five years in office set a policy precedent favoring 
interventionism. A shift in rhetoric accompanied McKinley’s change in policy. 
 McKinley’s rhetoric still employed American exceptionalism, except he now favored an 
interventionist interpretation of the rhetorical trope. McKinley argued the nation could not 
become an imperial power because it was inherently different from other nations. This unique 
American character permitted the U.S. to be active overseas, while not falling prey to the 
imperialist tendencies of European powers. Throughout his Midwestern tours, McKinley praised 
interventionism and expansion overseas, restructuring American history to make America an 
expansionist nation from its founding. His new policy appeared to be a natural continuation of 
U.S. policy and history. McKinley’s rhetorical shift was subtler, than his successor, as he did not 
give a major speech announcing a new foreign policy doctrine, the proverbial McKinley 
Doctrine. Rather, McKinley’s rhetoric evolved over time from his inauguration in 1897 to his 
last speech in 1901, adapting to the changing global context. McKinley, always reluctant to use 
military force, was more reluctant and cautious in intervening overseas than his successors. War 
180 
 
or intervention for McKinley was a last resort. However, once McKinley set the precedent for 
intervention, he could not undo it. 
In the Pacific, American forces fought the Filipinos until 1902, with the U.S. suffering 
4,000 deaths and 2,800 wounded. The Filipinos by contrast, according to U.S. estimates, suffered 
20,000 killed in action and up to as many as 200,000 civilians killed from war-related deaths.31 
In the Caribbean, U.S. marines landed no fewer than twenty times between 1898 and 1920, with 
a majority of these occurring after McKinley.32 Such interventions by the United States were 
justified by American presidents as acts benefiting all humankind. According to Roosevelt in his 
“First Annual Message,” interventions were “a most regrettable but necessary international 
police duty which must be performed for the sake of the welfare of mankind.”33 By 1903, 
Roosevelt was acting on his words. When Panamanian rebels revolted against Colombian 
authorities, Roosevelt sent a small fleet to prevent Colombia from ending the rebellion, violating 
the 1846 pact with Colombia giving them sovereignty in the region. Hay, still Secretary of State, 
negotiated the Bunau-Varilla treaty giving Panama $10 million and $250,000 annually for a ten-
mile-wide strip of land for the Panama Canal.34 A little over a year later, Roosevelt continued to 
expand on McKinley’s policy of interventionism by declaring the Roosevelt Corollary to the 
Monroe Doctrine. 
 Roosevelt announced his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in his “Fourth Annual 
Message.” He began by reinforcing a common American foreign policy theme of desiring no 
further territorial expansion. Instead, Roosevelt stated his desire for a peaceful, orderly, and 
prosperous relationship with America’s neighbors. Like McKinley, Roosevelt grounded his 
intervention in historical precedent, the Monroe Doctrine. In another rhetorical move, Roosevelt 
imitated Hay and McKinley’s ambiguous definition of America’s interests overseas. Roosevelt 
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never defined how nations were to be decent in social and political matters. Rather, he focused 
and emphasized the consequences of being a bad neighbor. Roosevelt warned, “Chronic 
wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, 
may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in 
the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force 
the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the 
exercise of an international police power.”35 What remained unclear was the circumstances that 
would provoke American intervention. However, Roosevelt left little doubt the United States 
would use force to protect its interests. Following McKinley’s trajectory, Roosevelt defined the 
U.S. as an interventionist nation. 
Furthermore, Roosevelt continued to increase America’s global presence by offering 
support for those seeking freedom. While Ulysses S. Grant and Rutherford B. Hayes failed to 
persuade the country of this position, McKinley had succeeded. Building off McKinley’s 
successful interventionism, Roosevelt stated, “It is a mere truism to say that every nation, 
whether in America or anywhere else, which desires to maintain its freedom, its independence, 
must ultimately realize that the right of such independence can not be separated from the 
responsibility of making good use of it.”36 Roosevelt continued McKinley’s trajectory by 
defining interventionism abroad as a policy in America’s best interest. The United States had a 
duty to uphold civilization under McKinley, they now had a responsibility to aid nations 
threatened by tyranny.  
While Roosevelt continued McKinley’s rhetorical legacy, albeit with major stylistic 
differences, Taft’s foreign policy rhetoric deviated significantly. To begin, unlike McKinley and 
Roosevelt, Taft “cared little about managing news releases, saw few reporters, withheld 
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information, and took the position that the public had little right to be informed.”37 Taft allowed 
a hostile New York congressman to label his foreign policy “dollar diplomacy,” without 
realizing the negative connections this label associated with Wall Street’s exploitation of average 
Americans. Throughout Taft’s presidency, constant unrest in Nicaragua required American 
troops to bring order. In Honduras, an expedition of U.S. investors, led by Sam Zemurray and 
backed by the United Fruit company, took effective control over Honduras’ custom house, 
creating the prototypical banana republic.38 In China, Taft and his Secretary of State Philander C. 
Knox defended the open door. However, more upheaval in China and the decline of the Qing 
government impinged on America’s already dwindling trade with the country. Taft’s actual 
policies did not deviate significantly, but he cared little about using rhetoric to defend his 
policies. Whereas Roosevelt followed McKinley’s meticulous attention to rhetoric, Taft allowed 
those outside his administration to frame the debate. He did not attend to the rhetorical defense 
of his policies in the same manner as his predecessors. 
Setting the Discursive Boundaries of the Twentieth Century 
 By expanding presidential power through rhetoric, McKinley maximized the 
transformative nature of the context to redefine the nation. McKinley’s rhetoric set a precedent 
for his successors to follow but he also set some discursive boundaries that were not challenged 
throughout the century, becoming accepted norms. The roots of America’s moralistic 
interventionism and the military industrial complex originate from this era. I explore the roots of 
these two ideas and how McKinley’s three rhetorical moves worked together to support his 
policy. 
 McKinley’s three rhetorical strategies examined here worked together, reinforcing the 
morality of America’s interventionism overseas. Past presidential appeals to civilization focused 
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on Americans settling the continent, bringing civilization with them the further west they went. 
Civilization typically referred to the lands on the American continent. Post-Civil War presidents, 
especially Grant and Hayes, attempted to expand the contextual and ideological meaning of 
civilization to encompass the globe but their appeals fell flat. During the post-Civil War era, 
civilization’s meaning expanded to include the Western hemisphere, but global concerns and the 
larger precepts of civilization were not part of America’s purview. The United States focused on 
becoming the hegemon of the Western hemisphere. With European powers concentrated on 
colonies in Asia, Africa, and the Indian subcontinent, the United States had nearly free reign in 
North and South America. More territory was not the priority of the United States, as it already 
controlled a vast continent that was resource rich.39 Rather, the United States focused on 
increasing its exports and economic influence in the region.40  At the first Pan-American 
Conference, measures for keeping the peace and promoting trade in the hemisphere were created. 
Specifically, according to historian Walter LaFeber, “an arbitration convention to help settle 
disputes, a recommendation to build a railroad connecting North and South America, and the 
establishment of the Commercial Bureau of American Republics (or the Pan American 
Union).”41 The U.S. had become the dominant power in the Western hemisphere. The U.S. 
focused on establishing and protecting civilization in the Americas, yet more was required of the 
country.  
In his rhetoric surrounding the Spanish-American War and its settlement, McKinley 
employed civilization as an ideograph to frame the contest as a worldwide moral battle between 
right and wrong, expanding the contextual frame of civilization to include the world. If the 
United States wanted to consider itself among the civilized nations of the world, it needed to 
adopt the rhetoric of civilization and accept the responsibilities of being a great power. The 
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United States could no longer remain isolated and uninvolved in world affairs. By employing 
civilization, McKinley socialized the United States into the international system. As a civilized 
nation, the U.S. worked with other great powers to fend off threats to peace from uncivilized 
states. How the United States and future presidents thought about America’s place in the world 
traced back to McKinley’s rhetoric. The emergence of the United States as a world actor was a 
consequence of the Spanish-American War, with McKinley being the first president to articulate 
America’s role on the world stage as a great power. The United States would be a moral actor 
with a global purview, supporting and intervening in uncivilized states around the globe when 
their actions threatened American values or interests.  
While civilization presupposed a moral purpose, a more explicit appeal was needed to 
persuade Americans of fighting overseas. Writing on American culture, Samuel Huntington 
concluded, “Since liberalism deprecates the moral validity of the interests of the state in security, 
war must be either condemned as incompatible with liberal goals or justified as an ideological 
movement in support of those goals.”42 For the first century of America’s existence, the United 
States shied away from sending Americans overseas to fight. The United States was a peaceful 
republic, standing as a beacon of freedom for other nations to imitate. America only fought in 
wars on the continent, defending the republic from external—England and Mexico—or internal 
threats—the Confederacy. Wars overseas were simply incompatible with American liberal 
ideology. American wars prior to 1898 were still framed as moral wars, as the country was 
defending itself, but foreign wars represented a failure to heed Washington’s “Farewell 
Address.” As anti-imperialists argued in 1898, American intervention on foreign soil represented 
a moral failing, a sin the country could not comeback from. However, McKinley used an 
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interventionist definition of American exceptionalism to support liberal goals and expand 
America’s role in the world. 
American exceptionalism always presupposed American values to be universal values 
that appealed to all people. No matter the race, creed, or culture American values would attract 
people. By being a city upon a hill, Americans demonstrated their superiority in hopes of 
persuading others to adopt these values. However, the Cuban situation represented a problem. 
Only ninety miles from the United States, Cuba was embroiled in a decades long conflict with 
Spain. Not only was the conflict a repudiation of civilized principles, it was also confounding 
how a nation so close to the United States could fail to adopt its values. Such a failure called into 
question exemplarism as a strategy of spreading American values. Thus, McKinley’s turn toward 
interventionism as a new strategy to spread American values was his answer to this problem. The 
United States would intervene overseas to not only curb uncivilized threats, but to spread 
American values. McKinley could continue to employ exceptionalism’s moral rhetoric of God’s 
chosen people, but now he could also send troops into Cuba. In McKinley’s rhetoric, the United 
States had always been an expansionist power, willing to help those yearning to be like 
Americans throughout its history. Furthermore, being God’s chosen people made the United 
States uniquely different from imperialist European powers. Rather than conquering and 
controlling territory for territorial expansion, the United States intervened for moral reasons. 
American intervention made the world safe for American values and helped peoples around the 
world become more like Americans. McKinley’s interpretation of American exceptionalism 
reframed its interpretation for future presidents.  
As McKinley expanded the context of America’s role and its preferred strategy for 
achieving its goals, he needed to prepare American citizens for their new role in the world. He 
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did this by emphasizing the unity and patriotic spirit of the citizenry in the face of uncivilized 
threats to America’s global objectives. To fend off these threats, McKinley called upon all male 
citizens to see themselves as citizen-soldiers, ready and willing to defend the republic and its 
values when the president called. McKinley’s American embodied the traits of an exemplarist 
citizen—patriotic, unified, and the best and the brightest the nation had to offer—but also 
included a willingness to sacrifice for the country and fight overseas to protect American 
interests. As citizens would be fighting overseas more often, they needed to blend the best traits 
of exemplarism with the willingness to intervene. Each citizen-soldier had to embody the 
principles of the United States, as their actions overseas served as examples for uncivilized 
people to imitate.  
Furthermore, McKinley’s emphasis on the citizen-soldier laid the groundwork for a slow 
militarization of the country. For many decades, the military and standing army were seen as a 
threat to the republic. Historian James Wood, stated, “Standing armies represented a threat to 
individual liberty, that military service was a duty and responsibility of all citizens, and upon an 
exaggerated faith in the military capabilities of American manhood.”43 Prior to the Civil War, the 
American military was the antithesis of the freedom loving citizen-soldier. Observers of the 
American military noted, often disdainfully, “that the army’s ranks were well populated by 
foreigners—men stereotypically presumed to more suited to a life of military subordination than 
independent-minded, freedom-loving Americans.”44 A British observer described “the United 
States’ peacetime military force as the ‘scum of the population of the older states . . . worthless 
German, English, or Irish emigrants.”45 The United States military was a place for immigrants 
and other undesirable male individuals of U.S. society. It did not reflect the values many 
Americans sought in an ideal citizen. Thus, McKinley’s use of the citizen-soldier trope helped 
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reshape American’s perspective on military service. As Ricardo Herrera explained, “Men 
capable of governing their passions and conquering their weakness were more virtuous and, 
therefore, better citizens. By conquering and controlling their passions voluntarily, instead of 
through compulsion, these soldiers further reinforced their republican identity.”46 With 
America’s increased interventionism overseas, a larger army was needed, slowly normalizing a 
larger military. 
From McKinley to Taft, citizen-soldiers went from serving the state to the federal 
government. As described above, the National Guard had been reorganized and was now 
equipped with gear and training provided by the federal government. National guard members 
signed oaths to both their state government and the federal government. They could be called up 
to serve by the president. While the National Guard was not part of the U.S. Army, refraining 
from a strong centralized military buildup many Americans still feared, its incorporation under 
the federal government enhanced America’s military potential. The president’s power also 
increased, as he now had a larger military reserve force to use in emergencies or to call up to 
protect America’s interests overseas. Such power meant that presidents no longer needed to rely 
solely on American diplomatic maneuvering to solve problems but could rely on a trained 
military force if needed. As the decades passed in the twentieth century, American presidents 
would rely on these citizen-soldiers to answer their call to defend the country in many conflicts 
spanning the globe and to aid millions in humanitarian need. Being a soldier in the army or 
National Guard was no longer perceived as being an outcast or lower tier citizen but as a 
patriotic protector of American values. The army was no longer a threat to the nation but a key 
protector of the country. The army’s transformation from a threat to protector of liberty began 
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with McKinley’s rhetoric during the Spanish-American War, beginning the change of how 
Americans viewed soldiers and the military’s role in U.S. society. 
Finally, the three rhetorical moves undertaken by McKinley worked together to transform 
American foreign policy. Without one move, the other two would have faltered. Civilization 
brought with it an expanded set of responsibilities for the U.S., engaging it in the world, not just 
on the continent or in the hemisphere. By adopting a rhetoric of civilization and the standard of 
civilization, McKinley socialized the U.S. into the international system as a great power. 
Civilization helped frame the larger debate surrounding interventionism overseas as a clash of 
good verse evil, us verse them, and acted as a moral warrant for U.S. action overseas. 
Civilization’s expanded context was closely related to McKinley’s reinterpretation of American 
exceptionalism. The U.S., according to McKinley, had always been an expansionist power and 
American expansion and action in the world was a positive force. As God’s chosen people, the 
United States was the only country who could remake the world without falling prey to 
imperialism and the dangers associated with intervention. Civilization and interventionism 
metonymized larger geopolitical issues to a simple persuasive appeal: the United States was 
fundamentally different from other nations, and to bring order, civilization, and American values 
it needed to act in the world. However, without a capable citizenry, who saw themselves as 
active participants in this new global mission, McKinley’s vision would have stumbled, if not 
failed altogether. A nation that was deeply divided by regional and cultural issues could have 
undermined McKinley’s vision. However, his rhetorical appeals to unity and patriotism helped 
heal the divided nation. His use of the citizen-soldier rhetorical trope reimagined American men 
into defenders of the republic and civilization. McKinley’s three rhetorical moves reinforced 
each other, strengthening his persuasive appeal. 
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The Rhetorical Presidency 
While not the main focus of this dissertation, McKinley’s increased rhetorical output, 
concentration on policy, and emphasis on persuading Americans to accept his definitions of 
citizenship and country has implications for our understanding of the rhetorical presidency. 
Jeffery Tulis’ The Rhetorical Presidency included only a few brief sentences and one full 
paragraph discussing McKinley. Tulis described McKinley as pushing the limits of nineteenth 
century presidential rhetorical practices, appearing “quite often” in public, but nevertheless 
McKinley was rhetorically unspectacular.47 Extending his criticism even further, Tulis accused 
McKinley of failing to address the public on any important policy issues of his administration: 
However, the speeches emerged as general discussions of the requisites of 
prosperity and make no mention of pending bills or treaties. There is no speech 
that even alludes to the Spanish-American War, the sinking of the Maine, the 
problem of “Jim Crow” laws, or the United States policy toward the Philippines, 
all major issues faced by McKinley. Indeed, much of McKinley’s rhetoric was 
characteristic of the century as a whole: expressions of greeting, inculcations of 
patriotic sentiment, attempts at building ‘harmony’ among the regions of the 
country, and very general, principled statements of policy, usually expressed in 
terms of the policy’s consistency with that president’s understanding of 
republicanism.48  
 
In 2007, Tulis revised his assessment of McKinley. Concerning McKinley’s lack of speeches on 
public-policy, he wrote, “I was simply wrong. McKinley specifically mentioned the very issues I 
claimed he ignored.”49 However, his overall assessment remained the same as his original 
conclusion. McKinley “pushed against the boundaries of the nineteenth-century constitutional 
order, but not beyond it.”50 Tulis maintained his insistence that the rhetorical presidency began 
with Wilson, but my examination of McKinley’s rhetoric has implications for this claim.  
  While Tulis described McKinley as rhetorically unspectacular, he failed to see the 
importance of McKinley giving more speeches than past presidents. Not all presidential rhetoric 
is transcendent and inspiring, and can border on the banal at times. However, Vanessa Beasley 
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observed, even the most ordinary speech serves an “important social function by promoting a 
sense of enduring democratic unity in the United States.”51 McKinley’s rhetoric may not have 
always been groundbreaking or moving, but his mere presence and the repetition of his definition 
of a unified nation were rhetorically significant as he traveled the country. McKinley’s speeches 
represent the necessary, if not sometimes tedious, rhetorical work needed to maintain a coherent 
American national identity. As a symbol of national unity, presidents are responsible for holding 
the nation together and reminding its citizens of their common bond. To do this, McKinley 
became more rhetorically active throughout his presidency. He continually referenced 
Americans’ shared beliefs, reinforcing their commonality and unity as a people. 
Furthermore, McKinley’s extensive travel as president ensured more people heard and 
saw him, than past presidents. This allowed ordinary Americans to hear the president and his 
message for themselves, taking in the moment and being part of the rhetorical act of being 
American. During his presidency, McKinley traveled the Midwest twice, in 1898 and 1899, and 
toured Texas, New Mexico, and Los Angles in 1901, making McKinley the most traveled 
president in American history up to that point. In his second term, McKinley had larger plans for 
traveling and speaking. He desired to travel to Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and Cuba. If he would have 
lived to make these trips, he would have been the first president, in the presidential role, to travel 
outside the continental United States while in office.52 McKinley’s decision to travel and his 
increased rhetorical output, set a precedent for future presidents to follow that Tulis 
underappreciated. Modern presidents are not only expected to travel the country, but overseas as 
well. They are often expected to travel overseas within the first few months of their presidency, 
with Americans and foreigners alike critiquing their performance. Teddy Roosevelt observing 
McKinley’s increased travel schedule undertook a speaking tour of California in 1903, and 
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became the first president to travel abroad, heading to Panama in 1906. Taft went to Panama and 
Mexico, and Woodrow Wilson traveled extensively at home and abroad as president. 
McKinley’s increased travel helped break the characterization of a president operating solely 
from Washington, allowing his successors to travel the country and world with their rhetoric 
reaching millions.  
At the heart of Tulis’ argument are the twin propositions that the president goes over the 
heads of Congress using rhetoric to promote policies to the American people and the president 
has become the unquestioned popular leader of the country, changing the institution of the 
presidency and American politics in general. McKinley traveled outside of Washington often, 
going directly to the American people to support his foreign policy initiatives and to reimagine 
Americans as a united people. If citizens could not see McKinley on his tour, his personal 
assistant George Cortelyou made sure his speeches were sent to all major press services and 
newspapers across the nation.53 McKinley used rhetoric as a tool to persuade the American 
public of three important ideas. First, the United States went to war with Spain over ideological 
differences, underpinned by the concepts of civilization and humanity, demonstrating a 
consistent moral theme to American foreign policy. Second, the divide between regions could 
not continue, as it was a threat to the nation. McKinley reminded Americans of their unity based 
on their shared beliefs. Third, interventionism and American action in the world was a natural 
evolution of the country’s history. As a great power, the U.S. had a duty to be an active 
participant in shaping the international system. Examining these arguments and his travel 
schedule offers a solid case that McKinley, at the very least, began in earnest the transformation 
of the presidency as an institution. McKinley strengthened his popularity with most Americans 
and the powers of presidency as an institution through his rhetorical practices. 
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Before concluding, I want to briefly speculate on why McKinley was able to increase his 
rhetorical footprint. First, the end of the nineteenth century saw a culmination of technology that 
made it possible for McKinley to travel longer and over greater distances, while staying in 
contact with Washington. The telegraph, and eventually the telephone, made it possible for the 
president to constantly monitor what was going on while being away. Improvements in rail 
technology allowed McKinley to steam across the country, completing trips in days compared to 
weeks or even months. Second, foreign affairs were a primary focus of the McKinley 
administration. Interventionism in foreign policy required more of an explanation to the public, 
than maintaining an exemplarist policy. Furthermore, most Americans are poorly informed about 
foreign affairs, affording presidents an opportunity to bring a foreign policy issue to the public’s 
attention. With their increased knowledge about foreign affairs and a successful foreign policy, 
an increased rhetorical footprint would help presidents appear more presidential and increase 
their ethos.54 Thus, McKinley’s decision to speak about his success was in his best interest. 
Third, the prophets of evil and isolationists arguing against an interventionist foreign policy 
required a rhetorical response. McKinley needed to persuade Americans that an active United 
States was in the country’s best interest. He was changing a hundred-year tradition that most 
Americans assumed would not change. To do this, the president needed to be active and speak 
more often to citizens. Taken together, these reasons factored into McKinley’s increased 
rhetorical activity. 
Conclusion 
Evaluating the McKinley administration, historian George Herring stated, “The War of 
1898 reinforced Americans’ sense of their rising greatness and reaffirmed their traditional 
convictions of national destiny. It sealed the post-Civil War reconciliation of the Union.”55 
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McKinley rhetoric was an important factor in garnering public support for territorial expansion 
and domestic unification. When McKinley spoke, the people believed he spoke for them. For 
example, in Clinton, Illinois in 1898, McKinley stated, “Your voice, when constitutionally 
expressed, is commanding and conclusive. It is the mandate of law. It is the law to Congress and 
to the Executive.”56 Here, he demonstrated his rhetorical strength and the trust of the people in 
his presidency.  
Most importantly, McKinley’s rhetoric stands as a reminder to scholars to pay attention 
to key transitional moments in history. These unique contextual moments offer presidents the 
opportunity to redefine and reconstruct the nation in ways that have been overlooked in 
presidential rhetoric. As a field, we have examined a lot of these moments. However, there are 
still many more that remain unexamined. This project was just one study attempting to shed 
some light on these key rhetorical and historical moments. McKinley was not always stylistically 
impressive, but he understood his audience. He knew how to transform his policies into terms 
familiar to the public, making his policies appear to be an expression of the public’s will. He 
used rhetoric to persuade the American people and to provide a sense of calmness and stability in 
the face of extraordinary change in the nation and world. Biographer, Wayne Morgan, described 
his presidency thusly, “The years of his presidency were transitional. He stood not as the last old-
fashioned chief executive nor as the first modern one, but as something in between, trying 
through his policies of conservative conciliation to ease his country and his people into the new 
position their responsibilities demanded.”57 McKinley’s rhetoric, like his presidency, was not 
wholly part of a past bygone era or of a new modern one but an important transitional point for 
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